Case Brief: Alva E. Campbell v. Charlotte Jenkins

Issue/Legal Question 

This specific case is about the application in court by the petitioner Alva E. Campbell, Jr., objections to the Second Transfer Order given by the United States Magistrate Judge known as Michael Merz. The Judge had given a Second Transfer Order with amendments and supplements. The case was transferred to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals as a second or successive habeas petition. Therefore, the main legal question in this specific case is whether the Second Transfer Order issues by the United States Magistrate Judge was legally in order. 

Rule/Relevant Law 

There is a relevant law that governs the issuance of case transfer orders by a judge. This is a capital habeas corpus case. It is undisputed that this case is Petitioner's second-in-time habeas application related to his conviction and sentence of death for a 1997 murder. His first case was dismissed with prejudice and that judgment is final. The main relevant law in this case is the civil rights provision that grants various advantages to capital litigant. The capital litigant has got many advantages over a habeas corpus action. Among other things, it is not subject to the second-or-successive limitation or the limits on discovery in habeas corpus. Because it is forward looking instead of focused on what happened in the state courts, it is not limited in the introduction of evidence imposed in habeas. 

Importantly, there is the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, AEDPA, which does not take kindly to repeat requests for habeas relief. It mandates that, if an inmate has already lost one such request, he may not file a `second or successive' petition without satisfying several stringent requirements. This law states that a claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed. 

Facts 

Not all second-in-time habeas petitions are deemed to be "second or successive." Panetti v. Quarterma and Magwood v. Patterson. The AEDPA does not define "second or successive," but courts have interpreted that term in the context of "pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ principles that asked whether a petitioner already had a full and fair opportunity to raise the relevant claim in the district court. 

Effect on Business and Society 

Businesses will be affected in the sense that there will be no chance to hear cases within their locations. This same impact goes to the society. 

Opinion and Decision 

The Court overruled those Objections and affirmed the Magistrate Judge's Second Transfer Order, as amended and supplemented. It also transferred the above-captioned case to the Sixth Circuit for a determination of whether Campbell may proceed on his claims. 

Use of Precedent 

In Ford v. Wainwright , the Supreme Court held that a prisoner who is currently insane cannot be executed. The Supreme Court has held that, because a Ford claim will never be ripe when the initial habeas petition is adjudicated, a petitioner does not abuse the writ by waiting to file a second-in-time petition asserting a Ford claim closer to the date set for execution. T he Sixth Circuit has held that certain "newly ripe" claims are not "second or successive" petitions.