If the tenant engages in illegal acts on the grounds or around the building as described in the lease, then he should be evicted. From the case, it was shown that any form of criminal activity was a substantial justification for eviction; therefore, Derek was engaged in a robbery resulting in her removal within a thirty days period. First Derek was issued with an eviction notice of thirty days to vacate the apartment and other instances; it might involve court appearances and a trial (Korobkin, 2003).
Based on Bishop’s argument, the lease grants the landlord ultimate discretion to determine whether Derek’s violation of the contract will subject him to possible eviction (Bishop v. Housing Authority of South Bend). It is clear that the provision outlined in the lease related to the commission of a criminal act strictly follows the established federal for similar provision on the public housing contractual leases. In addition to this, the rules set in the contract that grants the landlord discretion to terminate the lease is also clearly outlined in the federal law regarding public housing lease. For instance, focusing on a case between Lowery v. Housing Authority of Terre Haute it is evident that clear that all forms of leases on public housing ought to take into consideration the provision provided in the federal rule regarding public housing lease (Korobkin, 2003).
Delegate your assignment to our experts and they will do the rest.
It is clear that a due process in most instances will demand a notice of eviction, the chance for the tenant to be heard in addition to the opportunity to confront witnesses but this was not the case with Derek. It is undeniable that Derek as a tenant was given notice of the provisions of the lease where she had thirty days to vacate the apartment. According to the lease, it can be proved that Derek obtained a notice that her lease was terminated by the landlord because of her violation of its specific terms of the contract and to leave the premises within a period of thirty days. Subsequently, upon Derek’s failure to leave the premises on the agreed date, the landlord will have no otherwise than to file a notice of claim to the court for further legal actions (Bishop v. Housing Authority of South Bend).
Focusing on Derek’s argument, the most fundamental test that should be determined is the unconscionability testing, and this should be done in accordance to the general commercial background in addition to the business needs of the case. It can be argued that the clauses that were involved seem to be one-sided to being unconscionable under the current time of contract development (Korobkin, 2003). There is the need for the fundamental fairness to be adopted to avoid any form of unmerited, one-sided and perverse application of the terms of the lease to her. If this is not the case, then it will follow that the contract unconscionable based on the facts in evidence within the case might not be convincing.
In my understanding, Derek should vacate the premises because she had violated the terms of the lease by engaging in a criminal activity and further left without informing the landlord as agreed. Focusing on her plea for fundamental fairness, and whether the facts expresses aspects of unconscionability, it is worth noting that Derek did not state that she had not read or comprehended the lease. As per the lease, she was expected to fully comply with the provisions of the contract such as notifying the landlord that she was moving and never to engage in illegal activity but she failed on all aspects out but never did that; therefore, we can argue that the lease was unconscionable. Derek argument can be founded on the notion that in ending the contract, Bishop had imposed a significantly ‘strict liability’ concepts that imposed personal liability not considering personal knowledge of individual acts of anyone in the Bishop family violating the due process rights of the Bishop family.
References
Bishop v. Housing Authority of South Bend. Case study.
Korobkin, R. (2003). Bounded rationality, standard form contracts, and unconscionability. The University of Chicago Law Review , 1203-1295.
