Introduction
The evidence reflects on the collapse of the I-35W bridge over the Mississippi River in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on August 1, 2007 (Harris Jr, Pritchard, Rabins, James, & Englehardt, 2013). The collapse of the bridge resulted in the death of 13 persons with scores of other people being injured, as the bridge collapsed during rush hour. The collapse raised severe questions on the safety of bridges in the United States considering that this bridge had gone through annual inspections since 1993 with the latest being in March 2007. The bridge had been accorded a rating of 4, on a scale of 0 to 9, which signifies the fact that the bridge is in poor condition but can still be of use without any load restrictions (Harris Jr, Pritchard, Rabins, James, & Englehardt, 2013). The collapse highlights the fact that engineers involved in the construction failed to adhere to the engineering code of ethics that would be expected to define their approach towards creating a safe structure.
The code of ethics that applies to this case is Code 1a, which states that, “Engineers shall recognize that the lives, safety, health and welfare of the general public are dependent upon engineering judgments, decisions and practices incorporated into structures, machines, products, processes and devices” (Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology, 2018, p.2). In this case, the engineers failed to recognize the implications that their shoddy work may have on public safety. The argument that this report will seek to present reflects on the fact that the engineers, Sverdrup & Parcel and Associates, Inc. acted in a manner that does not reveal on expected moral standards while considering the nature of the project that they were undertaking. Highlighting this issue is essential, as it will help in the identification of specific areas where engineers may need to focus on as part of advancing public safety in the projects that they undertake.
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Arguments Supporting Thesis
An in-depth analysis of the case shows serious laxity on the part of the engineers involved, as well as, the design quality control department that is included in the inspection of bridges resulting in the collapse. Sverdrup & Parcel and Associates, Inc., which was the consulting engineering firm, acted in a manner that was contrary to the set engineering code of ethics touching on public safety. That can be seen from the fact that the firm failed to specify the proper thickness of the gusset plate, which is one of the critical factors that may have resulted in the collapse. By failing to determine such information, the firm put in jeopardy the entire project considering that the thickness of the gusset plate was insufficient; thus, meaning the bridge may have collapsed at any time.
The case also highlights the fact that the National Transportation Safety Board took note of the fact that federal and state transportation officials also acted in an immoral manner leading up to the collapse. The officials had a pivotal role to play in the inspection of the bridge as a way of ensuring that it adheres to set standards. That involved having to consider the gusset plates as part of the inspection process, which would have helped in the identification of possible insufficiencies in the plates. A report by the NTSB takes note of the fact that the inspections of the bridge did not give adequate attention to gusset plates, which meant that the officials involved excluded gusset plates when engaging in analyses touching on the loading rating of the bridge.
The state government, which is a critical stakeholder in areas of public safety, may also be considered as a stakeholder that failed to adhere to the expected moral standards; thus, paving the way for the ultimate collapse of the bridge. One of the key aspects to note from this case is the fact that the most recent inspection gave the bridge a rating of 4, which may have suggested that it was somewhat defective. It was within the responsibility of the state government to make relevant follow-ups on the state of the bridge with the aim being towards dealing with the issues that had cited as part of the report. It was expected that the state government would have mobilized resources as a way of ensuring that it focused on correcting some of the issues that had been identified as part of the report from the most recent inspection.
From this perspective, it is clear that the collapse was mostly preventable, considering that all the underlying issues associated with its loading rating would have been identified early in advance. Additionally, this means that the engineering firm would have indicated the expected thickness of the plate as a way of ensuring that it maintains the best possible performance outcomes. The fact that the NTSB report acknowledges failure on the part of the federal and state officials means that this is a case that was preventable if all the stakeholders acted in a manner that was focused on public safety. Each of the stakeholders identified can be held to account for the collapse on the basis that they failed to undertake their respective roles and responsibilities in a manner that was reflective of their expectations in promoting public safety standards.
Objection
On the other hand, it can be argued that the stakeholders, as have been discussed in the previous section, cannot be held to account for the collapse of the bridge considering that it has been in operation for 40 years since its opening in 1967. The failure of the bridge can be attributed to normal tear and wear attributed to a wide array of factors, which include weather, among others. Although the bridge may have gone through annual inspection, the design quality control department may not have been in any position to identify some of the critical aspects of the bridge that would have to determine whether it was likely to collapse. The department was only able to create a report based on what they were able to observe and analyze, which meant that their views of the bridge might not have taken to account the number of years that it has been operating.
Conclusion
The collapse of the I-35W bridge over the Mississippi River in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on August 1, 2007, highlights the need for engineers and other stakeholders always to consider public safety as a critical factor when engaging in projects. In this case, the engineering firm, Sverdrup & Parcel and Associates, Inc., and other stakeholders, who include federal and state governments, failed to adhere to the expected moral standards. That creates the need for having to ensure that all other projects are evaluated based on their viability to help in determining their safety projections. That also highlights the need for governments to invest heavily in such projects, as this would mean that they are in a much more powerful position through which to advance public safety at all times.
References
Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology. (2018). Code of ethics of engineers: The fundamental principles . Retrieved from https://engineering.purdue.edu/MSE/academics/undergraduate/ethics.pdf
Harris Jr, C. E., Pritchard, M. S., Rabins, M. J., James, R., & Englehardt, E. (2013). Engineering ethics: Concepts and cases . Cengage Learning.
