The discourse on moral truths has led to two schools of thoughts: moral skepticism and moral objectivism. Moral skeptics deny the fact that true and objective moral standards exist. Moral objectivism, on the other hand, holds that objective moral truths exist unlike the refutation of the moral nihilism postulates. Although elements of moral skepticism such as those held by moral relativist believe in the existence of moral standards, they hold that they can be correct without being objective ( Shafer-Landau, 2004) . Since people who abide by them craft the standards, a moral truth to one may not be a moral truth to the other. The two notions cannot occur together and if one is true then the other one is false. The following study shows that Shafer-Landau’s assertions on moral objectivism is true as seen from the argument that moral skepticism is false.
Shafer-Landau defends moral objectivism in an excellent way in his book ‘Whatever Happened to Good and Evil?’ He argues that some moral views are better over others despite the sincerity with which cultures, societies, or individuals endorse them. His assertion is that some moral views true while others are false ( Shafer-Landau, 2004) . In fact, although some moral views are true or false, they cannot be absolute. Moreover, not everything that a society endorses becomes a truth; the society or individuals are more likely to be mistaken concerning morality. Therefore, some moral standards do not arise from our actions and we just ascribe to them.
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Shafer-Landau acknowledges the existence of people who believe in the strong connection between objective moral value and a supernatural being. Shafer-Landau argues that most of them are theists who believe in ethical objectivity and hence do not see the need to defend the idea without God ( Shafer-Landau, 2004) . The view that Shafer-Landau has is that ethics is objective if God exists and as an atheist, he believes that God does not exist and hence ethics is not objective. Shafer-Landau is making a deliberate attempt to rescue moral objectivism. Therefore, certain moral judgments are objectively correct or incorrect all the time independent of the context ( Shafer-Landau, 2004) . In rescuing moral objectivism, Shafer-Landau argues against moral skepticism that such moral knowledge does not exists unless people choose to act in a particular dimension because they know the effects of their actions.
Shafer-Landau argues against three main dimensions of skepticism. The first one is nihilism where moral judgments are meaningless although people have been found to hold on or treasure false beliefs. In such a case, people often observe moral values without necessarily ascribing to any particular facts on this field. In moral relativism, moral rules are social conventions as rules followed in a game ( Shafer-Landau, 2004) . The model rules out any possible prejudice when people hold different views concerning a moral issue. This concept infers that it is possible to solve moral problems by observing some form of rationality in our problems. In moral subjectivism, moral judgments occur as personal evaluations and that they are only true or false to the extent that they are sincere or not. This model relies on individual biases thereof ( Shafer-Landau, 2004) . In my view, Shafer-Landau defends moral objectivism in a peculiar way. Instead of attempting to have an affirmative case for moral objectivism, Shafer-Landau demolishes the case for the propositions that some form of moral skepticism has been logically proven and that any form of moral objectivism can b disproven. This logical argument demonstrates that moral objectivism remains logically possible and hence does not make a case of it being a reality or close to true.
In the first part of the book, Shafer-Landau describes some arguments for moral skepticism and provides compelling evidence that the arguments for moral skepticism have weaknesses that make them inappropriate. In the second part, Shafer-Landau provides the reader with the notion that moral objectivism does not succeed without leaving some logical escape for its arguments. In my understanding, Shafer-Landau does a good job in part two as he convinces the reader by attacking some of the best versions of arguments in support of moral objectivism ( Shafer-Landau, 2004) . Most of the arguments in the book reduce to the notion that moral skepticism is incorrect because it leads to conclusions incompatible with moral objectivism ( Corduan, 2004) . Based on the arguments presented by Shafer-Landau, moral objectivism is not only reassuring and intuitive but it also allows for ordinary moral discourse. It is clear from the author’s argument that ethical objectivism is the solution to the problems of moral skepticism.
Ethical objectivism is based on the claims we cannot influence the occurrence of all moral truths within. Ethical objectivism explains the nature of the moral error and allows individuals to have moral fallibility because right and wrong are not what we may perceive them to be ( Shafer-Landau, 2004) . It does not tell us who is right and who is wrong but provides an independent standard on which to judge right and wrong. I agree with Shafer-Landau because ethical objectivism allows for moral progress due to the independent standard of evaluation ( Corduan, 2004) .
Based on skepticism, something exists only if it is needed as a form of explanation to what we experience. However, as developed by Shafer-Landau, only a few things are needed for such a task. He gives the argument that when people want to understand why the victim died, then it is important to understand the bullet that killed her without referring to the evil or wrongness involved in the death of the victim. Therefore, bullets exist but moral facts do not ( Corduan, 2004) .
Moral objectivism holds that some actions are right and others are wrong regardless of the judgment that people have of the actions. Therefore, Shafer-Landau is in conflict with relativists and nihilists. Shafer-Landau has the view that nihilists argue that Objectivism is poorly grounded as a form of metaethics ( Shafer-Landau, 2004) . Skeptics are of the argument that the moral status of an action can only be understood by looking at arguments beyond human authority. In fact, the external moral reality serves as a source of the principles believed by the moral objectivists ( Shafer-Landau, 2004) . In my understanding, nihilists and relativists argue that objectivism needs God and in the process claim that moral objectivism requires something that is not in existence.
Shafer-Landau also refutes the view by skeptics that objective truths lack when two people disagree on an ethic claim ( Corduan, 2004) . Shafer-Landau argues that even though there are disagreements about the building blocks of matter among physicists, it does not mean there is no objective about the topic or the notions developed by the physicists. Therefore, one’s metaethics depends on whether one can genuinely accept a permissible rule. If one can accept a permissible rule, some rules categorize an action as permissible. Such an individual is a moral objectivist ( Shafer-Landau, 2004) . However, although people may agree on some of the rules that make an action permissible, they may disagree on the concepts and the characterization of some actions. Shafer-Landau seems to argue that common acceptance of some truths and hence morality leaves room for people to have differences ( Corduan, 2004) .
The support of moral objectivism that the author provides stems from the argument that there is some level of moral congruity. Many people consider morality as something instilled by a supernatural being but Shafer-Landau as an atheist believes that morality is necessary to establish some consistencies in the actions taken by individuals. In most of the examples or arguments developed by ethical relativism, one evident thing is the openness to infringement of human rights ( Shafer-Landau, 2004) . For example, arguing that the morality of an act can only be assessed based on the society’s acceptance means that an action accepted by a specific society but harmful to another is justifiable. In my view, by believing in the inherent nature of our rights, we must accept the objectivism that comes with them ( Corduan, 2004) . The arguments for moral objectivism are cemented by the fact that people have equal. Therefore, morality is objective.
Overall, the world is controlled by a set of rules and principles upon which we must ascribe if we have to live in harmony. On his part, Shafer-Landau takes an objectivistic approach in his arguments against moral skeptics. Moral objectivism usually requires only the acceptance of a set of rules. This does not take content into consideration, as the rules may be tolerant, liberal, or tentative. If Objectivism is true, then there must be laws that are common among people with the aim of establishing a middle ground for all players. Therefore, objectivism is presented as a claim about what people ought to accept. Although moral objectivism is true, the lack of adequate information to consider the facts by individuals usually leads to moral disagreements. A disagreement does not imply the lack of truth in what is being said. Shafer-Landau argues that the extent of moral disagreements is usually exaggerated as individuals fail to put themselves in others’ shows to see the hidden facts and end the disagreement.
References
Corduan, W. (2004). Whatever Happened to Good and Evil?. Teaching Philosophy , 27 (4), 391-392.
Shafer-Landau, R. (2004). Whatever happened to good and evil? (p. 4). New York: Oxford University Press.
