The 22 nd of June 2009 saw the collision of two southbound Red Line Washington Metro trains. The total number of casualties was nine with tens of others being injured. According to DC Metro, the cause of the accident was a track circuit-related malfunction (Charette, 2009). The actual time of the accident was at 1702 and it too at least eighteen minutes for the first responders to arrive. They included fire personnel from the Metro Transit police, as well as fire personnel and paramedics from District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services. The first duty of the responders was to engage in rescue operations, with the mass casualty incident teams setting out to obtain bodies as well as help individuals that had been trapped in the wreckage. The rescue operations at the train station were accomplished with the aid of three battalion chiefs, including a special operations battalion chief, a safety officer, emergency services supervisor and a heavy rescue squad. Equipment used in the rescue operations include a crane, five fire engines, a single life support ambulance and two trucks (CNN Newsource, 2009).
The incident commander system was vital in ensuring smooth and effective operations at the site of the accident. Two battalion chiefs that responded to the accident, with the first serving as the incident commander and the other as a liaison officer at Metro Operations. They went on to establish a command post and incident objectives, as well as a plan of action that would see them utilized local as well as out-of-service resources ( National Transportation Safety Board, 2010) . As the nation's capital, it is without a doubt that the responders were faced with a gigantic task considering how busy the Metro Station can be (CNN Newsource, 2009). While it is evident that the incident command system was adhered to, flaws and loopholes can be noted in the rescue operations by the first responders. A case in point being the contention regarding the third rail which was apparently left open during the entirety of the rescue mission. According to the Metro Station, the third rail was switched off at the very onset of the rescue operations. However, information from the detectors used by the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services indicate that it was still on.
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This particular oversight can be looked like a communication mishap between Metro Station personnel and the rescue team. In failing to establish an effective communication line, the rescue operations could have been compromised in the event of an oncoming train. While it is seemingly a simple and oversight, it does hint at the need to enhance the collaboration and communication aspect of the incident command system. It is important to note the fact that identifying the span of control by the incident commanders was largely influenced by the huge jurisdictional and multi-agency presence at the site of the accident. Every catastrophe often comes with the silver lining of new lessons to be learned. The same goes for DC Metro train collision. The loss of lives, as well as the injuries sustained, remain tragic. However, it is by learning from the strengths and eliminating weaknesses in the rescue operations, that greater efficacies can be realized in the incident command system. Ultimately, a lot of lives was saved by adhering to the incident command system, and while communication remains a major loophole, acknowledging it is a challenge offers the best chance at enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the ICS.
References
Charette, R. N. (2009). Automated to death. IEEE Spectrum , 15 .
CNN Newsource. (2009). Investigator: D.C. Metro crash 'a scene of real devastation' . Retrieved on 22 February 2018, from http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/06/23/washington.metro.crash/.
National Transportation Safety Board. (2010). Collision of Two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail Trains near Fort Totten Station [Press release]. Retrieved on 22 February 2018, from https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/RAR1002.aspx.
