After the 1948 – 1989 Cold War, international organizations and states have frequently participated in peacemaking and peacekeeping to assist in resolving both intra-national and international conflicts. Albeit conflict resolution is a common aspect globally, peacekeeping operations have had mixed results. Afghanistan operations, for instance, under the command of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have made immense contributions towards attaining unity (Dawson, 2004). On the other hand, others such as the Rwandan 1994 operation had negative results. This essay seeks to compare and contrast the peacekeeping and peacemaking operations and evaluate which operation would have been more effective in the Rwanda case.
Peacekeeping is a procedure used by UN and associated parties to maintain peace in regions where wars have been halted, in addition to helping implement agreements reached by the conflicting sides. Since the end of Cold War, peacekeeping has shifted from a basically military form of supervising cease-fires and the separation of forces once inter-state conflicts are halted to incorporate a sophisticated model of various elements like armed forces, civilians, as well as police operating jointly to assist in establishing the foundations for a lasting peace (Bove & smith, 2011). The main function of peacekeeping is to enhance the transition from a state of war to a state of peace. Peacekeeping rests on three key political values, which demand that peace-keepers must maintain the consent of the host state(s) and immediate parties to the dispute, act without partiality, and conduct themselves in a non-violent as well as non-threatening manner.
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Peacemaking on the other hand comprises of ways of addressing conflicts that are in progress and usually entails diplomatic action to bring warring parties to a mutual agreement. The UN Secretary General has the authority to utilize his office to enhance resolving of the disagreements. Peacemakers could be groups of nations, envoys, governments, regional institutions or the United Nations (Bove & smith, 2011). Peacemaking operations may also be conducted by unofficial and non-governmental groups, or by an experienced individuals working autonomously.
While UN peacekeeping efforts are basically initiated to provide support in realization of a cease-fire accord, they are in some cases required to play an active role in peacemaking efforts and may participate in early peace-building activities. UN peacekeeping operations may exercise force at the premeditated level with the authority of the Security Council to defend themselves as well as their mandate. This is permitted in circumstances where the country lacks the capacity to provide security and sustain public order. Traditional UN peacekeeping efforts are initiated as a short-term strategy to help calm a disagreement in addition to forming a conducive environment whereby lasting peace negotiations can be conducted (Bove & smith, 2011). The responsibilities assigned to traditional United Nations peacekeeping efforts by the Security Council are to a large extent military in nature and may include observation, monitoring as well as reporting through the use of strategically positioned posts, aerial supervisions, road patrols or other technical means with the authority of the fighting parties. It may also include supervision of cease-fire and supporting verification mechanisms as well as interposition as a buffer and confidence-building measure.
In October 1993, the United Nations began its peacekeeping mission to supervise a cease-fire agreement between the Rwandese Patriotic Front and the Rwandan government, which was headed by the Hutus (Stanton, 2009). This peacekeeping operations in 1994 failed Rwanda terribly because both the Security Council and the Secretary General ignored the evidence sent to them on a planned genocide (Stanton, 2009). They also failed to take appropriate actions when the genocide began and they eventually abandoned the Rwandan citizens when they desperately needed help. The main reason for this failure was that the number of UN military deployed was small and the Security Council did not focus on strengthening it when killings began.
Furthermore, the officials on the ground were not allowed to undertake any military operation even after reports showed that there was massive human slaughter happening. Furthermore, the Council did not have the ability to deploy a force immediately and the neighboring nations were reluctant to send in their troops to stop an internal conflict. On the other hand, the Organization of African Unity lacked the military capacity or a planning staff and could not offer any help to the nation. This was worsened when ten Belgian peace-keepers were murdered while trying to protect the Prime Minister and this showed that there was little willingness to support and strengthen the mandate of the peace-keepers in the country.
By April 6, 1994, the UN had set out more than 2,500 UN assistance mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) troops (Stanton, 2009). The troops were however, lightly armed and very few compared to over 100,000 genocidists, some of who were heavily armed. Although the UN was aware that the troops were few, they declined to send more as the cost associated was exponentially high. The UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda would have been more successful had the Council considered deploying more forces upon receiving the information that genocide was being planned. Furthermore, if the force on the ground would have been permitted to apply military force, the mission would have been more successful (Douglas, 2002).
However, peacemaking operations would have been more effective in Rwanda had they been initiated early enough. Since peacemaking operations entails negotiated effort to avoid or end prevailing conflicts, this approach would have worked better than peacekeeping operations because it focuses on finding long-term political solutions (Dawson, 2004). Having in mind that the genocide involved two Rwandan tribes fighting against each other, coming up with a culturally suitable peace-building expertise would have made peacemaking efforts more fruitful than peacekeeping efforts. The success of peacemaking efforts is attributed to the fact that it tries to be insightful to the needs and cultural behavior of the country while at the same time avoiding application of an external model. If peacemaking was adopted in Rwanda, it would have catered for the needs of the two conflicting tribes hence avoid the genocide.
In conclusion, the failure of peacekeeping operation to bear fruits in the 1994 Rwanda genocide is primarily because of the Council’s inability to make important reinforcement. The traditional peacekeeping operations were however, unsuitable given the number of genocidists compared to available military assistants deployed by the UN. The best results would have, therefore, been achieved if peacemaking operations were conducted within Rwanda because the warring sides would have felt involved in the peace mission.
References
Bove, V, & smith, R. (2011). The economics of peacekeeping. In L. Braddon, & K. Hartley (eds) Handbook on the economics of conflict . Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Dawson, G. (2004). Peacekeeping, peace building, and peacemaking: Concepts, complications, and Canada’s role. In Brief . Parliamentary Research Branch Library of Parliament.
Douglas A, (2002). Confronting Rwandan genocide : The military options: What could and should the international community have done? Canadian Peacekeeping Press
Stanton, G. (2009) The Rwandan genocide: Why early warning failed. Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies, 1 (2), 6-25
