Recent diplomatic activity between the US and North Korea are successful in capturing attention and imagination at the national level. The Korean war is an example of a historical point where military campaigns were based on competing and conflicting ideas. Around the 1950s, communism, socialism, and capitalism were competing for global hegemony. As illustrated by the tensions between the US and the former Soviet Union, the rivalry for global ideological hegemony led to intense rivalries, the Korean and Cold wars. By virtue of ideological similarities between communism and socialism, the alliance of China, the former Soviet Union, and North Korea proved significant in the outcome of the Korean War. Therefore, it is essential to analyze the above-mentioned military campaign from an operational art and design viewpoint.
Joint Force Commanders (JFC) must develop products that describe how the force will use its capabilities to achieve military victory and staying continuously aware of the unacceptable consequences of using the capabilities as planned. Operational art and design are approaches that enable JFCs and their staffs create the above-mentioned products (Joint Chiefs of Staffs, 2017). The former is a cognitive approach that is augmented by knowledge, skill, experience, and judgement to create campaigns, strategies, and operations that organize and employ military forces by integrating risks, ends, means, and ways. The latter is the creation and construction of the framework for which a campaign or operation and its subsequent execution is based (Joint Chiefs of Staffs, 2017). And so, it is through the application of operational art and design can the JFCs and their staffs develop an operational approach.
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There are several benefits to using the above-mentioned tools in the development of an operational approach. In addition to allowing the commander to continue the Joint Planning Process (JPP), operational art and design facilitate the translation of comprehensive strategic and operational models into executable plans and lends precision to missions and tasks. Operational design forms the basis for understanding the Operational Environment (OE) (Joint Chiefs of Staffs, 2017). This lends it to make crucial contributions to understanding a complex OE and mission accomplishment. Furthermore, it encourages recursive and continuous discussions on the nature of the problem and the appropriate operational approach. Collectively, these tools allow commanders and planners to identify the risks, consequences, and risks associated with campaigns/operations because of their ability to enable a granular understanding of the OE (Joint Chiefs of Staffs, 2017). Furthermore, these tools facilitate the robust analysis commanders and planners require to deal with events that are either unexpected or outside their previous experience. Subsequent paragraphs shall apply these tools in an analysis of the Korean War, with operational art providing the point of departure.
Operational art
Commanders proficient in using the above-mentioned term generate the vision necessary to connect strategic objectives to tactical tasks based on their understanding of the strategic and operational environments. Moreover, the application of this tool endures for the campaign/operation duration. Through a series of questions, operational art allows commanders to connect the ends, means, and ways of achieving the desired end state as it incorporates large amounts of information collected during the planning and analysis stages (Isserson & Menning, 2013). Importantly, this tool provides a sufficiently detailed brief which enables a better understanding of the OE and decision-making process. Still, it affords commander the space required to make decisions and decisions without having access to all the relevant information. Again, this process creates the awareness of the personal and organizational biases that could influence the analysis and decision processes.
Operational art elements include end state and conditions; centers of gravity; direct or indirect approaches; lines of operations/effort; risk; culmination; simultaneity and depth; tempo and operational reach. For example, the end state of WW2 was the unconditional surrender of the Imperial Japanese while the liberation of occupied territory was one of the conditions. According to Clausewitz, the center of gravity (COG) is the: “hub of all powers and movement”, which also makes it the ultimate point of focus in campaigns/operations (Isserson & Menning, 2013). Defeating an enemy requires the use of a direct or indirect approach to attack the adversary’s COG and deliver one of the four defeat mechanisms. Decisive points are geographical areas that are vital to operation/campaign success. Arranging decisive points in time and space in relation to the enemy’s COG underscores the importance of tasks in terms of supporting the overall objective (Isserson & Menning, 2013). This facilitates the development of lines of effort/operation across missions and tasks. Therefore, there are several operational art elements that can be applied to the Korean War.
Operational design
This term describes a methodology useful to commanders and planners in understanding and organizing the OE. Accordingly, it has four seemingly independent components, namely: understanding strategic guidance; understanding the OE; definition of the problem, and formulation of the operational approach (Joint Chiefs of Staffs, 2017). Similarly, these are among the steps present in the methodology. Therefore, strategic guidance provides the organizational framework that facilitates the understanding and establishment of the OE.
Strategic guidance is fundamental to the formation of operational art and design. The President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staffs (CJCS) provide strategic guidance. This guidance encompasses the long-term and immediate objectives along with defining that which is considered a victory as well as identifying the available resources, forces, and authorities that will be dedicated to attaining strategic objectives (Reilly, 2012). Because strategic direction synthesized from strategic guidance documents can be vague, incomplete, outdated, or conflicting, it is necessary for planners and commanders to maintain civilian-military for the duration of the planning process. Strategic level considerations of the OE are typically investigated in terms of geopolitical regions, nations, and climate as opposed to local geography and weather (Joint Chiefs of Staffs, 2017). Further, non-military aspects of the OE like the industrial or technological capabilities of the nation or region influences the typology of the military and conflict. Therefore, non-military considerations assume strategic-level importance.
The definition of OE fuses conditions, circumstances, and influences that inform the engagement of capabilities and commanders’ decisions. Analysis tools available for this task include areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events (ASCOPE), COG, and political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) (Joint Chiefs of Staffs, 2017). Fundamental outputs of this analysis include descriptions of the current and desired OEs. Additional factors for consideration are like population demographics; geographical features; meteorological and oceanographic conditions; social and cultural factors; political and socioeconomic factors; infrastructure and information systems, and operational limitations (Reilly, 2012). Therefore, several parameters make up the OE definition.
Analysis of the Korean War
China was the largest liberated nation at the end of WW2, one of the desired end states of the military campaign against Imperial Japan. The Korean peninsula was located between China, Japan, and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). China was embroiled in a civil war based on political ideology that culminated in victory for its communist party (Woodhouse, 2011). By default, Japan favored a capitalistic ideology. Around 1949, by virtue of similar political ideals, China and the USSR formed an alliance that proved crucial to the outcome of the Korean War. Globally, the split based on political ideology had divided most of continental Europe into the capitalists on the west and the socialists on the east. Similarly, the peninsula was split into north and south by virtue of political ideology. The north obtained support from the USSR and China while the US supported the south. Furthermore, the north shares a border with China that is approximately 1400 kilometers wide (Ingen, 2015). This means that the peninsula acts as China’s buffer against campaigns/operations by hostile nations. The political alliance between China and the USSR contributed to Chinese liberation and the formation of a communist government in the northern part of the peninsula (Stueck, 2004). Therefore, both the USSR and China had vested interests in stopping the spread of capitalism towards the north.
The planners and commanders of this war underestimated Chinese power and influence over North Korea. In addition to the strategic reasons in the foregoing paragraph, the shared history between China and the peninsula includes Chinese rule in the peninsula and oppression by Imperial Japan (Woodhouse, 2011). Ostensibly, the Chinese COG was the defense of its sovereignty and political ideology but a successful military confrontation against the US lent credibility to the newly liberated republic and protected its industrialized north from encroachment. Similarly, the planners and commanders underestimated the strength of the political alliance. For example, the North Korean force that crossed the Imjin River comprised of several infantry divisions, regiments, and brigades along with over 100 Russian T-34 tanks and 90,000 men (Woodhouse, 2011). Conversely, Task Force Smith had less than 600 men with obsolete weapons. Not only was the task force plagued by poor resourcing but the 24 th also shared this problem. Again, because Americans perceived the North Korean Army and not communism or its close association with China as the enemy’s COG, the forces were critically vulnerable to Chinese attacks. Furthermore, the lack of specific strategic guidance failed to ease Chinese fears of the campaign/operation’s end state and conditions (Stueck, 2004). These are some of the circumstances that compelled the Chinese forces to engage in the war.
Operations during the war were hampered by weather conditions and the terrain. Not only is the northern part of the peninsula mountainous, but it also has cooler weather than the south. Even though there are four seasons, the cold of winter is bitter primarily due to its proximity to Siberia (Woodhouse, 2011). Operations wise, the cold reduced the life of battery-powered communication devices. Still, the Chechon operation remains the most logistically challenging because of weather conditions (Woodhouse, 2011). Once the mountain snow had melted because of the early rains, maintaining logistical support for the attacking corps became impossible due to flooding and a worsened road network. Furthermore, the entire peninsula is prone to Yellow Dust from the Gobi Desert during spring, monsoons in summer, and typhoons in autumn (Woodhouse, 2011). Clearly, weather conditions can impact operations and did impact the conduct of this war.
In addition to influencing weather conditions, the terrain also limited operations/campaigns. The north-south corridors limited the range of ground maneuvers and the ability to commit combat power forward (Woodhouse, 2011). Equally, echeloning of fires, along with the synchronization of counter-land, close air support, direct and long-range fires support should produce increased effects in the support of limited ground maneuver units. Generally, the terrain presented conditions that limited the selection of ground maneuver options and necessitated the use of additional support resources to meet set objectives (Woodhouse, 2011). Hence, the terrain influenced both the weather and operating conditions during the Korean War.
Force structure selection remains a function of terrain. In this war, the regiment routine was suitable because of the choke points, mountain passes, and restrictive corridors. For example, Colonel Freeman’s Regiment Combat Team executed its operations before strategically retreating to Chipyong-ri (Woodhouse, 2011). This team’s example at Chipyong-ri supports the argument for a regiment routine because the Colonel chose a location that prevented enemy observations and direct fire. Freeman was able to work independently and save the lives of the men serving under his command. This demonstrates that it was possible to have independent regiments that could leverage deep fire to maneuver within restrictive corridors (Woodhouse, 2011). Furthermore, the terrain prevented reciprocal support. It is obvious that the selection of force structure depends on the nature of the terrain.
The presence of civilian populations on the battlefield also informs operational art and design. For example, while the entire peninsula is mountainous, the north has more mountainous than the south. This affects population distribution in the north where the density is comparatively less but due to the terrain, internally displaced civilians have limited distribution options (Woodhouse, 2011). Advancing this argument further, most of the north lacks good transport infrastructure. To the south, most population centers are along strategically important locations along corridors on valley floors. The Taebek and Sobaek mountain ranges run from north to south. Not only do they create corridors that observe a similar course, but they also limit east to west movement (Woodhouse, 2011). After Chinese Communist forces had the Republic of Korea (ROK) II Corps and limited the operations of the 8 th (US) Army, the Army had to retreat with over 200,000 civilians. Food and medicine were used to entice civilians off of major highways (Woodhouse, 2011). Clearly, considerations of the welfare of civilian populations must influence the formulation of operational art and design.
The Korean peninsula’s historical record evidences its strategic location and experience with both military occupation and isolation. A culmination of WW2 was the end of the rule of Imperial Japan in the peninsula and across China. Also, at this point, ideological differences formed the basis for military campaigns aimed at either proving one ideal superior or stopping the spread of another. North Korea shared more than borders with the former USSR and China; they shared a similar political ideology. Communism contradicts capitalism that was present in South Korea and the American presence in the strategically valuable peninsula agitated China and its alliance partners. The resulting war provides lessons that are relevant to the study of operational art and design.
References
Ingen, R. (2015). Operational art in the Korean War: A comparison between General MacArthur and General Walker . United States: Pickle Partners Publishing
Isserson, G. S., & Menning, B. (2013). The evolution of operational art . Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center
Joint Chiefs of Staffs. (2017). Joint Planning . Joint Force Development.
Reilly, J. M. (2012). Operational design: Distilling clarity from complexity for decisive action . Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Force Research Institute, Air University Press.
Stueck, W. W. (2004). Rethinking the Korean War: A new diplomatic and strategic history . Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
Woodhouse, B., D. (2011). Operational Lessons Learned in the Korean War. School of Advanced Military Studies
