Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has determinedly pursued Liberal Hegemony that has seen the nation venture into deep engagements in global security missions. For the most part, the conversation about whether or not to discontinue the deep engagement has suffered bias and misinformation, leading to disillusioned claims about the efficacy of the US international relations philosophy. For instance, Barry Posen's critique of deep engagement and the consequential proposition of the minimalistic grand strategy dubbed "Restraint" undervalues the US's international security exploits' achievements. As such, I find Brooks et al. case for sustained global dominance more reasonable and suitable for the nation's growth mindset.
Posen's claims that military superiority, deep engagement, and widespread presence are costly and counterproductive is unsubstantiated. Among his top reasons for indictment for Liberal Hegemony is the financial factor, stating that the financial burden of "unnecessary" overseas missions is overwhelming and that pulling back will liberate a substantial amount of local programs (Rosen, 2014). These claims, however, are a misrepresentation of the underlying truth behind international security and diplomatic operations. For instance, while it is true that funding for Defence has been unconventional and keeps growing appreciably, there is no indication that they are about to hit unsustainable levels. Brook et al. offers an intuitive counterargument to the claim by observing no systematic evidence from the post-2001 era to support the claim (Brooks et al., 2013). More so, Salam (2020) reasons that Pentagon's budget has always been correctly appropriated in attracting the best labor and cutting-edge military technology, which are a vital pillar to military success. As such, the cost factor is still contentious at best and cannot merit to be a reason to pull back.
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Furthermore, Brooks et al. reason that retrenchment would reduce US security, which would be a counterintuitive move in bolstering security. The global security dynamics are quite complicated, and only protecting one's borders is not just enough to assure the nation of security. Viewed in the light of minimalism as primed in the suggested offshore balancing strategy, retreating on its deep engagements is likely to weaken the US's internal security. Furthermore, Brands et al. (2016) indicate that the retrieval will allow for the reunion of the nation's enemies with the claim that the US has given up. By the same token, Dueck (2015) faults the retrenchment suggestion, quoting the setbacks associated with the pilot retrenchment and budget cut program rolled out during the Obama years. While the downsizing on international operations worked to some extent, it attracted unforeseen outcomes such as restrained ability to respond to contingencies involving foreign diplomatic missions. Similarly, the 2012 Defence Strategic Guidance was misinterpreted by some allies as America's weaning goodwill in joint missions in the Middle East and Asia (Feaver, 2014). On the other hand, Posen fails to acknowledge the critical role the US's foreign military missions have done in underpinning hazardous nuclear energy programs in Tehran, which would have further complicated peaceful negotiations.
The US should intensify its Liberal hegemony to achieve the desired global cooperation and gain prosperity. Deep engagements are well-known for nurturing institutionalized collaboration for the benefit of all States. More so, when these engagements concern risks such as international organized crime that cut across the board, a massive US presence enables more trust with partners and allies. And the collaboration means better chances of disrupting attacks before they manifest. Thus, an optimal grand strategy for deep engagement, as envisioned by Brooks et al., enables the US to stay at the frontline in championing international security and cooperation. Essentially, the argument in favor of going harder on engagement goes beyond riffles and bullets and builds a sustainable regional diplomatic fabric. For instance, the US's heavy involvement in NATO has aided collaboration in the broader American region, which has, in turn, enabled the continent to establish reasonable diplomatic relations with Europe (Feaver, 2014). Therefore, going deeper and more challenging on offshore security guarantees the US a better bargaining chip in many political and economic progress areas, something retrenchment cannot afford.
Lastly, some of Posen's issues resulting from the US's overstepping are not a result of massive military deployment across the globe. Instead, the problems are committed by the Deep State in Washington and only implemented, at surface level, by the offshore security installments. For instance, the claim that restraint will remedy the claimed US's role in the 'Arab Spring' is relatively mistaken. Oddly, not a single US troop was documented to have taken part in the civic revolution in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain. While Posen's reasoning that excess US influence might have counted in the uprisings, there is little evidence that cutting down physical global military operations would restrain its diplomatic interference with other sovereign States (Brands et al., 2016). While the observation that the US's sustained involvement in Iran and Afghanistan has overstayed its welcome is relatively correct, it must be acknowledged that some thinning has already been done over the past seven years. Thus, Brook et al. recognize that some of the problems thought to emanate from the US's global presence are indeed manufactured in-house and can only be fixed from the Pentagon.
In conclusion, Brooks et al. 's position that America should continue forging deep engagement in global politics is more convincing because its claims are not only substantial but also in tandem with the demands of the twenty-first-century security situations. Equally, the paper's arguments are well-meaning for the American and reflect global leadership's true American ideals. In contrast, Posen's claims are outwardly populistic. Although they address a couple of long-standing issues, they do not fit properly in the nation's long-term economic, social, and political vision. Above all, America must keep the Liberal Hegemony and build a sustainable global dominance.
References
Brands, H., Feaver, P., Mearsheimer, J. and Walt, S. (2016, December). “Should America Retrench? The Battle Over Offshore Balancing.” Foreign Affairs. 9 (4), p.65-67.
Brooks, S. G., Ikenberry, G. J., & Wohlforth, W. C. (2013). Don't Come Home, America: The Case Against Retrenchment. International Security , 37(3), 7-51.
Dueck, Collin. (2015). “A Nation Must Think Before It Acts the Strategy of Retrenchment and Its Consequences.” Foreign Policy Research Institute. Retrieved fpri.org/article/2015/04/the-strategy-of-retrenchment-and-its-consequences/
Feaver, P. (2014, August). “Strategic Retrenchment and Renewal in the American Experience.” The United States Army War College . Retrieved https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2281.pdf
Posen, B. R. (2014). Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy. Cornell University Press.
Salam, R. (2019, January). “Democrats Are Wrong About Defence Spending.” The Atlantic. Retrieved https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/01/democrats-would-be-wrong-cut-us-military-spending/579457/
