Critical Thinking about Logic and Arguments

Inference 

The term “valid” means having a well-grounded or a sound basis in logic. A validity of inference is contingent on the inference form. The term “valid” refers to the form of inference not the truth of the conclusion. On the other hand, the term “warranted” means a justifiable course of action. Hence, a warranted inference is based on the dialectical principles widely used in the argumentation literature. The premises give enough justification to infer that the conclusion is not necessarily true but probably valid. 

These lexical definitions and connotations of valid and warranted inference aids to better understand the inductive and deductive arguments’ purpose. For example, “valid” means having a sound basis in logic. Deductive arguments also logically claim that the conclusion must be true if all the premises are true (Johnson, 2016). That implies that the conclusions of deductive arguments are established with complete certainty. There is a guarantee for the conclusion to be true if all the premises are true. On the other hand, warranted inference implies that if the premises are assumed to be true, then the conclusion is probably true. Inductive argument also claims that conclusion is probably true if all the premises are true. Truthiness of the conclusion is not guaranteed as in the case of deductive argument. Inductive arguments establish their conclusion not with certainty but with probability. 

Fallacies 

In reasoning about classes of objects as a valid argument template, some arguments get their structural validity from the word meanings in the used language to show how the groups of objects interact. For instance, words such as all and some are useful in the expression of ideas about how specific objects and groups of objects are relating. Reasoning about classes of objects work in a way that if F and G are classes of objects, and if X stands for a particular object, then a generalized argument template would work in this way: Each group F member is also a group G member. Individual object X is a group F member. It is concluded that the object X is a member of G (Facione & Gittens, 2020). This reasoning about classes of objects argument template exposes the fallacy of false classification. Two groups may have the same attributes but one group may not be part of the other group. 

Civic Responsibility 

Completing the bonus exercise at the end of chapter 9 would be time well spent. The exercise would expose one in mapping the reasoning presented using the mapping techniques learned in the chapter, analyze the arguments and diagram decisions, as well as using the four test process to evaluate arguments (Facione & Gittens, 2020). All in all, doing the exercise would be beneficial since it would help one apply what has been learned from the chapter. A comparable amount of time would be worthwhile in doing the bonus exercise. One would use it as an opportunity to practice evading the common misleading errors of reasoning such as appeals to emotions, appeals to reasoning, denying the antecedent, and erroneous generalization. 

As a critical thinker, I believe that citizens should get information on the topics of the current interest. Even though secrecy is warranted in some cases, citizens need to be informed on the current issues to help them make well-informed decisions democratically (Callaway, 2020). It would enable the democratic citizens to fulfill their civic role more effectively. Furthermore, when citizens have information on the topics of the current interest, a country’s democratic polity would be better. 

Reference 

Callaway, C. (2020).  Civic Duties, Civic Virtues, and the Barriers to Effective Citizenship . Americanbar.org. Retrieved 21 September 2020, from https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/we-the-people/civic-duties-civil-virtues/ . 

Facione, P., & Gittens, C. (2020).  Think Critically  (3rd ed., pp. 185-368). Pearson Education, Inc. 

Johnson, G. (2016).  Argument and Inference: An Introduction to Inductive Logic  (pp. 1-8). The MIT Press.