The paper The Nature and Value of Rights by Joel Feinberg argues the moral significance of claim rights. Claim rights, according to Feinberg (1970), are those that can be demanded, asserted, and insisted upon. Claim rights also have the supreme moral importance that gives their holder the reason to be proud and have a minimal level of self-respect that is equal to thinking of the rights holder as a person with rights that can be claimed, demanded, and asserted. I concur with Feinberg that rights are morally significant. However, I disagree with his view that said claim rights are supremely morally important, especially the corollary that self-respect and respecting others comes from recognizing one's claim rights and those of another person, respectively.
Vignettes as Case Studies
Take a fictitious individual named John, who ascribes to Feinberg's claim rights and, by implication, has self-respect. Furthermore, the people in his environment, such as colleagues at work, roommates, friends, and even romantic partners, recognize the rights and respect them. However, recognition and respect do not imply observance and compliance with the expected forms of behavior. In other words, there are certain occasions where they will be motivated to harm, cheat, or steal from John. Therefore, John will be expected to assert his rights immediately, and the offenders will be obliged to change their behaviors. However, there are cases where the interactions will go as follows.
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At John's place of work, it is customary to praise and congratulate any high performing or productive employee. Following this work culture, John will always give credit where it's due and even compliment his colleague. However, when John performs above his peers, they do not reciprocate by praising or complimenting him. Furthermore, John is quick to forgive his friends or colleagues whenever they wrong him regardless of the magnitude of the offense. However, his friends and colleagues do not reciprocate as expected. It does not matter if John is sincere or is willing to compensate more than he is morally obligated.
In all the cases, the other party is obligated to reciprocate, such as by giving John something or doing something for him. Yet, John has no right to them. In other words, it is wrong for John to demand some of the things. For instance, it would be wrong for John to demand of his colleagues to praise and compliment him. On the other hand, doing nothing about It is not an option, and any outsider might advise John to change his friends, colleagues, and even his place of work as it is unhealthy. However, these are the same claim rights that, according to Feinberg (1970), John is allowed to demand, assert, or insist upon.
The True Nature of Demanding
The core idea in Feinberg's paper is that claim-rights are supremely important because they can be claimed, demanded, affirmed, and insisted upon. Though the different verbs are normally applied in different contexts, they are a form of interpersonal influence. When one claims or insists upon a particular idea, their expectation is that the other party will change their beliefs or patterns of behavior in agreement. However, there is also the chance that the claim will not be followed because the other party does not view it as important or because they have no obligation to follow. It is, therefore, important to differentiate this form of interpersonal influence, to be termed as demanding for the rest of the paper, from other forms of influence.
First, demanding is different from epistemic influence because the latter changes an individual's behavior by informing and using rational arguments. For instance, when boarding an overcrowded subway, one might inform a fellow passenger that they have stepped on their foot. As a result, they inform and demand at the same time, and the offender might be obliged to move back. Secondly, demanding is not an exercise of normative authority. In other words, the other party does not oblige by creating new reasons that they did not have.
A good example is a relationship between a coach and their star basketball player. When the coach demands of the player to perform a certain number of suicide runs, the player is expected and will oblige. It might appear that the coach's demand gave the player a normative set of reasons to do the suicide runs. However, it is not the coach's demand that forced compliance in the player. Instead, it is the coach's authority that gave the player reasons to perform the suicide runs. Therefore, demanding is not enough to exercise normative authority. Therefore, it becomes essential to understand what drove the player to comply.
Take another case study. John receives a phone call demanding ransom from a stranger who claims to have kidnapped his mother and sister. To release them, the stranger demands that John sends $1.5 million and not contact the authorities. John has several options. First, he might comply with the demands. Secondly, he might refuse to send the money. Regardless of what he chooses, he will have to ask for proof and what might happen if he refuses to comply. The stranger might then answer by telling John: If you do not follow my instructions, I will do A starting with your sister, where A is an action or sequence of actions undesirable to John, such as killing.
The stranger's demands are, therefore, explicit threats. To avoid undesirable outcomes, John will have to comply, thus creating normative reasons. The same case with the coach. It might be team policy that when the coach demands for a suicide run, the player (s) have to comply or face the consequences, such as being benched for the next five games. However, there are other cases where threats are implicit. For instance, if Jane borrows $1500 from John and promises to return it by a certain time. If Jane fails, John can demand his money, and Jane will be obliged to settle the debt after imagining the things that John might do, such as embarrass her in front of her friends and colleagues.
Therefore, demanding works by coercing the demandee. The threats can be explicit or implicit, relying on the demandee's imagination. There is a condition, however. The individual making the demand should have standing. In other words, there are special norms that permit demanding as a special kind of coercion. For instance, all demands must have a basis. If Jane borrows from John, he has a basis for making the demand. However, if there was no debt between the two, John can be said to have no right to make the demand. Additionally, it is important that it is the demander's business. In other words, if Peter, a stranger, hears John's demands, he might side with either and demand that John has no right (if he is not aware of the debt) or demand that Jane repay the debt. In either case, John or Jane might rebuke Peter that it is none of his business.
The last norm involves John being permitted to demand his money back, but not demand that Jane be grateful while doing it. There is a limit to what can be demanded. Taking the previous case studies into consideration, it is John's business whether he receives accolades from his colleagues or that he be forgiven. However, John does not have a basis to demand forgiveness or compliments as they are not things that people are obligated to provide. Furthermore, demanding works by coercion and none of the things John deserves can be coerced.
Therefore, not all rights can be demanded. For instance, John has the right to demand the protection and other services from the law enforcement authorities when his life is threatened or when he suffers an injustice. Furthermore, he has the right to demand for his debt be repaid. In both cases, it is John’s business to make the demands and he has the special permission to influence the other parties via coercion. However, the limit to John’s right to coercion implies that he has no right to demand the other party to show gratitude.
Conclusion
In conclusion, claim rights as posited by Feinberg are morally significant. John has the right to be complimented and congratulated by his colleagues as he does to them. Furthermore, John has the right to be forgiven by his friends or romantic partners as he does for them. However, John has no basis for making the claims, demand, affirm or insist upon receiving said actions. There are no moral norms that would grant special permission for coercion. Therefore, claim rights are not supremely morally important, especially the corollary that self-respect and respecting others comes from recognizing one's claim rights and those of another person.
References
Feinberg, J. (1970). The nature and value of rights. The Journal of Value Inquiry , 4 (4), 243-260.
