Formulating a timely and accurate strategic estimate requires analysis of recent key events that have taken place in a region of interest to the United States. For instance, according to Wilcox and Menning (n.d.), “A review of key events that are occurring in the region or have occurred in the past is a good starting point for setting the context for the Strategic Estimate. These events should be related to U.S. interests in the region” To this end, this strategic estimate describes recent events in Ahurastan that have severe implications for the interests of the United States Following its political break with Iran, Ahurastan has actively but clandestinely engaged in a program of development for weapons of mass destruction. Current intelligence estimates indicate that Ahurastan will successfully develop a nuclear weapon or another nuclear capability within 5 to 7 years and may also be engaged in acquiring nuclear weapons from other countries. These findings are supported by satellite imagery that found a preemptive Iranian missile strike destroyed Ahurstanian nuclear and nuclear enrichment facilities to prevent this outcome.
Strategic Environment
Adversary forces, although relatively new having been established in 2019, Ahurastan maintains five military forces in the region an army, navy, the air force, internal security and strategic forces (National intelligence estimate, 2019)While these military forces only have limited regional power-projecting capacities at present, they are already capable of performing offensive and defensive joint operations.
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Besides, another adversarial force of interest in this strategic estimate is the South Azeri People’s Army (SAPA), an ethnic Azeri insurgency organization that operates out of Azerbaijan (National intelligence estimate, 2019). “SAPA continues to challenge the Government of Azerbaijan (GOAZ) in the south and southeast rural and larger urban areas of Azerbaijan. It is assessed that SAPA receives most, if not all of its support from Ahurastan. It includes limited operational direction, financial aid, tactical training, and equipping with low-tech, high-payoff weapons.” Besides SAPA, Ahurastan also maintains a Special Purpose Forces (SPF) that provides additional military expertise to the insurgency operations in Azerbaijan (National intelligence estimate, 2019).
Current intelligence estimates suggest that Ahurastan intends to employ SAPA forces as proxies if armed conflicts erupt between Ahurastan and Azerbaijan and any coalition forces that may become involved. Additionally, the asymmetric use of terrorist tactics may also represent a potential deterrent to any involvement by the United States and its regional allies. Friendly forces, the loyal troops in the region include Kuwait, Iraq, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Neutral powers; Regional states that are currently neutral to Ahurastan and the U.S. include Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Afghanistan (National intelligence estimate, 2019).
Strategic Direction
According to JP-50, strategic estimates should include an analysis of the strategic direction established by the commander-in-chief and the secretary of defense, among others. A recent press release from the White House summarizes the strategic direction advocated by these national leaders. In this regard, the press release states former President Barack Obama’s nuclear position: “I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons (Prague nuclear agenda, 2017).”
Likewise, the U.S. Secretary of Defense’s office has also made the U.S. policy position on nuclear proliferation clear, but they also emphasize the need to maintain atomic hegemony as a deterrent until this end state is achieved. For example, during his confirmation hearing before the U.S. Senate, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Dr. Michael A. Kuliasha (2017) stressed the need to “deter nuclear war and serve as last resort weapons of self-defense. In this sense, U.S. nuclear weapons are fundamental to our nation's security and have historically provided a deterrent against aggression and security assurance to U.S. allies.” Achieving these simultaneous but challenging goals, though, will require greater resolve on the part of the international community to enforce existing nonproliferation guidelines more rigorously and to identify new strategies for creating and sustaining a global environment in which nuclear weapons are obsolete (Prague nuclear agenda, 2017).
The nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction programs that are currently underway in Ahurastan represent highly destabilizing elements throughout the region, but there are other factors at play that will inevitably affect non-U.S. and multinational policy goals. For instance, following the fall of the former Soviet Union, there has been growing regional interest in the valuable reserves of oil and natural gas in the Caspian Sea region. U.S. domestic considerations: As the troubling experiences with North Korea’s nuclear proliferation program demonstrate clerly the potential for Ahurastan to develop a nuclear strike ability that is capable of hitting the eastern seaboard of the United States may occur far sooner than even the most optimistic estimates indicate at present (Nathan, 2017).
Furthermore, Ahurastan already possesses several oil refineries, and the country has formally claimed a 25% interest in Caspian Sea resources, even though none of the countries in the region have acknowledged this claim. To date, though, there has been little regional cooperation between nations and the limited export alternatives available for these resources have hampered developmental efforts (Overview of oil and natural gas in the Caspian Sea region, 2013). Nevertheless, there is the potential for a consortium of states in the Caspian Sea region to emerge in the foreseeable future that would make these resources more readily available to developing nations such as Ahurastan. End states: From a U.S. perspective, the most desirable end state for Ahurastan would be as a peaceful and democratic member of the international community with no weapons of mass destruction programming.
Strategic and Operational Challenges
Potential problems are requiring the United States decision, military, diplomatic or economic action. The overarching potential issues that would require a US decision or other action include the use of weapons of mass destruction by Ahurastan or their use of conventional forces against regional neighbor such as Kuwait, Georgia or Azerbaijan (National intelligence estimate, 2019). A concomitant cyber-attack by Ahurastan against Azerbaijan would likely be combined with an aggressive propaganda campaign against the U.S. and its allies, portraying them as evil imperialists that want these energy resources solely for themselves.
Flashpoints for potential conflict, at present, the most significant flashpoint for a possible conflict is between Ahurastan and the eastern and southern regions of neighboring Azerbaijan. This potential conflict would likely include military or special purpose forces attacks on Azerbaijani’s oil and gas storage facilities as well as strategically placed railroads, airfields, tunnels, and bridges. Also, Ahurastan-supported SAPA forces would likely seize major railroads, roadways and other vital transportation infrastructures in southern Azerbaijan (National intelligence estimate, 2019).
The geographic proximity of Ahurastan to these countries makes the latter eventuality even more likely, especially given Ahurastan’s otherwise unsupported claim to 25% of the Caspian Sea oil reserves. In this regard, U.S. intelligence analysts emphasize that “If this attack could seize the eastern Azerbaijani oilfields in the Kura River basin and the capital, Baku, Ahurastan would control the flow of oil through key pipelines in Azerbaijan and be in a position to control a significant portion of the Caspian Sea reserves.”
Potential Opportunities
There are some internal instabilities taking place in Ahurastan that can be exploited to destabilize the current regime’s tenability further. There are some internal instabilities taking place in Ahurastan that can be utilized to destabilize the current regime’s tenability further. For instance, U.S intelligence analysts report that “While there has been relative cooperation between the two security forces, there have been several incidents where the two have come into conflict. Riots in both the Mugan region in Gilan province and Kurdish villages in West Azerbaijan provinces have been allowed to go on unchecked which raises questions about the political reliability of these units (National intelligence estimate, 2019).”
Besides, economic incentives may serve to reduce or even eliminate Ahurastan’s current weapons of mass destruction efforts, especially given the country’s current fiscal problems. Finally, a negotiated settlement to the Caspian Sea oil and gas reserves issue could help mitigates Ahurastan’s aggressive military posture in the region.
Assessment of Risks & Mitigation
Comparison of potential challenges with anticipated capabilities. The potential problems involved in responding to the recent developments in Ahurastan are multifaceted with significant overlap between the salient elements. Besides its various weapons of mass destruction development efforts, Ahurastan also possesses a limited but increasingly sophisticated military arm as well as a cyber-attack capability that is likewise growing ineffectiveness (National intelligence estimate, 2019). It is reasonable to posit that these capabilities combined with Ahurastan’s ongoing sponsorship and support of SAPA forces will combine to create a situation that requires a UN or U.S.-led coalition response.
Moreover, Ahurastan continues to forge commercial and diplomatic relations with Russia as well as former Soviet republics and has been courted by China to secure access to the Caspian Sea oil and gas reserves should Ahurastan succeed in prosecuting its claims. Analysis of risks associated with significant challenges (National intelligence estimate,2019). As the recent events in North Korea have made abundantly clear, complex problems involving weapons of mass destruction demand complex solutions, but these have proven exceedingly elusive for the United States and its allies. Indeed, as the historical record confirms, the U.S. is highly reluctant to engage with nuclear-equipped states militarily and is far more likely to engage in regime-changing efforts when there are no weapons of mass destruction capability involved.
Possible mitigation measures; Economic sanctions against Ahurastan represent the first mitigation measure along a continuum that places “all options on the table,” including military interventions. Although economic sanctions have historically produced mixed results, they have been effective in deterring Iran’s nuclear development program (Rennack, 2015) and even the challenging North Korean regime is experiencing the cumulative adverse effects of numerous United Nations sanctions and unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The issue of the nuclear meltdown is a significant concern. The need for assistance with this leak will help open up more significant relationship ties between Armenia and NATO, as the country wishes to gain membership. Forces can then leverage the opportunity of gaining another ally in the region that will help with efforts to subdue threats from SAPA and Ahurastan.
Relationships with Turkey, Russia, and Georgia can help facilitate CTJF efforts in calming tensions in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. As Georgia wishes to join NATO, it can be used as a staging ground, along with Turkey which has also requested assistance with the Armenian nuclear leak. Together with these allies, strategic operations can be facilitated surrounding Ahurastan and Azerbaijan, primarily containing any further problems. With Russia on board and Iran with limited threatening power, there are limited options for SAPA and insurgent forces. Action must be taken quickly, as to minimize the nuclear threat Ahurastan poses to the near future.
The United States should continue to utilize soft power approaches, diplomacy, and an active Information Operations campaign to prevent the destabilization of the Ahurastan region and to leverage Russian influence while improving our regional standing. Continue U.S. governmental and commercial involvement in the Ahurastan and the Caspian Sea region.
Ensure as much as possible, social, political and economic progress and stability in the region. The United States must disrupt and deter regional terrorist groups through the local Defense Attaché Office and Office of Security Cooperation supported initiatives and programs with the assistance of the US Department of State. Primary recommendations to the command include joint regional military cooperation exercises in Georgia and Turkey, targeted humanitarian aid through USAID and local NGOs, and a joint operation with the US Department of Energy to provide technical and security assistance to prevent the loss or destruction of nuclear facilities and materials within this region.
References
Clapper, J. R. (2015, February 26). Worldwide threat assessment of the U.S. intelligence community. Washington, DC: Senate Armed Services Committee.
Kuliasha, M. A. (2017, January). Why nuclear matters. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. Retrieved from http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/.
Nathan, A. J. (2017, September 1). North Korea and nuclear weapons: Entering the new era of deterrence. Foreign Affairs, 96(5), 194-197.
National intelligence estimate: Ahurastan. (2019, June 15). Scenario reference book 1, part 3.
Overview of oil and natural gas in the Caspian Sea region. (2013, August 26). Washington, DC: U.S. Energy Information Administration.
Prague nuclear agenda. (2017, January 11). The White House. Retrieved from https://obama whitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2017/01/11/fact-sheet-prague-nuclear-agenda.
Rennack, D. E. (2015, October 1). Iran: U.S. economic sanctions and the authority to lift restrictions. Current Politics and Economics of the Middle East, 6(4), 619-623.
