OSCE Minsk Group: Performance, Issues, Possible Solutions

Introduction 

After the fall of the Soviet Union, hot fighting broke out in the Azerbaijan enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh leading to the United Nations granting the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) the mandate for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. The CSCE began her work in March 1992, immediately after the newly independent states of Azerbaijan and Armenia formally joined the organization (Volker, 2005). This period coincided with the historical watershed of the fall of the Iron Curtain and rekindled prospects of mutual understanding and cooperation among the CSCE participating states. In this euphoria, it appeared like former Soviet Union countries, including Russia, could be reincorporated into the world system as equals. As a sign of its intention to address the issues of mutual concern, the CSCE transformed itself into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in what looked like a naïve spirit of shared values and mutual trust prevailing over the historically potent national interests (Volker, 2005). In this regard, this paper assesses the evolvement of the Armenia and Azerbaijan conflict with an emphasis on the role played by the OSCE Minsk Group. While a long-term peace settlement has eluded the Group for over two decades, valuable lessons that can be applied in future processes are gained from its past mediation role 

The UN, caught in other major regional conflicts of the time, was quite eager to relinquish this responsibility to the CSCE. Furthermore, with its regional remit, the CSCE appeared better placed to resolve the conflict (Abilov, 2018). Nonetheless, Armenians and Karabakh Armenians preferred the UN channel since her historical allies, France and Russia, were Security Council members. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, favored CSCE leadership since its closest ally, Turkey, was an influential member (Hopmann, 2014). Above all, notes Volker, it was the conviction of key actors that a breakthrough would be attained that led to the CSCE taking mediation responsibility for the Karabakh conflict (2005). The first meeting was called in the newly independent Belarus in the city of Minsk. The conference, however, saw an ever-growing list of issues, and the Armenian occupations led to its failure. Later in 1992 Rome meeting, the Minsk Group was established to represent key member states to take charge of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Despite the Group’s initial efforts, a peace truce was only attained in 1994 when Russia brought the conflicting parties together to sign a ceasefire in Bishkek (Hopmann, 2014). The ceasefire, however, introduced a ‘no war no peace’ situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, achieving little in the form of long-term stability. Over two decades down the line, long lasting peace settlements under the Minsk group are yet to be attained. 

OSCE Minsk Group was created during the 1992 conference on security and cooperation to represent key parties in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and was charged with developing a peace settlement acceptable to the parties. Therefore, the Minsk Group has served as a negotiating platform for these actors. The United States, Russia, and France have for the longest time served as co-chairs of the group. Their role in the group’s peace process has, however, come under scrutiny in recent years from parties to the conflict and experts (Abilov, 2018). The main charge has been that these countries have used their positions in the Group to ensure continued stability and, therefore, conducive environment for advancing their interests as opposed to providing a forum for ongoing negotiations that can lead to a peace settlement. Furthermore, a co-chair like Russia has occasionally been accused by Azerbaijan of taking sides in the conflict through her support for Armenia. Azerbaijan has also often accused the group of failing to have her legitimate territory returned by Armenia despite clear provisions of International Law. And yet, despite some bad blood towards the Minsk Group by parties to the conflict, none has over the years demonstrated an intention to leave (Abilov, 2018). Negotiations on the conflict have, therefore, proceeded within the Minsk Group Framework. 

The Minsk peace process led to three main proposals for the peaceful resolution of the conflict, a common state, a package approach, and step by step solution (Hopmann, 2014). The common state's approach was undeniably the most controversial. It proposed the de facto formation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic that possessed all the characteristics of statehood within the borders of Azerbaijan. One year following the launch of the common state plan, the Geneva meeting of Presidents took place but did not produce meaningful progress due to the accompanying power vacuum in Armenia after the Armenian parliament shootings. The package approach suggested the simultaneous settlement of the conflict through the withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied territories and the concurrent determination of Nagorno-Karabakh status. The step by step plan recommended gradual steps where withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied territory would be followed by talks meant to determine NK’s final status (Hopmann, 2014). The failure of these approaches led to the Minsk group changing tact. It brought the belligerents together for one by one talks that saw parties sit in several cities for peace talks. The 1991 and 2001 talks saw territorial swap talks in line with key Goble and West plans. Failure by conflicting parties to arrive at a peaceful settlement, mainly due to prevailing domestic pressure, led to the 2001 Paris Process, and later, the 2004 Prague process. In all these processes, however, no tangible results were achieved leading the process to a deadlock. 

However, since the Russian-brokered peace settlement of 1994, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) was formed in the region and retains de facto control in the area. However, it has no international statehood recognition even by Armenia or Azerbaijan (Abbasov, 2015). The Republic’s access to the outside world and Armenia is restricted to a 90-kilometer two-lane road between its capita1 Stepanakert and Goria, Armenia. Armenians have since then controlled about 90% of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous blast as well as vast swathes of two districts of Azerbaijan territory outside NKAO. This represents over 13% of Azerbaijan’s territory. The line of contact established by the ceasefire, where both sides have dug in along the highly militarized frontier, is monitored by an OSCE observer group as agreed upon in the Minsk conference (Hopmann, 2014). Nonetheless, sporadic sniper fire killings have, according to the International Crisis Group (2013), been reported and only increased in the past few years. 

Prior to the ceasefire, an approximated 20,000 people lost their lives, and an additional 750,000 Azerbaijanis were displaced and now live as internally displaced persons in Azerbaijan. Also, about 350,000 Armenians fled Azerbaijan for fear of retaliatory attacks and now live as refugees in Russia and Armenia. Since the 1994 ceasefire, roughly 1.1 million people have returned to their homes. In brief, the humanitarian cost of the conflict has been quite stiff, leaving a high degree of animosity, distrust, and hatred and even a desire for revenge in both segments of the population (Hopmann,2014). Since the dispute crossed the Rubicon of large-scale conflict, options that might have been available to negotiators between 1988 and 1991 have largely disappeared, and mediators are now confronted with the daunting challenge of not just finding a peaceful settlement, but also overcoming a bitter legacy. 

OSCE Minsk Group Performance 

The OSCE Minsk Group, tasked with finding a long-term settlement to the dispute through the resolution of the underlying matters in the conflict, has perennially failed to arrive at an agreement. Their mediation efforts have, on occasion, been hampered by the seemingly intractable character of the salient issues in the conflict more so by the zero-sum perception of the dispute, which is not easily amenable to a 50/50 compromise (Garibov, 2016). Both sides to the dispute have based their positions on the constructed national identities, founded on mutually exclusive stories of the cultural and historical importance of Nagorno-Karabakh. The political leadership, having based local support on these mutually exclusive beliefs, has become increasingly entrapped by its rhetoric and, therefore, unable to implement several pragmatic compromises made by the Minsk Group facilitators (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2004). In light of these realities, many today consider the dispute to be the quintessential ‘frozen conflicts.’ However, as recent events in Ukraine and Georgia have demonstrated, seemingly frozen conflicts can resolve themselves through diplomacy or by violent means in which a novel status quo is imposed not by mutual agreement among parties but by force of arms (Abilov, 2018). In fact, in 2014, the Foreign Minister of Switzerland and the OSCE Chairperson in office expressed deep concern over an upsurge in violence levels along the line of contact and the Armenian-Azerbaijan border leading to numerous casualties. As such, they suggested the possibility of the conflict taking a non-peaceful turn (International Crisis Group, 2017). 

The Minsk Group has throughout the mediation efforts wavered between the step by step approach and the package approach. As was indicated earlier, the latter seeks a comprehensive agreement that combines all elements rather than a compromise on every issue. It seeks to identify compromises across all issues of the dispute while conceding to the other party on issues deemed to be of less importance. The key disadvantage of this approach, of course, is that it presupposes agreement on all key issues, including the difficult ones. This becomes particularly difficult when both parties deem an issue to be of high importance (Abbasov, 2015). The former approach is better equipped to address this problem since it allows for the building of trust and momentum on easier issues before addressing the more difficult challenges in the negotiation process. The chief challenge with this approach is that it requires compromises on every issue instead of allowing for cross-issue trade-offs in resolving the broader conflict (Abbasov, 2015). If anything, settlement of less contentious issues might dilute pressure to address the core of the dispute. 

The first package solution was presented by the Swiss Foreign Minister and incumbent OSCE chairman Flavio Cotti. It proposed the preservation of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan while retaining the broadest self-rule for Nagorno Karabakh (Hopmann, 2014). This would have demanded the withdrawal of all forces from Azerbaijan’s occupied territories outside Nagorno Karabakh, unlimited access between Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, and the guarantee of rights of internally displaced persons and refugees to return home. Armenia vehemently opposed this proposal since it resolved the key status issue along the lines favored by Azerbaijan (Abilov, 2018). At the 1997 Lisbon summit, the new co-chairs of the Minsk Group floated a step by step proposal. The key challenge with this proposal was that it postponed the most contested issue of the proposal; that of Nagorno Karabakh sovereignty, while many of the intermediate steps had direct implications for the final issue (Hopmann, 2014). That is, if put into place, it would be challenging to change once or if a final agreement were achieved. Nagorno Karabakh’s leaders, on the other hand, strongly held that the ultimate solution had to incorporate absolute independence. Their claim was especially influential since they already had full control over the territory, and were increasingly wary of intermediate settlements that may undermine that overall objective (Garibov, 2016) . Therefore, even with Azerbaijan’s and Armenian support, many intermediate options were rejected by Nagorno Karabakh’s de facto leadership. 

At the 2001 Key West meeting in Florida, the Minsk Group attempted to go back to the package approach in which Azerbaijan initially accepted to relinquish its sovereignty over Nagorno Karabakh, and in return, for favorable concessions. This offer was, however, later withdrawn by President Haidar Aliyev (Hopmann, 2014). In 2007 the group, having consulted with parties, announced a number of principles that would guide the OSCE’s ministerial council in Madrid later that year based on the fundamental tenets of the Helsinki Decalogue: affirmation of territorial integrity of every OSCE participating state, non-use of force, and respect for the self-determination rights of people (Waal, 2010). The principles, commonly known as the Madrid Principles, were meant to act as a formula upon which the negotiations would follow. However, the prioritization of these principles amongst parties was quite different. Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh underscored self-determination while Azerbaijan stressed territorial integrity of states (Hopmann, 2014). Nagorno Karabakh would, under these principles, be granted interim status including self-governance and security guarantees until other elements were agreed upon and implemented; a legally binding referendum would be conducted to establish the popular will of the people of Nagorno Karabakh about their preferred future status. 

Though seemingly combining elements of both approaches, the Madrid meeting postponed the final resolution of the main issue by introducing a referendum only after the other measures had been agreed upon though prior steps would invariably have a bearing on the sovereignty question. Additionally, the conference did not define the constituency that would participate in the referendum despite it having considerable bearing on the outcome. For these reasons, subsequent efforts by the Minsk Group to arrive at an agreement based on the Madrid principles have proven frustrating, and even attempts at violence reduction along the Armenia –Azerbaijan border and the line of contact have often fallen short (Hopmann, 2014). These failures suggest the need for alternative approaches to break the impasse. 

Contentious Issues 

The current impasse that continues to vex the Minsk Group revolves around a number of factors. The most contentious has undoubtedly been the autonomous status of the former Soviet Oblast of Nagorno Karabakh (Tharoor, 2016). While Azerbaijan has offered deep autonomy within its borders, it strongly opposes unilateral changes to the border changes recognized internationally after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Abilov, 2018). Armenians, on the other hand, are in strong favor for the creation of independent states or the attachment of the territory as an integral component of Armenia (Hopmann, 2014), arguing that Armenians living in Nagorno Karabakh cannot have their safety guaranteed under Azerbaijan dominance in light of recent and past historical events. 

Moreover, deep fractures remain over the status of former Soviet Rayons of Azerbaijan outside Nagorno Karabakh that are now under the occupation of Nagorno Karabakh and Armenian troops. Largely depopulated, this territory has seen many of the cities in it destroyed. Azerbaijan has been especially uncompromising on this issue, demanding the immediate return of this territory and restitution to aid defray the cost of rebuilding infrastructure and damaged homes (Hopmann, 2014). During the initial negotiations, Armenians held that this territory was essential as a security buffer until security guarantees were made (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2004). In more recent years, Nagorno Karabakh politicians have hardened their positions (Hopmann, 2014), claiming that these are liberated territories that ought to be incorporated into the yet to be formed the Artsakh Republic, as the Armenians in Karabakh refer to it. 

The right of return of internally displaced persons and refugees has been a less divisive topic. Indeed, both sides are in agreement on this principle though cleavages emerge on the implementation modalities (Hopmann,2014). On security guarantees, both sides firmly hold that before demilitarizing the line of contact that resulted from the 1994 ceasefire to a mutually acceptable frontier, they must first get mutual security guaranteed from an international authority (Abbasov, 2015). This is because the fear of aggression by the other side remains exceptionally high on either side. For this reason, the presence of an unstable situation is to most parties superior to any changes in the absence of international guarantees. While both sides have stood in support of OSCE’s High-Level Planning Group preparations for a peacekeeping operation, they all remain deeply skeptical of its capacity to implement proper security guarantees in the long run. 

The last contentious issue has been over access between Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia. Armenians have always wanted to retain control of the Lachin Corridor that connects Stepanakert and Armenia, across the Lachin Rayon that is currently under Armenian forces. Additionally, Armenia would like to fly from Yerevan to Stepanakert without the current threat of being shot down. Eventually, Armenia hopes for the opening of a highway and railway line connecting it with Azerbaijan’s capital, which has been closed since the start of the war (Hopmann, 2014). Azerbaijan, on the other hand, would like the return of Lachin district although she would most likely allow international peacekeepers to guarantee rights of passage between Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia. On the airspace above Nagorno Karabakh, Azerbaijan has always insisted that it is her sovereign territory and, therefore, has the right to control all air traffic (Abilov, 2018). Finally, Baku also wants access guarantees to the exclave of Nakhichevan through Armenia. 

As such, the failure of the Minsk process to bring a long-lasting resolution to these issues and bring peace to the Southern Caucasus region for over 20 years of negotiations has raised serious questions whether mediation mechanism is the right approach to the task (Mubashir, Morina, & Vimalarajah, 2016). The UN charter in article 33(1) recognizes that numerous techniques may be employed to bring about conflict prevention, conflict management, and resolution including the use of forceful and coercive means, informal and formal bilateral tools, legal and judicial measures, and third-party interventions (Abbasov, 2015). Mediation is undoubtedly the most commonly employed means of third-party intervention with the stated purpose being resolution or abatement of conflict through negotiation. Indeed, mediation is a distinctive form of third-party intervention in that it does not seek to compel either side but rather offer belligerents’ channels of communication, change the conflicting parties’ perceptions toward each other, and offer ideas that could engender concessions and directly facilitate the bargaining of both parties. 

Individuals, states, and non-governmental organizations may be involved in the negotiation process. In the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, individuals, in the name of high-ranking officials, have certainly played a profound role in the peace talks. States have, however, been most intensely involved in the conflict for fear of changes in the power balance and the desire to enhance their influence in the region. Nonetheless, non-governmental organizations including the human rights groups based in the region have on occasion been involved in the negotiating process (Abbasov, 2015). No institution has, however, been more involved in the mediation of Nagorno Karabakh conflict than the Minsk Group (Volker, 2005). Nevertheless, its failure to arrive at an agreement demands a review of its entire mediation process. A number of factors immediately become evident. 

First, the Minsk Group was, in its initial years, hampered by constant changes in leadership. Changes meant that different actors came with different agendas, which disrupted the continuity of approach (Hopmann, 2014). This has, however, stabilized in recent years as France, Russia, and the United States have assumed co-chair positions. It is worth underscoring that Russia, the US, and France have demonstrated a considerable degree of cooperation in this conflict despite having major differences in other foreign policy areas. Nonetheless, Azerbaijan has, on occasion, accused these countries of bias due to the huge Armenian diaspora within their own countries (Abilov, 2018). There is, however, little evidence to suggest that this has been a decisive factor in the facilitation of these actors. To some observers, Russia’s treaty alliance with Armenia within the framework of Collective Security Treaty Organization and the fact that Russia has military bases in Armenia is an indication of her pro-Armenian bias (Abbasov, 2015). Indeed, the role of major powers in the conflict greatly helps understand the performance of the Minsk Group in the past two decades. 

Throughout the talks, Armenia was rife with accusations of not negotiating independently due to reasons attributable to her military and economic dependence on Russia (Ohanyan, 2015). Nonetheless, even other actors in the process such as the EU, Iran, Turkey, and the US have considerable influence in South Caucasus and have been major players in the region since the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Abbasov, 2015). Some analysts have made the argument that failure to resolve the conflict has had little to do with the incompetence of the Minsk process but rather the power politics between the main actors (Abilov, 2018). 

The United States first entered the region in a bid to extend her commercial interests through support for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline project. During the OSCE summit in Istanbul, the United States expressed support for the construction of the pipeline because it served American interests for diversification of energy flow away from the conflict-plagued Middle East. These energy interests are what primarily directed American interests in the South Caucasus and influenced American support for termination of regional conflicts (Markedonov, 2012). For Azerbaijan, the arrival of American interests in the delivery of Caspian Sea energy to western markets was a boon since it allowed for balancing of Russian weight in the region, and ultimately enabled the realization of the pipeline project. After the 9/11 attacks, American interests in the region became even more entrenched. However, American interest in South Caucasus was largely limited to ensuring safe energy resource delivery across the Caspian Sea to western markets and, therefore, her support for security and stability in the South Caucasus without any special commitment to the attainment of sustainable peace in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict (Abbasov, 2015). The United States, it would appear, has been quite satisfied with the 1994 peace truce brokered by Russia. After all, the ceasefire had been effective in allowing western interests to penetrate the region for exploitation of Azerbaijan’s oil (Rumer, Sokolsky, & Stronski, 2017). In other words, American interests in the region have been extremely limited, and the US is generally unwilling to challenge Russian hegemony. 

It is not an incidental fact that American foreign policy towards former Soviet Union states in South Caucasus has been ‘Russia First.’ Although American interests in the region and more so in Azerbaijan increased tremendously during the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan due to the increased importance of Azerbaijan petrol in fueling American jets in the fight against the Taliban, this influence has decreased tremendously with continued American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the region, and with the historic Iranian nuclear deal (Abbasov, 2015). The nuclear deal has opened Iran to international markets, and in so doing, decreased Azerbaijan’s geopolitical importance for the delivery of vital goods and services from the Middle Eastern region to the West (Giragosian & Tornike Sharashenidze, 2015). All these developments have served to decrease American interest in resolving the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. This is especially disheartening for the Minsk process given the centrality of the United States in any employ of coercive force, especially in the form of sanctions. 

At the EU level, there lacks an adequate foreign policy composition that can actively engage in independent dispute resolution. The European Union has generally been a reluctant player in conflict management in Europe after the Yugoslav crisis and has generally been reluctant to confront Russia, especially in the crises of former Soviet Union countries (Abbasov, 2015). Despite constructing relations with South Caucasus states in the 1990s, the EU lacks the substantive capabilities to offer security guarantees to these countries in the face of Russian aggression. The Georgian-Russian war that lasted for five days and the 2014 annexation of Crimea demonstrates the extent to which EU’s eastern neighbors are vulnerable to Russian manipulation (Ohanyan, 2015). It is this situation that makes the European Union’s role in the region unlikely to produce a settlement in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. The other group of countries that could influence the conflict is Turkey and Iran. Iran took an active role in the conflict in the 1990s following the Armenian occupations during the Tehran peace talks. The results of those talks suggest Tehran cannot bring about a negotiated settlement (Abbasov, 2015). If anything, the recent rounds of sanctions against Tehran for alleged sponsorship of terror and nuclear program have completely limited her ability to engage in any meaningful mediation process. The other regional player, Turkey, is completely handicapped as a mediator in the Nagorno Karabakh dispute due to the so-called genocide it perpetrated against the Armenians (International Crisis Group, 2018). 

In the face of these realities, Russia has taken the lead role in the mediation process, and to some commentators, has completely monopolized that process. That role is reinforced by her strong influence [economic and military] in the region. The continuation of the conflict only enables Russia to exert her military and strategic presence in the region thus impeding the loss of South Caucasus as a Russian sphere of influence (Ohanyan, 2015). It is widely accepted that Armenia is economically and militarily dependent on Russia, a dependence that has been key in preventing it from integrating into the European Union. Indeed, this explains why Armenia failed to sign the more appealing EU association agreement but joined the Russian initiated Custom Union. With America not keen to upset this balance, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is likely to tilt in whatever direction Russia wishes. In other words, from a structural level of analysis, the Nagorno Karabakh peace talks for the last 20 years have revealed Russian influence in the trajectory of the conflict. Were Russia to exert her influence markedly, it is plausible to think the conflict would come to a close. 

Then again, other factors help to understand the intractability of the conflict. The Minsk Group has, for instance, since 1998 suffered from the absence of key non-state parties to the conflict including Azerbaijani IDPs and the representative of Nagorno Karabakh’s de facto government (Hopmann, 2014). These parties are likely to introduce additional spoilers to the conflict and, therefore, influence the process. Total spoilers are likely to surface whether or not they are represented in the peace process. ‘Spoilers’ must, therefore, be included if the final agreement is to take hold. The internal politics within Armenia and Azerbaijan and even within Nagorno Karabakh has become even more toxic for the Minsk process. Politicians in all these areas have become more radical in their approach in a bid to win votes. Therefore, most governments’ commitments to the electorate are largely at odds with the concessions discussed at the Minsk Group. These negotiations become even more challenging when extremist parties in either country ascend to power. Other than the character of internal politics amongst the parties, challenges also arise with internal instability (Garibov, 2016). Armenia, for instance, has been caught between episodes of political turmoil that invariably impact the mediation process under the Minsk Group. 

The failure to resolve the conflict must, however, also be seen with the context of the intractable nature of the issues themselves. Even the most competent negotiators are unlikely to broker a deal that none of the parties want. All the three parties gladly concede that there is no better option to the Minsk process and, therefore, have over the years remained committal to the framework (Volker, 2005). The challenge, it would appear, lies not in the abolishment of the Minsk process, but rather in finding a viable approach more likely to engender tangible, long-run results. This proposition stands in conflict with those of critics who see the Minsk process as being incapable of producing a long run settlement. It has thus been recommended that the dispute ought to be referred to the Security Council of the United Nations (Abilov, 2018). It is, however, unlikely that the UN will do a better job. Occupied with other conflicts around the world, the UN is unlikely to give more attention to the conflict than the OSCE. It is worth remembering that the UN surrendered the dispute to the CSCE in line with chapter 4 of the charter precisely because it thought that the dispute had better chances of resolution at that regional level (International Crisis Group, 2005). Furthermore, given that the matter pits major powers, especially Russia, it is more likely to end in deadlock as key actors exercise their VETO powers. It is, in fact, not historically accurate to assume that the UN has not played a role in the dispute. The Security Council passed resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 in the wake of Armenian occupations in which it expressed serious concern about the continuation of the conflict (Abbasov, 2015). The resolution would offer a solid legal basis for peace talks with an emphasis on the question of Nagorno Karabakh territorial integrity. 

Security Council Resolution 822 was unanimously adopted by members of the Security Council on April 30 th, 1993 in response to a report tabled by the Secretary-General. The report expressed concern over the deterioration of conflict and more so the invasion of Azerbaijan’s Kelbadjar district by local Armenian forces (UNSCR, 1993) . It demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities and the return of all parties to the negotiating table. Security Council Resolution 853 was adopted in July 1993 and was largely an affirmation of resolution 822, which had called for a cessation of hostilities and a return to the negotiating table. The resolution was, however, more emphatic on attacks on civilians and impediments faced by the international relief effort. The resolution also commended the work of OSCE Minsk Group and urged parties to prioritize negotiations (UNSCR, 1993) . 

These resolutions were followed by UNSC resolutions 874 and 884. The former reaffirmed resolution 822 and 853 and expressed concern about the continuation of the conflict. It also expressed support for the negotiation process and urged the conflicting parties to accept the ‘Accepted Timetable of Urgent Steps’ presented by the Minsk Group. The resolution was unique in that it was the first to urge neighboring states to desist from interventions that may exacerbate the conflict (UNSCR, 1993) . In resolution 884, the council reaffirmed the previous three resolutions and called for a cessation of hostilities as well as intervention by external actors (UNSCR, 1993) . This was at a time when the war had broken on the Azerbaijan- Iran border. The resolution, however, did little to stop the shelling, and sporadic fighting continued. This is despite these resolutions being chapter VII resolutions, which means that the UNSC could have intervened militarily or non-militarily owing to ‘any threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression.’ 

There are also numerous reasons why Nagorno Karabakh dispute mediation process has not yielded a settlement since the1994 Russian-brokered ceasefire. First, both parties tend to think that time is on their side (Volker, 2005). This makes them hold out in the hope of a better settlement in the future. For instance, Azerbaijan’s leaders believe they can alter the prevailing balance of power in their favor through consolidation of their armed forces and, therefore, pressure the Armenians to better terms with the threat of force, and retake the conquered territory with their new-found military might (Abilov, 2018). On the other side, and more so in the de facto Nagorno Karabakh Republic, it is believed that prolongation of the status quo will only serve to consolidate their claim for independence in the eyes of the international community as the reality on the ground evolves to become the accepted condition (Abbasov, 2015). In both instances, the notion that different forms of power are changing in their favor makes them reluctant to make concessions. 

Equally significant, the zero-sum perception of interest indicates a deeper identity conflict. The Nagorno Karabakh conflict is one of the many that emerged with the fall of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. Since the majority within the sub-units that became states came to be identified as a nation, all the other smaller groups became sub-entities. Although the history of conflicts is often framed as being between ancient rivals, in reality, there are no ancient hatreds, but contemporary concerns about securing national identities against fears and perceived existential threats, especially in light of recent histories of deadly pogroms or even war. The Azerbaijanis consider Nagorno Karabakh as part of a nation that stretches back to the Soviet times and view them to be central to the Azeri culture, the birthplace of many notable poets, artists, and musicians (Abilov, 2018). To them, therefore, the loss of this territory would mean tearing away an important cultural heritage. Armenians, on the other hand, consider part of the territory to be a cradle of Armenian civilization. Negotiations are, therefore, complicated by the fact that the conflict is not just an elite fight, but one between populations (Hopmann, 2014). This makes even strong leaders in these rather authoritarian states unable to risk the domestic consequences of being too generous with concessions, more so those that entail the surrender of socially constructed national identities. In brief, mediation is likely to be successful where parties are willing to make the necessary psychological reframing including on making concessions on the less than ideal outcomes. 

Possible Trajectories 

With well over twenty years of Minsk Group-led talks that have yielded ‘no war no peace’ situation, it is important to ask what trajectory the Nagorno Karabakh conflict might take in light of regional, international, and internal developments. Two scenarios, it is widely accepted, are possible, the resolution of the conflict through continued talks or war or, on the other hand, the continuation of the status quo (Abbasov, 2015). The resumption of war as a disruptor of the status quo is highly undesirable for regional security and individual parties themselves. For Azerbaijan, the war would mean the disruption of regional projects and energy resources on which it is highly dependent. The recent slump in international oil prices demonstrated all too well how vulnerable Azerbaijan is to shocks in international oil prices (Tharoor, 2016). It is, therefore, unlikely that Azerbaijan will support war as an approach to the resolution of the dispute given the likely effects on her economy. 

Regional developments also have a significant bearing on the conflict. The five-day Russian war, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the Armenian Turkish rapprochement have profound implications for the conflict. Russian actions have demonstrated the fragility of security in the South Caucasus and her willingness to use force to exert her influence within her orbit (International Crisis Group, 2018). These developments only serve to make a negotiated settlement even more unlikely. The status quo, which has persisted for over twenty years now, is likely to endure in the coming years. It would, however, be undesirable for the current untenable situation to persist. There is, therefore, a need to examine how a negotiated settlement can be attained within the framework of the Minsk Group. 

Towards a Resolution 

Previous efforts under the Minsk process offer wonderful insights on the measures that ought to be taken and what ought to be avoided. For instance, the Madrid Principles offer useful guidelines on the basis upon which future deliberations ought to be based. Some initial steps are important to build confidence. In this, the international community, and more so key regional powers can play a profound role. Mutual withdrawal of forces from the demilitarized zone along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and the current line of contact would be important initial steps (International Crisis Group, 2005). The OSCE should subsequently revamp its monitoring role to rein in the recurring violence. Should this take place, Armenians ought to pull out their forces from the present five occupied territories, probably starting with Aghdam, which are internationally recognized Azerbaijan territory. This, however, has to be accompanied by security guarantees to Armenia (Hopmann, 2014). The effectiveness of security guarantees is nonetheless dependent on the actors issuing them. After the manifest failures of the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission in Eastern Ukraine, it is unlikely that either Azerbaijan or Armenia will be comfortable with such guarantees. Any guarantees, therefore, would have to entail key actors like Russia, the United States, and France who have taken a keen interest in the conflict and have the substantive capacity to implement such guarantees. Russia is an especially important actor in the region and has close ties with Armenia. It is, therefore, unlikely that other actors will accept guarantees without Russia acceptance. This is because the United States, the only other power that could offer similar security guarantees, has not demonstrated a keen interest in the region beyond commerce. Disarmament and peacekeeping forces would serve as the initial steps that demonstrate goodwill and intention to find an amicable solution to the dispute. 

Beyond these first steps, the resolution of the conflict will have to confront the critical issue of Nagorno Karabakh status. A comprehensive package focusing on the sovereignty question ought to be presented, upon which all other issues are contingent. This is because addressing other issues with first solving the core matter is likely to be counterproductive. In this package, the Minsk Group ought to propose an internationally supervised referendum in which the legal status of Nagorno Karabakh is determined, with voters deciding on three options: unification as an Armenian province, autonomy with Azerbaijan or Nagorno Karabakh’s independence (Hopmann, 2014). It can be expected that considerable dispute will emerge on who can vote in the plebiscite. Armenians would prefer to have residents of Nagorno Karabakh vote. Given the present composition of Nagorno Karabakh, after the ethnic cleansing of almost all Azerbaijanis who lived there for years, the proposition for unification with Armenia would win with a landslide. Azerbaijanis, however, submit their constitution does not permit secession if it is not voted for by the entire country. An election based on this electorate composition would undoubtedly ensure Nagorno Karabakh remains part and parcel of Azerbaijan since the huge Azerbaijani population would oppose Nagorno Karabakh’s loss (Abilov, 2018). The third option, which appears the fairest and most logical, and yet most difficult to execute, would require all current Nagorno Karabakh residents as well as refugees (who were Nagorno Karabakh residents at the time of the Soviet break up in 1992) and their descendants to be the ones to cast a vote. In this case, attachment to Armenia or independence would likely carry the day, but with a narrower margin than in the initial option. 

All parties in the Minsk Group are well aware that a referendum would be merely a formality since the composition of the electorate is going to be the decisive factor, and such a route would be in Armenia’s favor (Garibov, 2016). However, handing Nagorno Karabakh back to Azerbaijani would be entirely unacceptable for the residents there, who after twenty years of violence and threats from Baku, are completely opposed to being part of Azerbaijan state regardless of the degree of autonomy. It would be similar to persuading Kosovo Albanians to return to Serbia after the violence of the 1990s (International Crisis Group, 2013). Even if the return of Nagorno Karabakh were accompanied by extensive international guarantees, it would still be at considerable cost to Baku, which is generally averse to the international presence on its territory (Hopmann, 2014). Furthermore, such a concession would demand major guarantees and protection of rights of the Armenian population not just in Nagorno Karabakh but also in the rest of Azerbaijan. Such a victory would, therefore, be largely pyrrhic due to the high long-run cost. The alternative would be to settle for a referendum, which would certainly result in independence for Nagorno Karabakh. With this concession, Azerbaijan can seek concessions in other aspects of the settlement (Hopmann, 2014). Overall, a settlement along these lines offers a less complex and more viable settlement, albeit still fraught with numerous stumbling blocks. 

Besides the issue of Nagorno Karabakh status, Azerbaijan has a rather strong case and should get major concessions in her favor. The claims by Nagorno Karabakh political leadership that the seven occupied districts are liberated Armenian territory flies in the face of international law, more so the doctrine of territorial sovereignty. Thus, the Minsk Group settlements need to amend for the initial violation of Azerbaijani’s territorial integrity (International Crisis Group, 2005). Similarly, Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh-based Azerbaijan refugees need to be guaranteed a right of return in any future settlement. However, the right of return is only important in principle as few refugees would be willing to return even when presented with the opportunity (Hopmann, 2014). Another secondary issue would be that of the right of passage. This right ought to be guaranteed via sea and land between the three territories and neighboring states. This could be attained in several ways including restoration of pre-existing infrastructure. The mutual benefits of keeping these routes open is already a powerful incentive for all parties to adhere to a comprehensive agreement (Hopmann, 2014). While such a plan to peace makes some heroic assumptions, especially the assumption that parties would be willing to make some initial concessions, it nonetheless reflects what needs to be done to attain peace. Above all, for the Minsk process to have even a modicum of success, parties must have a genuine interest to resolve the conflict, a fundamental necessity that has so far been lacking. 

Conclusion 

The paper has sought to establish the primary reasons behind the failure of the Minsk Group peace process over the last more than twenty years. The Minsk Group, being the OSCE body mandated with coming up with a peace settlement on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, has made several proposals including a step by step plan, a common state plan, and a package approach. While the inadequacy of the Minsk Group, including lack of continuity in leadership, played a profound role in the failure to resolve the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, other factors such as major power relations were significant in influencing the trajectory of the mediation process. In light of the criticisms leveled against the Minsk Group and the likely continuation of the status quo, the paper ends by sketching possible a viable route to a long-term settlement. The intractability of the issues in the dispute, it is underscored, makes an easy settlement impossible and in fact, a settlement can only be attained with the commitment of all parties. 

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