For both the illegal and legal businesses alike, technology has become one of the main tools of carrying out businesses globally. For instance, Russia has recently been successful in utilizing technology as one of the main tools in organized crime. In 2013 and 2014, the Russian crime syndicate stole over 1.2 billion email addresses, usernames, and passwords in one of the biggest hacks in history ( Ortner, 2015) . The organized crime groups are not motivated by ideology or ego. They are purely motivated by monetary gains. Therefore, they often target financial institutions because of their access to funds. Furthermore, corporates are targeted because of profitable business intelligence and intellectual property that can either be sold or used to control the stock market. The internet offers the organized group a global reach and can launder money by transferring it to particular accounts or purchasing certain goods that they redistribute. The term paper will evaluate the Russian Organized Crime, Cyber-Crime and how it affects corporates.
The Organized Cybercrime Underground
The reach and power of organized crime are highly manifested in the Dark Web. The Dark Web described a form of the black market on the internet specifically designed for selling tools and contraband for conducting cybercrimes. Before the Silk Road was shut down, it was the main online marketplace in the Dark Web designed for purchasing weapons, drugs, credit cards, fake IDs, and stolen credit cards. Tor is an anonymous browser that may be used to navigate the Dark Web with little or no detection where the Russian cyber groups use t traffic child pornography, weapons, and drugs among many other illegal items ( Jasper and Wirtz, 2017) . Some of the goods sold in the Dark web facilitate cybercrime. Organized Crime in Russia has elevated hacking to a higher level of professionalism where they offer cybercrime as a service.
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Currently, aspiring cybercriminals do not need to spend long hours learning how to develop or code applications so that they can hack corporations. Instead, they only need to pay for malware and hacking services. As long as the customer has adequate funds, they can hire organized crime groups that can infect or hack particular computers with malware. Also, clients can purchase plug and play malware or rent botnets to carry out attacks. One of the most used pieces of crime as a service is the Gameover Zeus Botnet. The botnet can steal banking credentials and then utilize them to manipulate wire transfers. The botnet is believed to have compromised about 50000 to one million computers ( Kshetri, 2017) . The botnet caused the computers to be infected with a cryptolocker ransomware that was used to extort large amounts of money from its victims.
Impact of Russian Organized Crime and Cyber-Crime on International Relations
There are reports that Kremlin may be using Russia mafia groups in the West. Some officials in Moscow reported that the country might be using organized crime to conduct targeted assassinations and launch cyber-attacks. After they annexed Crimea in 2014, there was tension between the West and Moscow ( Ortner, 2015) . Therefore, Kremlin began looking for tools that will allow them to wield their political impact abroad. Other than using their security services, Russia employed some Russian speaking organized crime groups in Europe and the USA as new instruments in the increasing conflict. Moreover, the reports claimed that there are close associations between Russian organized criminal activities in the west and Kremlin’s state security apparatus such as Federal Security Service (FSB), Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Military Intelligence (GRU ( Ortner, 2015) ). Also, Kremlin tasked the organized crime groups to work and act on the state's behalf. Besides, the reports added that Russia is highly criminalized and that the state often uses criminals as instruments of its rule.
The worlds of business, crime, and politics became interconnected with state security in the 1990s. After Vladimir Putin was elected president about two decades ago in 2000, the interconnection structure began changing. The political elites started using the criminal world to drive personal or state agenda. Due to the protection of the political elite, the organized crime gangs could continue operating without the fearing systematic crackdown as long as they realized and respected the leadership of the state ( Kshetri, 2017) . It is believed that there is a Russian mafia in Europe that continues to be used by Kremlin for various purposes such as conducting targeted assassinations, launching cyber-attacks, and trafficking goods and people on behalf of Moscow. Besides, the Russian organized crime gangs are believed to be one of the sources of black cash for the Moscow authorities. Therefore, some of the Russian authorities will assist the gangs to smuggle goods across their border but as long as they shared the profits.
The other possible connection between organized crime gangs and Russian authorities is related to the spy scandal between Russian and the Us that dates back to 2010. The issue made various headlines internationally. About ten members of the Russian spy network who were uncovered and arrested by US authorities were exchanged with four American spies. Nevertheless, the 11 th member of the Russian spy group, Christopher Metsos, went missing ( Ortner, 2015) . He allegedly disappeared without a trace after being arrested and released on bail in Cyprus. It is believed that some Russian criminal groups caught up with him and covertly sent him to Kremlin.
According to the report and records of conversations with various security officials in Russia and Europe, there were strong links between Russian organized criminal gangs and Kremlin. The most common areas where the gangs could operate include various Russian speaking communities in Latvia, Spain, and Greece. They may also operate in major people and drug trafficking areas such as Berlin. Unlike two decades ago, the Russian criminal gangs no longer operate on the streets. Currently, they act as suppliers, allies, and facilitators for global criminal networks. Russian mafia groups often prefer working in the shadows. They do not only have significant influence on the criminal world but also in politics. It is evident that high officials use them to carry out particular activities. The connections with the criminal gangs allow Kremlin to mask any direct connection between the criminal gangs and Moscow. The criminal gangs used by Kremlin often have families, assets, or activities back in Russia or transfer goods through the border ( Jasper and Wirtz, 2017) . Therefore, the authorities have a level of leverage over the criminal gangs. Therefore, the political elite often makes requests to the organized criminal gangs that they cannot refuse.
State Control on Russian Organized Crime Gangs and Cyber Attacks
Recently, the Russian hackers made launched attacks on the New York Times, a French Television Network, the US State Department, a German Steelmaker, the US House of Representatives, the Polish Stock Market, and the White House. Western intelligence officials believe the suspects were not rogue cyber pranksters but were working for Kremlin. Cybercrime has become a significant tool of power and statecraft in Russia. Putin's administration has become increasingly effective in deploying particular practices that are more common in organized criminal gangs than a permanent member of the UN Security Council ( Scherrer, 2016) . In most cases such as hacking, Kremlin subcontracts criminal gangs that the state cannot carry out without plausible deniability. In other scenarios, the state involves itself in fraud, kidnapping, bribery, extortion, and blackmail to drive their agenda.
Some western intelligence officials believe that the operations and activities of Russian organized criminal gangs may be indistinguishable from those of the state. According to information from the FBI and other US intelligence agencies, Russia supports the most skilled group of organized crime groups and cybercrime internationally. Furthermore, Russia maintains close ties with the gangs. In 2016, it is believed that Russian hackers began surveillance on significant infrastructures such as energy supply networks and power grids in Canada, the US, and Europe ( Galeotti, 2014) . Moreover, Russian security services have been secretly recruiting specialized groups of hackers. Intelligence official observed that when a suspect is believed to have proficiency in Russian underground activities, all their pending cases disappear and the suspects are never seen again. It is then believed that the hacker was recruited by Russian security services. Most of the criminal hackers are now working willingly as cyber militia.
However, hacking is only one of the techniques used by Russian authorities to drive their agendas. Kremlin relies heavily on local organized criminal gangs when supporting separatist movements in Donbas, Trans-Dniester, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia ( Scherrer, 2016) . During the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, various organized criminal groups were Russian agents who funded and armed the pro-Russia rebel groups. When they annexed Crimea, they appointed a well-known gangster known as “the Goblin” as their chief executive. Also, Russia thrives in geopolitics of extortion. Putin's mafia groups not only use and act with organized crime groups but also operate like organized crime groups themselves. In some cases, they used graft as a tool of control. It is a tactic that is efficiently used by Moscow in the entire former Soviet space by associating the elites with corrupt schemes such as money laundering or shady energy deals to secure their interests.
The tactic was used in Ukraine and Georgia in 2004 and 2003 respectively. In Ukraine, Russia used opaque gas deals that hampered the new Ukrainian administration. Putin attempted similar tactics in eastern Ukraine. Russia tried to use the local oligarchs to control eastern Ukraine by exerting both political and economic influence on Kiev ( Taylor, Fritsch, & Liederbach, 2014) . Besides, they efficiently used blackmail by making a series of offers that the international community could not refuse. It was an effective trick. Russia initially creates or worsens the existing instability such as in Syria and Ukraine and then offer services that will re-establish order. Ultimately, Russia creates demand and then meets it. It means that they act as rogue but end up being treated as statesmen. The Russian organized criminal gangs operate as protection rackets. Moreover, the strategy has become one of the key pillars of Russian foreign policy ( Taylor, Fritsch, & Liederbach, 2014) . It may be a form of geopolitical extortion, but it is probably working for Kremlin. Putin simply identifies various trouble spots globally especially areas that have significant interests to the west and proposes that he can decide to be a good partner if they make a deal or he can cause more trouble.
Impact of Russian Cybercrime
It is believed that the Russian mafia decided to manage and professionalized online crime between 2010 and 2011. Russian speaking hackers earn over $4.5 billion globally through different online criminal tactics. Russian organized hackers account for over 35% of $12.5 billion dollars earned annually to cybercrime ( Galeotti, 2014) . However, there is a difference between Russian speaking criminals and cybercriminals living in Russia. Russian speaking cybercriminals may be citizens of any country in the former Soviet Union. The Russian cybercrime market is worth about $2.3 billion while the entire Russian speaking elements of organized cybercrime double to about $4.5 billion ( Galeotti, 2014) .
In 2011, the Russian organized cybercrime was embraced by most traditional crime groups that attempted to control the whole crime process. It led to a merger of various crime groups that refocused traditional criminal activities from their emphasis on arms and drug trafficking to cybercrime. The trend led to a rapid increase in data breaches and other forms of security breaches on the global financial sectors. Online banking fraud has become the most common element of cybercrime. Due to the emergence of many groups, the Russian cybercrime market began consolidating their gains. The different groups began working together and linking up while sharing financial scams, compromised data, and botnets ( Scherrer, 2016) . Moreover, due to the increase in non-technical criminals who were attempting their luck in the industry, there was an emergency of outsourcing services in cybercrime such as the sale, consulting, and training regarding exploits and malware. Therefore, the Russian cybercrime syndicates made a transition from their quantitative state to a qualitative state. The Russian cybercrime market is no longer chaotic, and it is well organized.
Theft of stolen funds, online banking fraud, and phishing attacks increased rapidly in Russia and was the main area of cybercrime that amounted to about $942 million ( Scherrer, 2016) . About $230 million was paid to cybercriminals while spam amounted to about $830 million ( Scherrer, 2016) . It became a common trend in Russia to target various wealthy individuals rather than focusing on financial institutions. The criminals often use Trojan programs, and web inject technologies to direct users to their phishing sites. After the USSR collapsed, the Russian state had various problems recruiting talent that would drive their agenda. Through the necessity to control particular factors, they turned to contractors and outsourcing to manage or control issues that could not be handled in-house. The trend gave Kremlin deniability about the current cyber operations and organized crime in the country.
The Future of Russian Organized Crime and Cyber-Crime
Although the use of organized criminal gangs has been effective in the country, the Russian strategy of utilizing hacker and criminal groups to launch attacks on other nations is beginning to collapse. However, the imminent collapse is influenced by the long-term global economic trends rather than individual law enforcement activities. The emergence of globalized hacking and cryptocurrencies has loosened the grip of Kremlin on the organized criminal groups because they are no longer dependent on Russian bank for money laundering ( Allodi, 2017) . The state is currently employing hackers who work beyond their geographical borders that make it difficult for the country to impose coercive force on the criminal gangs if they do not comply with rules that govern their relationships. The patriotism appeals may not be efficient to control all the criminal gangs. Moreover, the threat of being tortured is only efficient with resident hackers.
The reducing control of Kremlin over criminal gangs is influencing cybersecurity globally. Some nation-state actors may use their experience working with Russian state authorities to drive their agendas because some of the former state operatives are becoming hackers or mercenaries for hire. The services that were initially only affordable for state actors are now affordable in the private sector. On the other hand, some states are trying to emulate the Russian model in an attempt to build online cybercrime syndicates. The actions may end up affecting them because most of the cybercriminals often target local businesses and people before they acquire adequate experience and skills to target multinationals or foreign companies ( Scherrer, 2016) . Besides, some military grade hacking tools may leak leading to a widespread arms control proliferation issues in the countries seeking to emulate the Russian model regarding organized crime and cybercrime.
Conclusion
The term paper evaluates the Russian Organized Crime, Cyber-Crime and how it affects corporates. Aspiring cybercriminals do not need to spend long hours learning how to develop or code applications so that they can hack corporations. Instead, they only need to pay for malware and hacking services. Due to the protection of the political elite, the organized crime gangs could continue operating without the fearing systematic crackdown as long as they realized and respected the leadership of the state. Russia has effectively used organized criminal gangs and cybercrime to exert political and economic control in various countries. Western nations should develop better techniques for managing Russian cybercrime statecraft. All multinationals should not wait for attacks before they set up mechanisms against cybercrime. Business should quickly monitor suspicious activities to mitigate or prevent imminent attacks ( Allodi, 2017) . All in all, the Russian organized criminal groups and cybercrime is unlikely to cease anytime soon, and all affected parties should set up systems that will control the situation.
References
Allodi, L. (2017). Economic factors of vulnerability trade and exploitation: Empirical evidence from a prominent Russian cybercrime market. arXiv preprint arXiv:1708.04866 .
Galeotti, M. (2014). Global crime today: the changing face of organized crime . Routledge.
Jasper, S., & Wirtz, J. (2017). Cybersecurity. In The Palgrave Handbook of Security, Risk, and Intelligence (pp. 157-176). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
Kshetri, N. (2017). Cybercrime Firms’ Internationalization Strategy and Tactics: An Exploratory Framework.
Ortner, D. (2015). Cybercrime and punishment: The Russian Mafia and Russian responsibility to exercise due diligence to prevent trans-boundary cybercrime. BYU L. Rev. , 177.
Scherrer, A. (2016). G8 against transnational organized crime . Routledge.
Taylor, R. W., Fritsch, E. J., & Liederbach, J. (2014). Digital crime and digital terrorism . Prentice Hall Press.
