The Australian philosopher and cognitive scientist David Chalmers are one of the greatest people who have come to explain more about the philosophy of zombies. Chalmers explains in the philosophy that zombies are just imaginary creatures that are used to help in illuminating the problems that many people go through about consciousness and how it is related to the physical world ( Chalmers, 2016) . According to the philosophical zombies usually abbreviated as p-zombies, it is an idea of a hypothetical creature that resembles regular human beings but has no conscious.
The concept of philosophical zombies is a mind trick and Chalmers uses his argument about zombies to challenge physicalism. Physicalism in philosophy is the argument that everything that defines us humans is derived from our physical characteristics ( Cottrell, 2016) . As human beings, there are ways we can be sure to inhabit the world with other feelings and not zombies. This can happen in a situation where we people, as human beings show some sense of self and consciousness. All behavior that we show as human beings must go beyond the physical level ( Marcus, 2018) . Zombies are imaginary creatures that exactly look like us and the only difference that makes us not live like zombies is that we critically think and make sound decisions based on various circumstances.
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We can also ensure that we inhabit the world with other feelings and not zombies by supporting some form of dualism. Dualism is the opposite of physicalism and views the mental phenomenon as non-physical ( Cottrell, 2016) . In this aspect, we have to admit that dualism is true and consists of not that the physical but also the mental ( Chalmers, 2016) . One of the ways that can be used to justify this is how human beings can communicate and interact with each other, gets a solution to various problems that face them and develops new technological ideas to make life easier.
References
Chalmers, D. (2016). David Chalmers. Conversations on consciousness , 37-49. https://www.multi-mania.be/david-chalmers/
Cottrell, A. (2016). On the conceivability of zombies: Chalmers v. Dennett.
Marcus, E. (2018). Why zombies are inconceivable. Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 82 (3), 477-490. https://aap.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713659880#.YEmYH9yIa1s
