When it comes to change the police, most efforts fall short, which is contrary to what people may believe. This chapter shows sources of resistance when it comes to policing. Some of these resistances are not only from unions but also external. Proposed plans are usually done with politician’s support brought about by public outcries. Summarize are the eleven obstacles hindering changes in police organizations that vary from the top to the bottom in terms of bureaucratic interests and different classifications of police resisting the changes. Resistance by the mid-level managers has led to community-policing projects failure in various cities. This is because of the changes that would come with these decentralization schemes, and it leads to resistance, for instance, the reduction of the management layers. An example is when Chicago abolished the Captain rank; a lieutenant equated it to feeling like being “kicked in the teeth.” Being control in the field is a priority for these leaders. While managers seek to tighten bureaucratic hold on field officers, the reforms are seeing to reducing hierarchy, giving employees more independence and exercising discretion while revealing any misconduct these most likely may cost the managers their jobs. Officers assigned to the community seem to have stress-free lives and are free to choose their working hours. New York City’s C-POP officers implemented this. Sergeants have control of the daily operations of street officers. The department head may want a diverse style of policing, but the officers still have to meet the expectations of his sergeant. Sergeants are a big problem to changes, and if they support the changes and believe in them, they may help in the transition. This means that if they do not endorse, then implementation would be challenging. If sergeants are convinced it won’t work, then they influence their officers. Ordinary officers also create resistance to the implementation of police reforms. They dismiss them as just politics and become skeptical about programs brought up by civilians. When the reforms suggest involving civilians in the definition and evaluation of work, it brings up resistance. They do not approve of civilians having an influence on their operations and the effectiveness of them. This creates a culture of we versus them with the belief that politicians and civilians do not understand their job. They also resist because these reforms bring about a new way of doing things. Units like detectives often feel that programs may necessitate changes in their ways. Most times, these special units have distinct affiliations with politicians, which creates a form of protection. In turn, the detectives use their status to evade participating in the programs. Chicago, for instance, has a history of chief detectives using the same strategy to avoid the programs. Other specialized units that avoid the programs include narcotics units, organized crime division, and plainclothes tactical officers, among others. The level of opposition by police unions varies from city to city. The states vary in the extent to which unions can represent the police. Chicago records a significant community policing program endorsed by the union that concentrated on wages, working situations, benefits, and safety. Contracts between unions and cities affect the decision making of the managers leading to cases where the managers may not determine specific job assignments or shifts. The contracts bound the parties to rules, personnel policies, and performance standards. Public involvement in police issues is challenging. Disadvantaged communities perceive the police as brutal and arrogant, while residents fear that individualized attention from the police would lead to harassment. Sustaining civic participation is areas of high crime are also tricky. This is because crime creates a withdrawal from community life and leads to residents viewing each other with suspicion. Fears of retaliation are also quite common. The hiring of officers can be costly to a department while the numbers are necessary for community policing. Departments avoid having to scavenge from other units as it can create conflicts among the executives. This creates the need for new programs to be implemented cheaply. Training is also expensive as it requires officers to away from duty. This has led to cities offering one or two-day training. Community policing experiences as hard time documenting what officers are doing and their effectiveness. Evaluating if a problem-solving component is practical can deem difficult, making it even harder to determine in individual officers are performing in their jobs. New York and Chicago adopted the CompStat, which measures crime rates, apprehensions, guns seized, and calls answered. Management focuses on the statistics, but residents still complain about noise, graffiti, loitering, etc. which are do not account when it comes to measuring effectiveness according to the management. Due to various bureaucratic and political reasons, most agencies view community policing as a police department’s program. They avoid them to avoid changing their professional priorities and budget plans. Having these agencies work together can be the most challenging task for innovation. In Chicago, the interagency program was not possible, but the mayor’s intervention led to even those who had resisted cooperating. Service delivery becomes the most successful attribute in the early years. The gap between races in the United States has not changed for forty years. Repetition of highly-publicized violence shakes the attitude of the people and reverses the opinion of the public. Brutality and killings by police have become a public concern. These nasty misconducts undermine the efforts of the reforms since the management loses its focus on the reform and diverts media attention from the reform. Transitioning organizations face divisions the most. When a leader comes to the office, they have new ideas and want to do new things and leave their mark. They never want to pick up on unfinished projects left by their predecessor. For the reforms to survive these transitions, the manager in charge of the reform has to ensure they are department-wide, not their project. Building public and political support is inevitable as it may also ensure that the budget for the reform survives.
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