Joint Theater Support Contracting Command

Integrative planning is vital prior to making any purchases within the commercial industry. This enables organizations to make considerable savings that lead to an increase in the bottom line. However, this is not the case for the Department of Defense, as there is no relationship between its bottom line and savings. For the DoD, contracting or purchasing is treated as being an administrative function, and it must be undertaken to achieve a given outcome. However, there has been a significant reliance on contract support within the DoD, as witnessed during the Afghanistan and Iraq war. The Joint Theatre Support Contracting Command through the Joint Contingency Contracting allows for a more synchronized oversight for joint operations involving complex theater, support contracts, and services 

In most cases, contracting policies and procedures are used in governing the contracting undertakings of commercial companies. However, in the case of the DoD, the Federal Acquisition Regulations lay down a foundation for all its contracting activities. The Federal Acquisition Regulation comprises various elements such as the Code of Federal Regulations, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplements, and other FAR supplements (de Rassenfosse, Jaffe & Raiteri, 2019).

The Federal Acquisition Regulation defines contracting as the leasing, renting, purchasing, or obtaining services or supplies from non-federal suppliers. When making the contracting, the DOD must be able to provide a clear description of the required services and supplies. Moreover, the Federal Acquisition Regulations involves the formulation of an acquisition team of which all its participants must be identified (de Rassenfosse et al., 2019). This will involve the contractor identified to provide the required services and the customer.

On the other hand, contingency contracting included all the activities that are defined by FAR. Nonetheless, in this case, there is a modification of the available resources, environment, and governing regulations. The Federal Acquisition Regulation defines a contingency as being a military operation that the members of the armed forces participate in after its designation by the Secretary of Defense. The armed forces at times can be involved in hostilities, operations, or actions toward the enemies of the United States.

There are various types of contingency contract support, including theater support contracts, systems support contracts, and external support contracts. In the case of the external support contracts, they are owned by a particular Service and are awarded outside of the theater. The systems support contracts that provide maintenance and technical support to a system deployed in a theater. The contracting officer grants the theater. support contracts.

Service components are mostly used in managing smaller-scale operations that are required to be for short-term purposes. However, in case the operations involve complex theater. support contracts, and services involve joint operations, there is a need for a more synchronized oversight. It is at this point that the Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC). Moreover, the JTSCC is necessary in case the mission is long-term, beyond the single Service's capability, and when a similar local vendor base aids joint bases. Once the Joint Theater Support Contracting Command is formulated, it will take over the control authority and command of a given theater. support contract organizations found in a given region of operations. The JTSCC will directly report to the JFC Commander despite performing the same functions as a lead service agency.

1. Background 

The Joint Contracting Command-Iraq (JCC-I) was formed in November 2004 to manage contracting efforts in the nation though it officially began its operations in 2005 (Ocampo & Mapp, 2012). The JCC-I combined the PARC-F and PARC-F into one single structure. In July 2005, JCC-I was given the authority to manage all contracting efforts in Afghanistan by the USCENTCOM (Ocampo & Mapp, 2012). This saw the organization changing its name to JCC-I/A, and it helped to manage various challenges that the Contingency Contracting Officers were facing in the field. However, following the end of the Iraq and Afghanistan operations, the JCC-I/A was later renamed to CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting in January 2011 (Ocampo & Mapp, 2012). Today, this new contracting agency has taken control over all the Afghanistan based DoD contracting undertakings and offers Combined Joint Operations Areas (CJOA) in Afghanistan effective theater. contracting support. C-JTSCC oversees the contracting of all requirements that will enable the deployment, management, receiving, and redeployment of contracting personnel. The body can adapt to any situation within the battlefield. C-JSTCC is very important to USCENTCOM as it will ensure all missions are successful, and any goals are accomplished (Ocampo & Mapp, 2012).

However, the C-JSTCC has continued to face a considerable number of challenges with regards to the management of its contracts and reliance on contractors. A majority of the policies put in place by the DoD across the years have not been implemented. This has forced the DoD to try and reduce its reliance on the contractor. Contingency contracting officers continue to face many challenges. This is brought about by the increased rates of oversea deployment, ever dynamic acquisition policies, and having to work in an austere environment (Ayers et al., 2011). As such, the Department of Defense sought to come up with means of eliminating the problems arising from the use of external contractors, especially those associated with contingencies. This saw the DOD provided various resources to help curb the issues such as the Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook in 2007 and the Deployed Contracting Officer’s Representative Handbook in 2008 (Ayers et al.,2011). Nonetheless, in 2009, the Secretary of Defense had recommended there is a need to ensure that are contracting functions are changed to DoD civilian personnel (Ayers et al., 2011). This sought to enable the DoD to track all contracting activities and help it in making informed workforce decisions through the Joint Contingency Contracting.

1. Literature Review 

Johnston III et al. (2005) state that the nature and scope of the mission are what determine the contracting type and procedures to be employed. The designated lead Service formally forms a Joint contracting structure. There is the centralization of the significant contracting authority and functions. However, decentralization of the mission execution is necessary to ensure that there is an immediate satisfaction of all approved contracting requirements. Examples of contingency contracting environments include a multinational environment. The USA has paired with various allied countries to carry our various missions across the globe. Contingency operations will thus involve the Services of allied nations and not a single Service’s force. This leads to a diversification of the contingency contracting support systems. The various Service leads will form a Joint Contingency Contracting structure, restrictions, responsibilities, command relationships, and locations

According to the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (2012) report, the USA has spent more than $85.5 billion on the reconstruction of Afghanistan. These funds were provided to the Department of Defense, the US Agency for International Development, and other related agencies. Various contracting authorities use these reconstructions for development and security projects, including the US Central Command's (CENTCOM) Joint Theater Support Contracting Command. Through 2007-2009, the C-JTSCC released reports showing that the Afghanistan contracting obligations amounted to $6.7 billion. However, these figures were refuted by Congress in 2011 as it sated that two contractors’ obligations had primarily been overstated. Congress reported the Kabujilan Construction Company's contract as being $18 million, yet C-JTSCC had reported it as $690 million. The C-JTSCC took several steps to ensure that it released accurate data by training its staff and also implemented a three-level process data review system. The Office of the Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (2012) report cited that to ensure the C-JTSCC does not report inaccurate data, it must pass through the Joint Contingency Contracting Systems. The Joint Contingency Contracting aims to ensure that it reformats the data before submitting it to the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG).

Ausink, Castaneda & Chenoweth (2011) documented a report on the Joint Contingency Contracting undertakings within the USA Air force. According to the authors, the contracting personnel within the Air force play a vital role as they provide and purchase supplies and services within a variety of environments. In 2008, the USCENTCOM spent $28 billion in buying goods and services. Out of this, $6.6 billion was spent in Afghanistan, $16 billion in Iraq and $5.5 billion in Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait. The Contingency Contracting Officers within the Joint Contingency Contracting-Iraq/Afghanistan played a vital role in drafting the contract actions and amounting to $7.5 billion to support the USCENTCOM during the years 2008. The data was recorded in the FPDS-NG and JCCS data systems though some were only recorded in the Joint Contingency Contracting System. The JCC contracting officers were thus responsible for 34% of the total spending contracting budget for the year 2008. According to Ausink et al. (2011), the multiple purchases contained in the Joint Contingency Contracting system are broken down into three main categories, construction services, and commodities. The CCOs' spending for the year was majorly for the services and over 70%, and 63% of the contract themselves and contract action respectively was for commodities. According to the JCCS data, it shows that CCOs are primarily involved in the contracting and purchasing process from beginning to end.

According to the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services hearing held in 2009, it sought to determine the various issues related to contingency contracting within the DoD. The main issues were related to the weapons systems acquisition and the costs involved in the contingency operations. The committee sighted that proper oversight of contingency contracting by the JCC is essential. Following an increased purchasing of weapons, there is a need to ensure the process is smooth and efficient. At the hearing, the Director of the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Mr. Shay Assad, stated that there had been numerous changes made by the DoD with regards to improving the contingency contracting process. This is contained in the Gansler Commission report of 2007, which laid out recommendations for all military branches in the USA. The Director noted that a Task Force for Contracting and Contract Management for Expeditionary Operations was set up to ensure that the recommendations were applied across the entire DoD. This included members from the Joint Contingency Contracting Command, Defense Acquisition University, Joint Staff and Defense Contract Management Agency. Likewise, the Director noted that there was a need to ensure all contingency contracting officers within the JCC are trained to ensure that the DoD’s mission and visions are attained. Mr. Shay Assad noted that al the recommendations outline by the Task Force were adjudicated and implemented. However, there is more work to ensure that all contingency contracting operations are streamlined.

Johnston III et al. (2005) carried out a study to ascertain the various contingency contracting issues affecting the Pacific Command (PACOM). The researchers found out that PACOM lacks skilled and enough contingency contracting personnel. PACOM requires dedicated personnel who can create the SSCP for the AOR once a tasker is issued from the Joint Staff. The researchers recommended there is a need or PACOM to add a contingency contracting branch to its J42 Logistics Support Division. Likewise, PACOM has an inefficient organizational structure that manages and contingency contracting. This has forced PACOM J2 to rely on outside Service Components. Other issues identified by the researchers include an inefficient Theater Level Contracting Board and a lack of clear information.

The Joint Contingency Contracting acquisition team of the JTSCC is made up of various team members. The commander is the overall leader of the team. The commander must offer contracting support and ensure that all the guidelines and policies are adhered to. The comptroller has the duty of ensuring that the Command's budget is prepared and maintained (Johsnton III et al., 2005). Before any purchase request is made, the comptroller must certify the funds. The staff proponents are responsible for approving the request purchases and ensuring that within their functional areas, there is an efficient contracting support requirement. The requiring activity comprised of an organization, activity, and unit that identifies what is needed and when it is needed (Johnston III et al., 2005). The requiring activity will receive all the services and supplies after a requirement has been contracted. The contracting officers have the duty of acquiring supplies and services for the DoD, and they must comply with the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, Service Supplements, and Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (Johnston et al., 2005). The Contingency Contracting Officer is a contracting officer. However, they have received more specialized training to ensure they are ready for deployment into the contingency contracting environment. Contingencies mostly comprise the unexpected emergencies, a major theater. war, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, or disaster relief. Other essential personnel within the JCC include the judge advocate general (Johnston III et al., 2005). Financial officer, paying agents, ordering offices, receiving official, property book officer, and government-wide commercial purchase cardholders.

1. Findings 

Contracting support is essential for the success of any mission outlined by the DoD. However, in cases where is large multi-Service operations, there is a need for the Geographic Command Combat to designate a JTSCC, LSCC, or LSC to ensure that there is efficient contracting support for the personnel. The JTSCC was formed as Joint Contracting Command-Iraq (JCC-I) in November 2004. However, it is only until 2011 when it assumed its current name, the C-JTSCC. The JTSCC ensures that there is an elimination of duplicate contracting undertakings. The JTSCC is mainly applied to complex, lengthy, and sizable military Phase IV and V activities.

Nonetheless, over the years, there have been claims that the JTSCC has been inflating contract costs. In 2007-2009, it reported $690 million of contracts instead of $18 million associated with Kabujilan Construction Company. In order to eliminate such figures, the data was to be passed through the JCCS. In most cases, the JTSCC is involved in contingency operations. Contingencies mostly comprise the unexpected emergencies, a major theater. war, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, or disaster relief.

In this case, the USA might enter into contingency contracting environments, which include a multinational environment. The USA has paired with various allied countries to carry our various missions across the globe. Contingency operations will thus involve the Services of allied nations and not a single Service’s force. This leads to a diversification of the contingency contracting support systems. The various Service leads will form a Joint Contingency Contracting structure, restrictions, responsibilities, command relationships, and locations. However, the formation of a Joint Contingency Contracting acquisition team must ensure that it comprises the following members; the commander, comptroller, staff proponents, requiring activity, contracting officers, contingency contracting officer, judge advocate general, financial officer, paying agents, ordering offices, receiving official, property book officer, and government-wide commercial purchase cardholders.

1. Conclusion 

In almost all wars engaged by the USA, contingency contracting has been undertaken in one way or the other. There has been a rapid change in contracting obligations. The Afghanistan and Iraq wars have played a vital role in bringing about the various operational contract support changes and challenges. Billions of dollars have been lots to abuse, waste, and fraud in contingency operations over the years. Following a need for better contingency contracting activities, the JCC-I/A was formed in 2004. It was later reassigned to the C-JTSCC in 2011. Under the C-JTSCC, it has played a vital role in managing the Joint Contingency Contracting operations of the USA military over the years.

References 

Ausink, J. A., Castaneda, L. W., & Chenoweth, M. E. (2011).  Air Force contingency contracting: Reach-back and other opportunities for improvement . Santa Monica, CA: Rand Project Air Force.

Ayers, J. R., Balloon, V., Bull, J., Coffey, C., DiNapoli, T., Jaynes, J., & Woolwine, G. (2011).  Contingency Contracting: Observations on Actions Needed to Address Systemic Challenges , Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office.

de Rassenfosse, G., Jaffe, A., & Raiteri, E. (2019). The procurement of innovation by the US government.  PloS one ,  14 (8).

Johnson III, E. K., Paton, B. H., Threat, E. W., & Haptonstall, L. A. (2005).  Joint contingency contractin g. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School Monterey.

Ocampo, R. E., & Mapp, J. A. (2012).  An analytical evaluation of contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan: corporate knowledge for the future.  (Doctoral dissertation, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School).

Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. (2012, April 20). C-JTSCC has taken steps to improve the accuracy of its contract data, but it should assess the feasibility of correcting data for the fiscal year 2009 and earlier. Retrieved March 21, 2020, from https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/2012-04-20audit-12-07.pdf 

Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services. (2009, March 25). Contingency contracting: Has the call for urgent reform been answered ? Retrieved March 21, 2020, from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg50056/html/CHRG-111hhrg50056.htm