Introduction
One of the most important aspects of the United States’ criminal law justice system is the rules of criminal procedure. It is a well-established legal provision supported by several Supreme Court decisions that a police investigation should not just unravel the truth but also do so in the right way. These rules are based on the fact that protecting the right to privacy and implied by the 4th amendment is fundamental and ought to adhere to whenever possible or practicable (Kerr, 2013). Further, these rules seek to prevent the police from taking the easy way out by seeking to victimize the most probable suspect without conducting due diligence. In the instant case study, the issues of criminal procedure that come into focus are the search and seizure rules. These are the laws applicable when the police suspect that contraband or illegally acquired goods are within the private premises of an individual. The normal procedure is for police to apply for warrants to enable search and seizure of the items suspected to be in the premises. However, under some exigent circumstances, the police can actually conduct search and seizure without a warrant. When this happens, it is common procedure for an interim herein referred to as a probable cause hearing to be undertaken to assess if the exigent circumstances under which the search and seizure were conducted were warranted. In the case the exigent circumstances are not proven, the search and seizure are declared to have been illegal (Kerr, 2013). Any information derived from it and the investigation premised on that search and seizure declared the fruits of poisonous trees. Many cases have been taken all the way to the Supreme Court based on the instant rules as shall be indicated in the case law to be outlined below.
Overview of Search Issues
It is worthy of notice that the warrants of arrests sought for are limited to the stealing of a singular artifact named Fallacy by Isaac Mendez. Any other crime apart from that of theft and specifically of that artifact is therefore not a primary factor. The first and primary issue is whether or not there was a probable cause to search the house of Charlie Kelly at all. In the case there was no probable cause to search the house at all, the entire search was illegal, null and void and the warrant of arrest requested for would amount to fruits a poisonous tree. The second search issue is based on the most probable allegation by the police officer that the search and seizure were based on an invitation by an individual who had control over the house. This issue is informed by the fact that Frank Reynolds was found at but not within the premises, has used a parking lot within the house and seemingly there was a guest room in the house that he was in the process of moving things from. Further, Detective Peralta had to actually search the house to find the good in question meaning that they were not in plain sight which forms another issue. Under the same issue, there will also be a secondary issue of to what extent Frank Reynolds would lawfully authorize search and seizure in the house of Charlie Kelly including his private space and a locked cabinet in his garage.
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Probable Cause for a Search
The primary argument by the defense would be that there was no probable cause for a police officer, investigating the theft of the said artifact fallacy to search inside the home of Kelly at all. According to the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the probable cause for searching for obtaining a warrant of arrest for the search and seizure of the fallacy from the house of Kelly would be based on solid investigations that created evidence that the particular artifact was in the house (Thomas, 2014). It is clear from the particulars of the case study that Detective Peralta did not get any information from Reynolds about the fallacy. Indeed, Reynolds is not reported to have indicated having seen the said artifact at the house of Kelly. From the totality of the solid information within the possession of the detective at the time, he could not under any circumstances have lawfully obtained a search warrant for the house. Therefore, the motivation to search the house was premised on creating a short cut for his investigation and amounts to a dereliction of duty. Allowing the use of the evidence collected in the house would not only set a bad precedent but also support an act of breaching the fundamental rights of Kelly by the said detective.
Consent to Search the House
In response to this allegation, the prosecution would allege that the search was not based on probable cause but on a generous invitation by a resident of the house. The state will argue that the detective, having developed suspicions through the information received from Reynolds developed a hunch that there could be something incriminating inside the house. The detective, therefore, sought and obtained permission to search the house and it is based on this permission that the search and seizure took place. Reynolds was in the house and clearly had the control of the house hence was authorized to give permission to the detective. The prosecution would, therefore, rely on the case of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218 (1973). The main argument, in this case, is that a request to search a house can be denied and upon denial, the situation in Mapp v. Ohio (supra), would ensue. However, it is not the obligation of the police to notify either a generous or indolent member of the public of the right to decline a search. Under the circumstance, the search was lawful as it was premised on permission given without any coercion. In this instance, Reynolds plays the part of an informant who also has lawful access as outlined in Hoffa v. the United States , 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (Thomas, 2014).
Lack of Authority to Give Consent
The response to this by the defense would be that Reynolds was not a resident of the house but a guest who was only there for the purposes of collecting some personal possessions from the house. Therefore, Reynolds was not in any ways authorized to allow the police officer to search the house. Further, and without prejudice to that argument, the defense would also argue that in the event Reynolds was found to have some control of the house, the same was only limited to his room which only had two boxes with the name Frank written on them. Having some form of consent does not allow for a fishing expedition according to FTC v. American Tobacco Co ., 264 U.S. 298 (1924). Anything the police officer may have seen while walking to Reynolds’s room has been admissible under the plain sight rule but conducting an actual search that involved going room by room was ultra vires of the invitation to look around and therefore illegal (Peterson, 2014).
Reasonable Assumption of Authority
The prosecution would, however, issue a rebuttal that the arrangement between Kelly and Reynolds was immaterial to the case. According to Illinois v. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. 177 (1990), the only important issue was whether or not the detective actually believed that Reynolds had authority over the house (Peterson, 2014). Finding Reynolds in the house moving things out freely in the absence of Kelly was enough to cause any reasonable person to believe that he had authority over the house. On this basis, the search was based on lawful permission and, therefore, valid. The depiction of Detective Peralta’s conduct as reasonable would become the new focus of the defense and it would look at the overall conduct of the said detective during the search in an attempt to gauge his capacity to reasonableness.
Mischief as a Factor to Negate Reasonableness
Proof of mischief would automatically negate the contention of reasonable action and show that the search was overall illegal. As held in the case of Smith v. Maryland , 442 U.S. 735 (1979) an expectation of privacy is enough to invoke the provisions of the Fourth amendment (Kerr, 2013). Breaching this expectation of privacy under any circumstances would, therefore, be an act of mischief and would negate the concept of reasonableness. After the search in the house and the discovery of the artifacts, the detective decided to extend his search to the garage where he found Reynolds. The detective asked to search in the locked cabinet found in another parking garage apart from the one he found Reynolds. Reynolds clearly did not have the key to the cabinet. The word located as used in the case law means he had to search for the key until he found it and not pick it from a place known to him. Under normal circumstance, the acts committed by Reynolds would have amounted to a crime and anything removed from the cabinet including information would have created a cause of action for larceny. This disqualifies Reynolds as an informant and makes him an accomplice to the detective. The detective was unreasonable a fact that negated the lawfulness of the search thus the warrant of arrest ought to be declined (Kerr, 2013).
Conclusion
On matters relating to criminal procedure, a criminal court becomes a court of law and not a court of justice and fairness. In all fairness, the totality of the facts of the case depicts Kelly to be a terrible person who breaches the trust of his professor by stealing from him. This is supported by the access he had to the professor’s house, his student loan debts and the evidence found in his home. The rules of probable cause will, however, ignore all this and seek to understand if indeed, the search of the house by the detective was legal or illegal. The prosecution will accept the argument by the defense that there was no probable cause and rebut that the search was based on a reasonable belief that Reynolds had authority to allow for a search. The overall conduct of the detective, however, indicates an extreme absence of reasonability by the detective which would clearly sway the probable cause hearing in the favor of Kelly.
References
Kerr, O. S. (2013). The curious history of fourth amendment searches. The Supreme Court Review , 2012 (1), 67-97
Peterson, C. (2014). Irrevocable implied consent: The roach motel in consent search jurisprudence. Am. Crim. L. Rev. , 51 , 773
Thomas III, G. C. (2014). Mapp v. Ohio: Doomed from the Beginning. Ohio St. J. Crim. L. , 12 , 289
