Facts
The case involved Robert Keeler the defendant who had accosted his wife Teresa Keeler after finding out that she was pregnant for another man. The two had divorced on September 27, 1978, and the assault occurred on February 23, 1969. The defendant had forced Teresa to pull over and confronted her about the pregnancy. The sight of her pregnancy drove the defendant to strike Teresa in the stomach using his knee with the sole intention of causing a miscarriage. Following the confrontation, Teresa underwent an emergency Caesarian section but the fetus was stillborn. The fetus had suffered a skull fracture, which was cited as the cause of its death following an investigation. The evidence further suggested that the fetus had been viable of the attack and had a 75 to 90 % of survival even if it had been born prematurely. The defendant was then charged with murder under the Californian Penal Code § 187 criminalizing the offense. His motion was denied at the lower court forcing him to petition the superior court from proceeding with the charge.
Issue
Does the fetus, that the defendant is accused of killing, considered a human being within California's statute’s meaning?
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Is the killing of a viable but unborn fetus a murder?
Rule
The case was guided by the Cal. Penal Code § 187, which establishes that the unlawful killing of a human being or a fetus with malice constitutes murder. This statute means that a killer usually has a wanton disregard for life and engages in an act that has a high probability of resulting in death. Section 187 was part of the Penal Code of 1872, which had been enacted to help bring a clear definition of what constituted murder in this jurisdiction. The other rule that applied, in this case, was 2 Penal Code section 5, which had also been enacted in 1872. The rule established that "The provisions of this code, so far as they are substantially the same as existing statutes, must be construed as continuations thereof, and not as new enactments" (Justia, 2020). The rule was aligned with the common law of abortional homicide. This law indicates that an infant cannot possibly be subject to homicide unless it has been alive at the time of birth. Apart from the common law on abortional homicide, the case relied on Penal Code section 6. This section establishes that an act of omission is not punishable unless authorized or prescribed by the code. Furthermore, the section encompasses a constitutional prohibition against unusual and cruel punishment since the power of fixing penalties and defining crimes is exclusive to the legislature. In this case, the state has a policy of construing a favorable sand reasonable statute for the defendant.
Analysis
The court conducted an extensive survey into the legislature's intention of adopting § 187 and established that it did not intend to include an unborn fetus in the reaches of this statute. If the court were to declare that an unborn fetus would fit within the murder statute, it would exceed its constitutional and judicial limits. In the case that the court would adopt § 187, it would have to apply it progressively since applying the new rule to the defendant would violate his right to due process. The court went ahead to issue the writ of prohibition that held that the viable but unborn fetus would not be considered a human being under Cal. Penal Code § 187.
Furthermore, the court felt that although the Penal Code calls for the construing of its provisions, it would be illegal to enlarge a statute by deleting and inserting words to create an offense (Justia, 2020). In this case, penal statutes may not be capable of reaching beyond the plain intent they convey unless they address the offenses that come near the import of their language. Section 87 of the Californian Penal Code would only apply to the malicious and unlawful killing of individuals born alive. The liability of murder in California could only be determined solely within the legislature's province. The jury established that a court could not simply adopt judicial fiat to declare that section 187 could be used to prosecute a person who kills an unborn but viable fetus. Such a decision would be rewriting the statute, while in the real sense, it would be under the guise of construing it. The court concluded that the application of the rule would only be compelling where the defendant's conduct was improper or immoral, but this was not the case.
Conclusion
The case relied on section 187 of the California penal Code, which highlighted the actions that constituted murder. According to the section, the defendant would have been guilty since he had maliciously killed a viable but unborn child. While the rule seemed to apply in the case, the court decided that this rule would not be applicable since it aligned to traditional common laws. The court concluded that the defendant would not be charged under this rule, as doing so would translate to rewriting it to fit the case. The case shows that there is a need to have comprehensive laws written in direct language to ensure that justice is served. States must amend their laws considering that Keeler would not be charged with homicide in a much as the infant had a 95% of surviving.
Reference
Justia. (2020) . Keeler v. Superior Court. https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/2/619.html
