Aviation law is a field of law that covers most facets of air travel. This field of law encompasses the operation and regulation of business activities or issues that relate to air travel, such as rules, regulations, and minimum standards that relate to the manufacture, operation, and maintenance of aircraft. These rules and regulations are often issued and enforced by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Thus, the operation and regulation of business issues that relate to aviation require an in-depth knowledge of the FAA regulations. It also requires a complete understanding of the specific laws regarding air travel and a comprehensive understanding of aviation. Aviation law applies to almost every person connected to aircraft operation and maintenance, from the pilot, air traffic controllers, passengers to flight attendants. This paper will explore one of the facets of aviation law: the relationships between an accident and litigation (lawsuits) after the crash. This document examines the 2001 tragic event that involved flight N7701J that resulted in four deaths to explore this facet of aviation law.
Factual Description of the Crash
Background
Flight N7701J, which was carrying three passengers, namely, George Thomas Bowden, Adrienne Abrisch, and James Abrisch, crashed near Jacksonville International Airport (JIA) on December 12, 2001 (Abrisch v. U.S., p. 4). The passengers were on a business flight. The flight took off from Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Before taking off, the pilot of the flight called the FAA, Gainesville, Florida, Automated Flight Service Station, and asked to be briefed on the weather condition. The flight was destined to land at St. Augustine, Florida, and with Craig Airport, Jacksonville, Florida, as the other option. The FAA briefed the pilot on the weather condition and gave the pilot the flight plan information.
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At 1535, the pilot departed from Fort Lauderdale to St. Augustine, Florida, on the same evening (NTSB, p. 3). He called the FAA Miami Automated International Flight Service Station (NTSB, p. 3). He reported that he was flying the aircraft at an altitude of 900 feet. He also reported that he intended to land the aircraft at St. Augustine first before departing to its destined airport. In this respect, the pilot asked the station to brief him on both airports' weather conditions.
At 1835:35, the FAA Jacksonville Approach Control Controller called the pilot to inquire if he had been briefed about the airport's existing weather conditions (NTSB, p. 3). He confirmed that he had already been briefed about the weather condition. In this respect, at 1836:05, flight N7701J was cleared to fly to St. Augustine (NTSB, p. 3). However, the pilot failed to land at the airport and reported to the controller that he was forced to perform a missed approach at the airport. The controller asked the pilot to ascent the flight to 3,000 feet and outline his plans. He outlined his plans to direct the flight to the alternative airport. The controller asked the pilot to return the flight to Jacksonville International Airport in cases he fails to land at Craig.
At 1909:44, Jacksonville Approach Controller cleared the pilot to land at Craig Airport using runway 32 (NTSB, p.3). The pilot was also instructed to contact the Craig Airport Control Tower so as to be briefed about the weather condition at the airport. At 1916:51, the pilot performed a missed approach and reported it to the Jacksonville International Airport (NTSB, p. 3). In this respect, he was asked to ascent to 2,000 feet as well as head 280 degrees and direct the flight to Jacksonville International Airport for landing. At 1919:50, the pilot was asked to contact the next controller to be briefed on the weather. The pilot was asked if he had received the Jacksonville Automated Terminal Information Service weather report "Mike." He responded, yes.
The pilot was then instructed to contact the next controller, where he did at 1921:08 (NTSB, p. 4). At 1929:06, the pilot was instructed by the controller to head 040 degrees as well as climb to 2,000 feet (NTSB, p. 4). Following this, the controller then cleared the pilot to land the flight using runway 7. The controller then asked the pilot to contact the Jacksonville Airport Control Tower. The pilot contacted the station as requested. It is important to note that the tower was operating from a temporary facility at the time.
Ahead of the N7701J airplane, two other airplanes had made successfully landing through runway 7. The pilots reported that they managed to break out of the clouds at approximately "50-100 feet above the decision height of 200 agl." (NTSB, p. 4). In addition, the pilots of these two flights reported that, after breaking out of the clouds, they were able to see approach lights. However, the pilots of the two flights reported that the runway lights were not on. The local controller reported that he did not see these two airplanes until they passed the control tower (NTSB, p. 4). Thus, the two planed approached the runway without the guide of the landing light. The local controller gave this report to the pilot of flight N7701J. At the time the pilot was receiving this report, the flight was passing the "Dinns" locater outer marker (NTSB, p. 4). The local controller reported that he did not see flight N7701J when making the approach to land. The local controller immediately contacted the pilot and informed him that the flight's radar path was making a missed approach. While making this report, the local controller heard crackling sounds on the radio. According to the local controller, the pilot reported that some of his instruments malfunctioned. The local controller contacted the Approach Controller in an attempt to re-establish the contact with the pilot. The Approach Controller reported that he had lost contact with the pilot. The local controller then attempted to contact the pilot but did not succeed. The Approach Controller then informed the local controller that the radar contact with the flight had been lost. In this respect, the search and rescue team were deployed. The search and rescue team located the flight's wreckage on December 13, 2002, at around noon (NTSB, p. 4).
Two individuals working at a guarding facility located near the airport reported hearing the approach of the flight. One of the guards reported seeing a red navigation light from the aircraft as it approached the airport. According to one of the guards, he lost sight of the red navigation light as the aircraft passed over the alert aircraft area. In addition, both guards reported hearing the engine increasing in power as flight N7701J approached the end of runway 7. According to the guards, the airplane started to climb rather than landing. They also reported that the aircraft made a number of circles and descended before crashing through trees.
According to the radar data recorded at the airport, the airplane approached runway 7 and maintained straight flight path on the localizer course. At this point, N7701J was at an altitude of 500 feet (NTSB, p. 5). The aircraft then turned slightly to the right and continued to descend. After attaining a height of 300 feet, the aircraft turned to the north and started to ascend. The aircraft then performed a 380-degree left turn and climbed to 1,000 feet. After attaining this altitude, the aircraft performed another 360-degree left turn and started to descend to 300 feet. At 1941:23, the radar lost track of the aircraft while at 300 feet (NTSB, p. 5).
Personnel Information
Donald Weidner, the pilot of flight N7701J, held a FAA private pilot certificate, which authorized him to operate single-engine aircraft. Weidner also held a FAA second class medical certificate. The medical certificate limited the pilot to wear correcting lenses during flights in order to enhance his distant vision. Pilot books record obtained by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) showed Weidner had completed several flights in the week before the accident. In particular, in the week before the crash, "the pilot had accumulated 965 total flight hours, 442 flight hours in the Piper PA-32-260, 17 hours of instrument flight time, 24 hours of simulated instrument flight time, and 225 flight hours at night" (NTSB, p. 5). However, the logbook did not indicate whether the pilot met the FAA's recency of experience required for instrument flight.
Airplane Information
The aircraft that was involved in the accident was a Piper PA-32-260. It was manufactured in October 1968 (NTSB, p. 5). The serial and registration number of the airplane were 32-1068 and N7701J, respectively. The aircraft underwent some inspections on November 21, 2001, where the entire airplane was inspected (NTSB, p. 5). This includes the inspection of the engine, which was a Lycoming O-540-E4B5, 260-horsepower engine. The engine was subjected to a total overhaul on August 1, 1997 (NTSB, p. 5). Flight N7701J was equipped with a Hartzell HC-C2Yl-1BF propeller, which was previously overhauled on March 18, 1998 (NTSB, p. 5). During the overhaul, the airplane was equipped with a serviceable hub as well as two new propeller blades. On March 7, 2000, and on March 9, 2000, flight N7701J received a transponder and a static system and altimeter system check, respectively (NTSB, p. 5). The airplane's vacuum pump was overhauled on August 2, 2001, and an engine-driven pump was installed (NTSB, p. 5).
Meteorological Information
Before and during the flight, the pilot was briefed on the weather by the local controllers located at Jacksonville International Airport and Craig Airport. This includes Automated Terminated Information Service (ATIS) information "Mike," ATIS information "November," and ATIS information "Oscar," which were issued by Jacksonville International Airport at 1920:04, 1924:39, and 1940:07, respectively (NTSB, p. 5). With regard to ATIS Mike, the weather observation was "wind from 070 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 1 and ½ statute miles in mist, clouds 200 feet broken, 500 feet overcast, temperature 68 degrees F, dew point temperature 67 degrees F, altimeter setting 30.17 in. Hg." (NTSB, p. 5). With regard to ATIS information November, the weather observation was "wind from 050 degrees at 6 knots, visibility ½ statute mile in fog, clouds 100 feet broken, 500 feet overcast, temperature and dew point temperature 68 degrees F, altimeter setting 30.20 in. Hg." (NTSB, p. 6). With regard to ATIS information Oscar, the weather observation was "wind calm, visibility ¼ statute mile in fog, clouds indefinite ceiling vertical visibility 100 feet, temperature and dew point temperature 68 degrees F, altimeter setting 30.20 in. Hg." (NTSB, p. 6).
According to the local controller at Jacksonville International Airport, two airplanes that approached and landed at the airport prior to flight N7701J broke the clouds at 50-100 feet above the decision height of 200 agl. (NTSB,p. 6). After breaking out of the clouds, the pilots reported that they were able to see the approach light, but not the runway lights. The local controller also reported that he did not see the two airplanes approach until they passed the temporary control tower and touched down about 1,5000 feet from the end of the runway (NTSB, p. 6). According to the local controller, the two planes landed without the guide of the landing lights. At around 1937, the local controller gave this report to the pilot of flight N7701J when his flight was approaching the "Dinns" locator outer marker (NTSB, p. 6).
Following the accident, the NTSB conducted a comprehensive review of the meteorological information. From their review, the NTSB found that a stationary front stretched across the northern Florida Panhandle to just south of the Jacksonville area at the time of the crash. The front then continued to stretch towards the Atlantic Ocean. From their review, the NTSB also found that there were saturated conditions as well as reduced visibilities near the frontal boundary.
Wreckage and Impact Information
Flight N7701J crashed in a wooded area that is located near Jacksonville International Airport. In particular, the airplane's wreckage was located one mile NNW of the approach end of runway 7 of the airport. Based on the examination of the crashing site, flight N7001J first collided with the tops of pine trees that were 75 feet tall. It then continued to crash with trees as it descended, separating some of its parts, such as the left-wing and the right-wing. Examination of the crash site showed that the aircraft came to rest approximately 200 feet from the point of the initial crash. All of the aircraft's wreckage was located within 50 feet from the main wreckage (NTSB, p. 6). In addition, all the necessary components of flight N7701J were located at the crash site.
All the necessary components of the flight were collected for examination. The examinations were conducted at the manufacturer's facilities under the supervision of NTSB of FAA. For example, the examination of the autopilot system, propeller, vacuum pump, and electric turn and bank indicator was performed under the supervision of the NTSB, while the examination of the UPS Aviation Technologies GX-60 GPS receiver and Northstar Avionics Model 1 Loran was performed under the supervision of FAA. Examination of the wreckage of flight N7701J indicated that most of the flight's components had received impact damage. Examination of the crash site showed that there was no inflight or postcrash fire. The examination also showed significant impact damage to control surfaces, cable systems, engine, autopilot system, propeller, vacuum pump, vacuum-driven altitude indicator, electric turn and blank indicator, and altimeter other necessary components.
Medical and Pathological Information
After the crash, the bodies of the victims were collected for postmortem examination. The examination was performed by the Office of Medical Examiner, Jacksonville, Florida. The postmortem examination results showed that the pilot and the three passengers sustained multiple severe injuries following the crash. The cause of death for each was attributed to multiple injuries. The postmortem examiner did not find any findings that could be considered causal to the accident. The Office of the Medical Examiner also performed a postmortem examination on the three passengers. The test was negative, positive, and positive for ethanol for the right front seat passenger, left middle seat passenger, and right rear seat passenger, respectively.
In collaboration with the FAA Toxicological Laboratory located in Oklahoma, the Office of the Medical Examiner that is located in Jacksonville, also performed toxicology testing on specimens obtained from the pilot. The results showed that the pilot was negative for "ethanol, carbon monoxide, cyanide, barbiturates, benzodiazepines, cocaine metabolite, and opiates" (NTSB, p. 8). The tests were positive for "0.97 mg/L ephedrine/pseudoephedrine and 5.64 ug/ml acetaminophen. The pilot's briefcase was also examined, where the examined found "Medic brand A-Phedrin pills, Acetaminophen gelcaps, Robitussin CF, and Medic brand "Stay Awake" caffeine pills" (NTSB, p. 8).
Additional Information
After completing their investigations, the NTSB returned the wreckage of flight N7701J to the registered owner on December 15, 2001 (NTSB, p. 8). However, the NTSB retained some components for further testing. These components were returned to the registered owner on a later date. In particular, the wreckage of the flight was to return to the owner's insurance company.
NTSB's Conclusion on the Probable Cause of the Crash
Following the crash, the NTSB conducted a number of investigations to determine the probable cause of the crash or accident. From their investigations, the NTSB found that the pilot was spatially disoriented during the flight. Due to the spatial disorientation, the pilot lost control of the flight during a missed approach. As a result, flight N7701J descended uncontrolled and collided with trees and the ground.
Parties Involved in the Legal Case
The parties involved in the legal case were Joy Abrisch et al. and estate representatives, who were the plaintiffs, and the United States of America, who was the defendant (Abrisch v. U.S., p. 1). The plaintiffs filed a suit against the USA under the Federal Tort Claims Act, claiming that the FAA, a government agency, breached its duty of care when it failed to provide the pilot of flight N7701J with air traffic control services (Abrisch v. U.S., p. 13). According to the plaintiffs, the negligence by the FAA caused the accident.
Conclusions Made by the Judge and Rationale
All the parties agreed that the accident occurred because the pilot of flight N7701J was spatially disoriented. As a result, the pilot lost control of the flight, causing the crash. Thus, the judge stated that there was enough evidence to concluded that the FAA air traffic controllers failed to provide the pilot with accurate weather briefs. Due to the FAA air traffic controllers' negligence, the pilot was not informed that the weather was rapidly deteriorating, contributing to the pilot's spatial disorientation (Abrisch v. U.S., p. 14). The judge also concluded that the pilot himself also contributed to the accident. In particular, the judge concluded that the pilot contributed to his spatial disorientation by forgoing the other alternatives and forcing to land the flight at Jacksonville International Airport (after performing two missed approaches) when he was fatigued, ill, and on medication ( Abrisch v. U.S., p. 14). Based on the evidence available and by applying Florida comparative negligence principles, the judge held both the FAA and the pilot responsible for the accident. In particular, the judge held that the "FAA's negligence was the legal cause of 65% of the accident and that pilot Weidner's negligence was the legal cause of 35% of the accident" (Abrisch v. U.S., p. 16).
Analysis
As stated earlier, aviation law covers most facets of air travel. This includes air travel accidents and litigation (lawsuits) that follow these accidents. In this case, we are presented with a real-life case scenario of an accident that led to lawsuits. The 2001 tragic event involving flight N7701J resulted in four deaths (Abrisch v. U.S., p. 1). The next of kin of the passengers sued the U.S. under the Federal Tort Claims Act. According to the plaintiffs, the FAA's negligence in providing air traffic control services is what led to the accident. Aviation law covers this facet of air travel. Air traffic controllers are expected to provide air traffic control services, accurate weather briefings, and reasonable care, among many other services (Abrisch v. U.S., p. 11). However, in this case, the air controllers at Jacksonville International Airport neglected their duties and failed to provide the pilot of N7701J with accurate weather information. As a result, the pilot became spatially disoriented. After holding a bench trial, the court ruled that the FAA's negligence in providing air control services is responsible for 65% of the cause of the accident (Abrisch v. U.S., p. 16). The other 35% is attributed to the pilot's negligence (Abrisch v. U.S., p. 16). Pilots are not required to work while fatigued or when under medications. However, here, this was never the case. The pilot was comparatively negligent since he had previously performed two missed approached. Instead of flying the airplane to another airport, the pilot chose to fly N7701J to an airport with instrument flight rules. In addition, the pilot was fatigued and was under medications. Thus, part of the cause of the accident was attributed to the pilot's negligence.
Conclusion
To sum up, aviation law covers most facets of air travel. This document explored one of these facets, namely, the relationship between an accident and litigation after the crash, by using the 2001 tragic event that involved flight N7701J as a case study. Flight N7701J was involved in an accident on the evening of December 12, 2001, after the pilot was spatially disoriented, resulting in the death of the pilot and three of his passengers. The NTSB conducted investigations of the crash and found the probable cause of the accident to be spatial disorientation of the pilot. Following the accident, Abrisch et al. filed a lawsuit, claiming the FAA's negligence caused the accident. Based on the evidence presented, the court concluded that both the FAA and the pilot responsible for the accident.
References
Abrisch v. United States, 359 F.Supp.2d 1214 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
Hamilton, J., & Nilson, S, Practical aviation & aerospace law . Newcastle, Washington: Aviation Supplies & Academics, Inc (2015).
National Transportation Safety Board Aviation Accidence Final Report MIA2FA045 (2003) .
