Appeal Brief for the Case: Crane v Summers

Appellant’s Statement of The Case 

Mrs. Cranes filled a complaint against Summers alleging that while Summers was driving along the road, he recklessly and negligently caused the death of her granddaughter. The complaint alleged that Summers was negligent in his driving hence the accident. The complaint further alleged that the plaintiff had suffered emotional distress as she witnessed the death of her grandchild which happened right in front of her. 

Upon hearing both sides, the court found that the defendant had indeed negligently inflicted emotional distress to the plaintiff. The court arrived at this conclusion upon being satisfied that the plaintiff had discharged her burden and proved to the court’s satisfaction the bystander test. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff. The plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages for the medical expenses as well as damage for pain and suffering. 

Questions presented on appeal 

a. Did the trial court err in ruling that the plaintiff had a close relationship with the victim? 

b. Did the trial court err in finding that the plaintiff was in close proximity to the scene of the accident and that the emotional shock was the sensory and the contemporaneous result of the accident? 

Appellant’s Statement of Facts 

Michael Gold, a businessman, and his wife Sarah held a reception on their back lawn. The two hired an outside caterer to provide food and refreshments to the guests. Summers was one of the guests at the reception. The bartenders hired by the cater for the event were instructed alcohol only to adults, and if they noticed that anyone was too drunk, they were not to serve such a person. At the event, guests were served wine which was placed on the dining table. The adults were expected to control how much alcohol they were to consume because there was no way of the bartenders to do it since it was available at the dining table and the open bar. 

After the event, Joey Summers, the defendant and now the appellant, having consumed a considerable amount of alcohol, went driving. The car took a corner too fast losing control veering off the road onto the yard of a home belonging to Mrs. Crane, herein, the respondent. Helen Crane, the grandchild of the respondent, was playing on the lawn. 

The car slid into the child, killing her instantly. The car continued sliding towards the respondent, who was about 30 feet away from the point of contact of the car and her grandchild. She was however not in the line of the vehicle. Fearing for her life and the accident she had just witnessed, she went into hysteria. At no point was she in any actual danger. She is still undergoing treatment for her alleged trauma. 

Appellant’s Summary of arguments 

The Respondent does not fall within the immediate family category that is required for liability for the defendant to arise. The immediate family is limited to consanguinity for which the respondent is not. At the time of the accident she was not within the danger zone and as such she was not under any peril and for the same reason, she is not entitled to recover within the circumstances of this case. 

Arguments 

1. THE COURT OF THE STATE OF MERCY IN DEFINING A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A VICTIM AND THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE PURPOSE OF A NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ACTION SHOULD LIMIT THE RELATIONSHIP TO THE FIRST LEVEL OF CONSANGUINITY 

It is undeniable that the defendant, as a driver owes a duty of care to other. In determining whether the defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff, the foreseeability test must be applied. What is considered foreseeable however must be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis. The obligation of the defendant cannot be fixed. Case law has provided some general guidelines for assessing the degree of duty owed and foreseeability of harm. In a case where a plaintiff suffers shock or psychological injury as a result of physical injury or death to a third person, the criterion presented in Dillion v Legg (Dillon v Legg, 1963) should be adopted. The particular requirement that is relevant in this instance is the consideration of whether the plaintiff and the victim were closely related. 

For the plaintiff to recover in this case, she must demonstrate that she is immediate family to the victim. The case of Trombetta v Cockling and others (Trombetta v Cockling, 1993) defined what immediate family is. In the case, a niece of the victim was denied recovery even after showing that a strong bond existed between them. The effect of this is that it limits the definition of immediate family to the first level of consanguinity. We ask this court to adopt the same interpretation in which case a grandmother is not a consanguine relative in which case then the plaintiff and the respondent herein is precluded from recovery. 

The definition of immediate family should not be expanded for public policy reasons as was stated in James v Lieb, 221 Neb.47, 375 N.W. 2d 109. Expansion of duty must be done with extreme care, for legal duty imposes legal liability. This court has a responsibility of defining the orbits of duty by precedence and justified public policy for reasonable and practical implications. To limit the number of bystander claims that could be imposed on defendants is to prevent the proliferation of such claims that would require the courts to delve into assessing an enormous range and array of emotional ties. 

Beyond the practical difficulties, there must be a limit to attaining essential justice in this regard. While it may seem that there is a need for there to be a remedy for every wrong, this ideal is limited by reality. Every injury has consequences without end like the rippling of water. Law must limit the legal consequences of wrongs to certain realistic degrees. The decision of the lower court should be overturned because it has opened up the potential for frivolous cases coming up. The court of appeal decisions is bidding on the lower court under the principle of precedence. The decision of the court in this matter should produce good law by limiting the definition of immediate family. 

2. THE COURT IN DEFINING ‘CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT’ FOR PURPOSES OF A NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ACTION SHOULD LIMIT THE ZONE OF LIABILITY TO A ZONE OF DANGER WHERE THE PLAINTIFF NEEDS TO BE IN PERIL 

The plaintiff may recover damages for emotional pain as a result of their reaction to injuries to the victim caused by the negligence of the defendant. The sole limiting condition is that the ‘Palsgraf Principle’ be satisfied: that the plaintiff is within the zone of danger of personal injury caused by the alleged negligent driving of the defendant which resulted in the death of the victim, this was held in Bovsun v Sanperi (Bovsun v Sanperi, 1984). 

The plaintiff must have been exposed to the risks as well. In this case, the plaintiff was far from the path of the sliding car and was not under any risk herself. For this reason, she is not entitled to recover, and the decision of the lower court should be quashed. The liability zone should be not be expanded to preserve the sanctity of the court process. 

Conclusion 

It is the appellant’s submission that the respondent failed to discharge their burden of proof to show that she can be considered to be in a close relationship with the victim and that she was in close proximity to the accident. It is for this and the preceding reasons that the respondent respectfully asks that the decision of the Common Court of the State of Mercy be reversed. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF MERCY 

CRANE, Plaintiff, and Respondent 

V 

SUMMERS, Defendant, and Appellant 

Appeal from a Judgement 

Of the Common Court of the State of Mercy, 2nd District 

RESPONDENT’S OPENING BRIEF 

Table of Contents 

Statement of the Case…………………………………………………………………….…….12 

Statement of Facts………………………………………………………………………………12 

Summary of Arguments…………………………………………………………………..….…..13 

Arguments………………………………………………………………………..………………13 

1. THE COURT IN DEFINING A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE VICTIM AND THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE OF A NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ACTION SHOULD ADOPT A BROADER REQUIREMENT THAT THERE BE A MARITAL OR INTIMATE FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIP……………………………..………….………………………………13 

2. THE COURT IN DEFINING ‘CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT’ FOR PURPOSES OF A NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS SHOULD BE ALLOWED A BROADER DEFINITION OF ZONE OF DANGER………………… ………………………………………….14 

Conclusion………………………………………………………………...………………..……14 

Respondent’s Statement of the Case 

The issue surrounding this case is whether the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff, herein the Respondent had a close relationship with the victim and whether at the time of the accident she can be said to have been in close proximity to the scene and that the resulting emotional distress was the direct consequence of the accident. 

The trial court measured the evidence before it against the criteria provided in Dillon v Legg (1963) which generated a three step criteria for the bystander test. That is: 

The plaintiff must have a close relationship with the victim 

The plaintiff must be in close proximity to the accident and 

The emotional shock has to be the “sensory and the contemporaneous result” of the accident. 

Upon satisfaction that the plaintiff had discharged its burden, the court ruled for the plaintiff. A judgment for the plaintiff was entered. The plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages for the medical expenses incurred and damages for pain and suffering. This Court should affirm the decision of the trial court. 

Respondent’s Statement of facts 

On the particular day in question, the respondent was at home looking over her granddaughter, the victim. During the afternoon hours, her granddaughter was playing on the lawn as she watched a few yards away. The appellant then appeared, driving at high speed around a corner losing control as a result and sliding into the victim killing her instantly. The car continued sliding in the direction of the respondent, who fearing for her life and having witnessed her grandchild being killed right in front of her eyes went into hysteria. She was hospitalized and is still under medication for the trauma she suffered. 

She later learned that the appellant had been to an event within the neighborhood where he had consumed a substantial amount of alcohol. The appellant was driving under the influence of alcohol which impaired his judgment. He put other people in danger by being behind the wheels in such a state and as a result caused the death of the victim which resulted in emotional trauma for the respondent herein. 

Respondent’s Summary of Arguments 

The respondent maintains that she witnessed the horrific accident which claimed the life of her granddaughter and as a result suffered emotional distress for which she is still under medication. She was within proximity to the scene of the accident and witnessed firsthand the accident. The vehicle kept sliding in her direction which sent her into a state of fear foe her life as well. She suffered emotional distress as a result of the reckless and negligent behavior of the appellant. The trial court decision recognized that she was properly within the danger zone and awarded damages for her pain and suffering. This court should uphold the decision by the trial court. 

Arguments 

1. THE COURT IN DEFINING A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE VICTIM AND THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE OF A NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ACTION SHOULD ADOPT A BROADER REQUIREMENT THAT THERE BE A MARITAL OR INTIMATE FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIP 

The case of Bovsun v Sanperi (Bovsun v Sanperi, 1984) established that the relationship requirement be limited to immediate family. The circumstances of the case were significantly different from the circumstances of the present case and as such should be used as the definition of what immediate family is. The circumstances of the case did not require the court to define what immediate family entails and as such it did not limit the possibility of a grandmother to be considered immediate family for purposes of claiming damage. 

There is no statute or case law or any other legal instrument within the State of Mercy that defines what immediate family is. This court has to look to decisions in other states to formulate the most appropriate definition of the term. The question before this court is, therefore, whether the close relationship requirement should encompass relationships other than those based on consanguinity. In the interest of justice, the category of immediate family should be expanded to include intimate familial relationships. Other states have done it. In the case of Leong v Takasaki 55, Haw. 398, 520 P. 2d 758. A child who witnessed the death of a step-grandmother after being hit by the defendant was allowed after proving the nature of the relationship. 

This court should reject the argument that the plaintiff should not be allowed to recover upon a legitimate claim because other fraudulent ones may emerge. The contention that allowing such claims would result in the courts being flooded by litigation is flawed. The courts deal with cases on merit whether they be few or many. The possibility of administrative difficulty should not be used to deny the plaintiff justice. The interests of meritorious claims by the plaintiff should prevail over alleged administrative difficulty. 

2. THE COURT IN DEFINING ‘CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT’ FOR PURPOSES OF A NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS SHOULD BE ALLOWED A BROADER DEFINITION OF ZONE OF DANGER 

The artificiality surrounding the zone of danger role should be done away with, Dillon v Legg (Dillon v Legg, 1963). The concept of the zone of danger cannot be restricted to the area of those exposed to physical injury alone; it must encompass the area of those exposed to emotional injury as well. There should be no distinction between a plaintiff who is within the zone of danger of physical impact and a plaintiff who is within emotional impact. As long as the plaintiff, whether within or outside the zone of physical injury witnessed the victim’s death or injury, and as a consequence suffered emotional distress, they are entitled to recover. There is no reason for denying the respondent a course of action in the circumstances submitted. 

Conclusion 

The respondent submits that the findings of the trial court were proper and that she discharged the burden of prove placed upon her by law with the evidence presented at trial. For the reasons presented in this brief, the decision of the trial court should be upheld. 

References 

Bovsun v Sanperi, 843 (Court of Appeal of New York February 23, 1984). 

Dillon v Legg, 7816 (Sac June 28, 1963). 

Trombetta v Cockling, 678 (Court of Appeal of New York December 20, 1993).