Crime Control in Mainland China

Introduction

Criminal activity is one of the major factors that derail the developmental process of a country. These include rebellious behaviors such as corruption, violent crimes and homicides among others. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is one of the countries marred by criminal activity. With the presence of the world’s largest population, control over criminal activities is a difficult task, hence the need for prevalent rules that regulate of public behavior. Through the Ministry of Public Security, the two sets of documents used to impose administrative sanctions include the “ 1957 Regulations on Reeducation Through Labor ” amended in 1979 and the “ 1957 Regulations Governing Offenses Against Public Order ” initially withdrawn but were replaced in 1986 by laws of the same title. The total population of 1.9 million police officers enforces these regulations in Mainland China. 

The practice of communism has made it even more difficult to take control of the public. Corporate CEOs utilize their wealth to pay off public officials and have their way despite being contrary to the law. However, when Xi Jinping assumed officer as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and the head of state, he made a promise to eliminate and punish “tigers and flies” which is a symbolic representation of high ranking leaders and local civil servants. This was an effort to ensure there is no abuse of power or corruption through bribery. The following paper will address the claims by critics who believe that campaign against corruption is an act of political revenge and not solving the core issues facing the country.

Organized Crime & Corruption

One of the most threatening criminal activities in PRC is organized crime and corruption. It is depicted that gang members usually stationed in select areas of the country incorporate violent and anti-social behaviors that are destructive to the society and contrary to government efforts that seeks to improve the lives of ordinary citizens. These Chinese gangs are probably the highest profiled organized crime groups widely spoken about by media groups including television and newspaper reporters. They are usually associated with the worst form of human rights violation where shipping containers are used in the transportation of poor Chinese citizens who are illegally immigrated into the US with promises of being provided high paying jobs. The desperation these individuals results in illnesses and in many cases death. Many of the smuggled individuals are women who are turned to prostitution for the monetary benefit of the gang leaders. These practices prompt observers and the criminal justice system to equate them to similar groups in Italy, Japan and Russia. 

The Fujian Province in the Southeastern parts of Mainland China is one of the localized hotspots for organized crime. The gangs are depicted to originate from rural areas where they gain control of local criminal activities. Unlike the aforementioned countries, these criminal groups are more diverse as they are only able to take control within the local areas. Research has shown that the organized criminals ate back in the mid 1700s and Fujian is the most likely place of origin. A number of Buddhist monks came together in an effort to defend against an emperor recognizing themselves as the Heaven and Earth Society. Western countries referred to them as the Triad which represents the triangular symbol used in reference to the group. In the modern China, these gangs are more diverse in their formation as there are either ethnic or regional created. They have transformed in recent years as they participate in theft, protection racketeering, and forcing new members to pay heavy dues to become part of the group. 

There are cases where the dues might sum up to a month’s salary forcing the new recruits to engage in dubious moneymaking ventures. The gangs became a new form of providing the leaders with a source of income despite its source. A pyramid-like organizational structure is used to exert control from the leader to the lowest common thug. In an effort to keep up with the hefty membership dues the lower members are forced to engage in continued recruitment. The vast size of PRC both in geographical land mass and population has made it a struggle to control these groups. The central government has achieved significant domination through its ability to prevent any of these groups from achieving national control of political, social and economic outcomes. 

Resurrection of “Red Mafia” Corruption

Mao Zedong’s dominance in the early parts of the 20th Century resulted in the demise of the largest organized criminals in the country. Many of them fled the country in an attempt to begin their atrocious practices in the periphery. They took refuge in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau where they would be able to re-establish their criminal organizations. However, none of them have been able to attain the dominance, wealth and stature of the Green Gang in the early 20th Century. As a result, the administration of Mao had little disturbance from these groups as he threatened any arising group with death. However, his policies of establishing an independent state free from foreign dependencies unraveled causing destabilization of his organization. The impact resulted in large scale starvation and stagnation of the country’s economy created poor living standards. Deng Xiaoping despite never attaining the role of head of state or the General Secretary, he was involved in massive economic reforms. He opened up the local economy to the influence of global markets through a decentralized form of government in terms of economic control.

The economic reforms allowed the local authorities to take control of the activities in their region. Special economic zones were constructed some of which were in Fujian province the region depicted to be the source of the organized crimes. Local authorities and business people in their localities identified the reforms as a significant opportunity of generating wealth as they developed dubious business. This action was a primary factor that caused the rise of the criminal organizations and their in-depth controls in the rural areas of China. Despite the existence of laws and regulations in place to control the political powers of the local authorities, they were either convoluted or plainly ignored. Some of the organizations would create partnerships with the already established criminal syndicates in Macau, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Selling of narcotics, human trafficking, extortion of the local business owners and engagement in partnerships with local authorities are some the major crimes they performed. 

In this regard, the criminal justice system identified the major role played by local authorities in reinforcing their strength. Entrepreneurs would seek assistance of law enforcement and government officials for protection from legal implications. In turn, the local authorities would receive monetary benefits from the profits earned by these criminals. The primary condition for such activities was that the illegal practices should not be flaunted to the public. The criminal justice system developed the term ‘Red Mafia’ which is the collective term used to refer to these government officials who are corrupt are depicted to be the most troublesome criminal group in Mainland China. The efforts by Deng Xiaoping and future generations of leaders, the Chinese has been unable to completely eliminate the influence of the Red Mafia. It has almost been impossible to capture and prosecute leaders who turn a blind eye to criminal activities. 

Ant-Corruption Campaign

Following his ascend to the helm of the country’s leadership structure, Xi Jinping made a vow to eliminate the ‘Red Mafia’ from the political system. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) was given the mandate to oversee the critical evaluation of the performance of leaders who have abused their powers as they allowed prevalent spread of organized crime. The previous generations of leadership since the fall of Mao’s administration had failed to establish effective leadership and oversight in the anti-corruption campaign. The secretary of the CCDI Wang Qishan would be responsible for the direction and guidance of the program. He identified that the institution would be an effective factor towards breaking down the unspoken rule of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) criminal immunity. There were various of its members like Zhou Yongkang who was a primary participant in the cooperation between government officials and the gangs. Qishan was also one of the seven members of the PSC but that did not deter him from enforcing the laws.

The CCDI was established as a means of ensuring discipline among members of the Communist Party. In light of this, the organization would combat malfeasance while enforcing the full extent of the law by serving the leaders with punishment. This practice would only be possible through the involvement of judicial organs and the military body. The CCDI is depicted as an internal organ of the party hence does not have judicial power to prosecute the various wrongdoers in the party. The team would serve their roles as mere agents to conduct investigations of various party leaders at state, military and national levels. Additionally, leaders of the state-owned corporations would be evaluated for their roles in the multiple criminal activities. Though the CCDI was set to report to the Party Congress which is the highest body of the party, the fact that it meets every five years would derail the efforts of the investigation. Therefore, the agency would report to the Xi Jinping who is the General Secretary and highest power of the country.

The involvement of Jinping in the anti-grafts efforts and investigations by the CCDI has been depicted as the highlighting success of his administration. However, in cases where former highly ranked PSC members are recognized as suspects in criminal activities, the current members would evaluate them and serve their decision on whether or not to progress in prosecution. At the level of the provinces and assessment of the state-owned companies, a central inspection teams would perform their various tasks. The Central Inspection Teams would send their reports to the Central Leading Group for Inspection Work which was also led by Qishan. The “CIT” would be deployed into organizations and the province offices where they conduct thorough audits. The performances of the leaders are evaluated on their involvement in business practices and how public funds were managed. Upon a successful audit, the CCDI receives the report before undertaking immediate action like Shuanggui which is a Chinese term referring to the detaining of the accused individuals for investigation.

Affected Leaders

The efforts of the CCDI have been largely successful particularly in indentifying present and past leaders who have played major roles in the extensive spread of the criminal activities for their personal gain. The first act of the administration’s intent was presented by the immediate firing of the Deputy Party Secretary of Sichuan, Li Chuncheng towards the end of Jinping’s first year in power. By the third quarter of 2013, the Central Inspection Teams were deployed to assess numerous provinces including Hubei, Jiangxi, Chongqing, and Inner Mongolia. This audit process was considered the first inspection and led to discovery of numerous provincial level leaders involved in corruption leading to their immediate relief of duty. Jiangxi in particular provided more than a dozen high ranking individuals that included the Vice Governor Guo Youming. Wnag Suyi the regional party leader in Inner Mongolia was also detained following this process. 

Towards the end of the year 2013, a separate investigation took place that required the evaluation with officers who directly dealt with Zhou Yongkang who was a former PSC member and the leader for national security. Following the investigations in three areas where the latter had significant influence such as the oil sector, the security body, and the Sichuan province, the findings led to significant indication of numerous officials in each sector. More officials associated with these sectors were also evaluated for their participation in corrupt and graft practices. The former CEO of China Petroleum Jian Jiemin where Zhou was hus close confidant was a clear indicator of the law catching up to him. The reporters indicated that the latter was the ultimate target of the CCDI in the campaign. As a result, he became the first former PSC member to face criminal investigation. Xu Calhou, one of the senior leaders considered to be the “four tigers”, investigated in 2014 also became the highest ranking military official for taking bribes. As of 2016 nearly, 120 senior leaders in the party were investigated and many of them undergoing prosecution. Furthermore, more than 100,000 persons have been accused for corruption a clear indicator of the deteriorative impact of the guanxi aspect of interaction in the country.

Discussion & Conclusion

The actions of the Jinping’s aegis and his oversight on the CCDI’s action are a clear indicator of his intent to fulfill the promises to the Chinese citizens. The communist party has suffered a great deal since the economic reforms of 1976 to open up the local market and relinquish power to the local officials. However, the CCDI demonstrates that the times have changed and that the full extent of the law will be enforced despite the ranking of the individual. The investigations conducted on 120 senior party and state-owned leaders shows that the intentions of the fifth-generation administration are per the prerequisites of the constitutional law. In this regard, the audits have played a major role in the reduction of the organized criminal activities. The actions significantly reduce the dominance and strength of these organizations increasing the chances that they can be put to an end. However, there are critics who believe the anti-corruption campaign was a purge of politics where the winner is Xi Jinping who takes it all.

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