In the recent past, people across the globe there have been many conflicts between the companies like Google, Apple, Microsoft, Twitter, Amazon and Facebook and the federal governments. In the US, the conflict between intelligence services and business has come to the forefront of public discussion. On Tuesday, March 29, 2016, an official closure of the resonant trial took place, through which the FBI (on behalf of the US Department of Justice as a whole) tried to force the Apple Corporation to cooperate actively with the investigative authorities.
Specifically, the FBI insisted that the smartphone manufacturer specifically develop a special code for the "backdoor", which opens the government access to the encrypted information stored in the device's memory. Apple, on its part, categorically refused to do this, arguing that such actions significantly undermine the security of not only the devices themselves, but, in fact, all users of their super-popular products.
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And although the matter has now been declared closed, it cannot be said that one or the other of the parties to the conflict can be considered victorious and proved to be right. As for the US FBI and the Ministry of Justice, they withdrew their claim from the court only because of changed circumstances. An unnamed "third party" helped them and, without involving Apple, unlocked access to the data in that particular iphone of the arrow-terrorist from San Bernardino, which figured as the subject of the trial.
Neither Apple's management nor lawyers are obviously illusions that it is in fact the arrow from San Bernardino that the history of confrontations with the state authorities can be considered complete. After all, access to encrypted data in any smartphone and other digital devices is desired not only by the organs of the US government, but also by the authorities of, say, China or Russia, as well as by the great number of other countries where corporations like Apple have not only business but also inevitable contacts with law enforcement structures.
Attempts by Barack Obama and the FBI to legally require smartphone manufacturers to build a backdoor for the security services into encryption algorithms have been criticized by the leaders of the IT industry, including Google and Apple, scientists and even ardent supporters of national security. This is a reflection of the fact that privacy is the most cherished rights for the citizens.
The confidence in American communications technologies directly depends on sales of the same smartphones and cloud services, as well as the development of national legislation of different countries, which can prevent American companies from freely selling their products. However, law enforcement agencies and security forces claim that companies that produce and market communication products that are highly encrypted must within the confines of the law give them codes to help them gain access to those devices. The aim of doing this is purposely to scrutinize personal emails, messages conveyed through social media, and other electronic communications to curb terrorist schemes and protect the citizenry. As much as the provision of these encryption codes is necessary for beefing up security, it is equally important to consider the concerns of defenders of civil liberties, whose greatest fear is that people will eventually be deprived of their right to privacy as the government and security agencies keep intensifying their capacity in monitoring private communications.
For this very reason, backdoor access to encrypted devices or unwarranted access to personal communications is not right since the idea has even compelled the technology industry to come up with and deploy gadgets to customers and businesses whose encryption is highly sophisticated (Hoven et al. 2014). Such enterprises cannot stand the chance of being engaged in court orders to produce decryption codes that involve the iMessage service since the manufacturers themselves can't decipher the encryption alone. Therein lies a conundrum which renders court orders meaningless basically because companies engaged in manufacturing these gadgets are not in apposition to decode messages or retain avenues of unlocking the devices of their customers. Suggestions requiring federal government and security agencies to consider an option where courts are needed to deal with suspects man-on by compelling them to give their passwords makes some violent crimes go unsolved because defendants may choose not to disclose their credentials due to intimidation whose result would incriminate them. Here, a victim may also be in a state where justice won’t prevail on their case.
Due to modernism and globalization, there is need to secure communications in order to facilitate trust in online businesses. Therefore, industries producing gadgets meant for conveying information should come up with products that are not subject to the vulnerability in their design to avoid exposing physical, financial status and emotional well-being of the clients alongside their most valuable business secrets (Perlroth, 2015). With this aspect in mind, federal governments should not put pressure on individuals to reveal their communication details since the event also endangers the lives of critics of oppressive regimes, thus denying them the freedom of expression and association. Conversely, there are better procedures to be followed as investigative alternatives other than those that breach peoples’ privacy. Without compromising the entire security apparatus of communications networks, law enforcement agencies can, on specific grounds, compel passcodes from device owners contrary to the idea of converting devices and apps into components of the surveillance apparatus.
Granting access to personal information will impact negatively on the business of these industries in dealing with foreign governments. Some governments have poor human rights records and, therefore, companies will face unnecessary pressures from abroad as they try to evaluate market opportunities on whether to withdraw their supplies from such countries. Notably, the issues arising from each country, and each situation, will have a different phase. However, the most recent adjustment to the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act gave provisions where communication companies ought to employ measures that aid in data retention within their systems, so that specific information regarding communications is kept. In this scenario, metadata is preserved rather than content for a set period. The platform enables data subject to a warrant to be accessed from computers or data storage devices thus minimizing the cases of confronting individuals to give their passwords and encryption codes (" Personal Data Encryption and its Legal Implications ," 2014). Such data held in the computers or storage devices can then be copied to other storage devices to create grounds for converting them into documentary forms to be used by intelligence agencies in carrying out detailed investigations.
Federal governments don’t have the right to access peoples’ communication since the First Amendment protects the rights of individuals to engage in speech even anonymously (" Government Wants a Backdoor into Your Online Communications ," 2013). It is not a guarantee that prejudicing secure communications will curtail the terrorist problem. Instead, such acts of gaining backdoor access to communications undermine the fundamental human rights by weakening the security of the majority users as they try to gain access to the potentially illegal communications of the few thus depriving the larger populace of their right.
Better means of enforcing the law on communications got to be devised. Such avenues will aid law enforcement firms and the federal government in conducting their tasks with ease without necessarily breaching personal information. It will also ensure protecting companies' freedom of innovation and the neighboring nations' liberty to communicate with reasonable security (" Should Law Enforcement Have the Ability to Access Encrypted Communications ?" 2015). Achieving this requires collaborative measures between the government and the industries producing encryption on devices to agree on issues that involve technical solutions, legislative creativity, and compromise.
References
Should Law Enforcement Have the Ability to Access Encrypted Communications? (2015, April 20). Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/should-law-enforcement-have-the-ability-to-access-encrypted-communications-1429499474
The Government Wants A Backdoor Into Your Online Communications . (2013, May 22). Retrieved from https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/caleatwo
Personal Data Encryption and its Legal Implications . (2014, October 7). Retrieved from http://stlr.org/2014/10/07/personal-data-encryption-and-its-legal-implications/
Perlroth, N. (2015, July 07). Security Experts Oppose Government Access to Encrypted Communication. Retrieved November 03, 2017, from https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/technology/code-specialists-oppose-us-and-british-government-access-to-encrypted-communication.html
Hoven, J. V., Blaauw, M., Pieters, W., & Warnier, M. (2014, November 20). Privacy and Information Technology . Retrieved November 03, 2017, from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/it-privacy/
