Organizational health, defined as the organization’s ability to function effectively and appropriately cope with change and growth is a fundamental consideration in business success (McKinsey, 2019). Regardless of the industry or size of the organization, its management must be conscious of the key dimensions of organizational health. As with any other establishment, my previous employer, the US Navy, had a well-structured organizational structure. Despite being rigid, the naval organizational structure is well-tuned to accommodate change, which is affirmative to the definition of a healthy organizational structure. In the following paragraphs, I will be assessing the Navy (and military by extension) organizational structure in line with Lencioni’s four disciplines of organizational health and Bolman & Deal’s four-frame model of leadership.
Basic Organisational Structure
Briefly, the Navy’s organizational structure consists of an established chain of command, with the President, as the commander-in-chief, sitting at the helm. Below the President is the Secretary of Navy (SECNAV), who then oversees a complex set of ranks below. Functionally, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) holds the Navy’s highest position in active duty, overseeing task groups such as Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups. At the lowest level are the midshipmen, divided into four contiguous classes, who make up the squadron under team leaders.
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Structural strengths
The US Navy has a strong organizational structure because it has been in operation for centuries, and continuous improvements have made it stronger and more dependable. The Navy seems to have got Patrick Lencioni’s six questions all figured out, given the high degree of flexibility it has (Pane et. al., 2018). The organization of troops and squadrons during rapid deployment reflect how the “why do we exist” question is well-understood. Ideally, every soldier from every squadron responds to orders with enthusiasm, and the high sense of duty is a proper proof understanding of the “what we do question.”
Another structural strength with military units is that its members received similar training in nearly similar situations through a similar fashion, making the organizational behaviour quite predictable. As a result, the generals have an easy time passing down instructions or implementing new strategies. Furthermore, Lencioni’s ideals number 2-4, which all relate to clarity, are well implemented in the Navy. The command structure is clear, and the leadership is superbly responsive.
Structural weaknesses
The Navy, and military by extension, faces great challenges processing changes. Particularly, naval leadership has always been plagued with inappropriate responses to changes, especially in the professional domain (Holmberg & Alvinius, 2018). More so, the bureaucratic nature of the profession makes it hard for critical information to be passed down to juniors for timely implementation in fear of espionage or simple mistrust. Political favouritism in processing performance appraisals aside, the military professional culture inhibits independent thought and unconventional solutions, which are often seen as contesting the ultimate authority. Thus, most naval taskforces fail on Bolman and Deals’ (2017) virtues of clarity in metrics, systems and procedures in addressing organizational change (p.25). On the other hand, the Navy’s organizational structure lacks transformational leadership at the O level because of the rigidity that comes with the inflexible nature of policy-making beyond the Lieutenant Commander (McFate, 2020). Such regressive forms of leadership are what caused Iggy’s Bread of the World’s initial stagnation.
Recommendations
The recommendations I would offer my former employer would strictly follow Bolman and Deals’ (2017) futuristic insights on reforming organizations. The need for the Navy’s junior management to upgrade talent management comes first. While we cannot overhaul the military culture of arduous and hierarchical decision-making processes, managers (CNO, Lieutenants and Regent head for this case) must install permanent and responsive structures to manage talent effectively. Presumably, one founded on a less conventional and not founded on the “chain of command.” That would bolster operational effectiveness, given the amount of wasted time unskilled leadership costs the forces. Given that the Navy has a sufficient supply of technology, financing, and advisory, strategic integration of transformational leadership in combat will go a long way in enhancing talent.
Besides, McGinn & Lefort (2001) recommend financial integrity as a magical bullet in shrewd management. As such, I would recommend tighter scrutiny of expenditures with naval expeditions, especially for overseas missions. Given that financial opaqueness is an old and enduring problem in the military, better control of finances would improve the morale of the foot soldiers, which would then translate to effectiveness in mission pursuit (McFate, 2020). While naval troops do so well in leader-member information exchange, it fails disgracefully in achieving a sustainable work-life balance for the leaders, who spend turn up with various psychological challenges in the end.
My preferences for taking a practical bottom-up rather than a policy-based top-down approach consider structure and relationships as the most relevant aspects of the Navy’s organizational structure. Essentially, the simplistic take limits my appreciation of the fact that the military thrives on a rigid business framework. This underpinning is noticeable in the way my recommendations castigate cherished military establishments such as the chain of command. On the other hand, the recommendations elevate my perception that regardless of industry, leadership has to be dynamic, transformational and transparent, especially in the interest of finances.
In conclusion, I find my previous employer both proud of Lencioni’s and Bolman & Deal’s criteria for a successful organizational strategy, but equally guilty of failing in their definition of change-readiness. While I find the Navy doing well in addressing the six questions of organizational health, some of the working mechanisms are in clear contravention of what defines the effective structural outfit to harness talent and change. In effect, the recommendations attempt to reconcile the human conflict arising from the misconception that rigidity is the signature of military success.
References
Bolman, L. G., & Deal, T. E. (2017). Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice, And Leadership. John Wiley & Sons.
Holmberg, A., & Alvinius, A. (2019). How Pressure for Change Challenge Military Organizational Characteristics. Defence Studies , 19(2), 130-148.
McFate, M. (2020). Being there: US Navy Organisational Culture and the Forward Presence Debate. Defence & Security Analysis, 36(1), 42-64.
McGinn, K. L., & Lefort, A. (2001). Iggy's Bread of the World. Harvard Business School . 9, 801-822.
McKinsey & Company. (2019 March) “ What Makes an Organization ‘Healthy’?” Retrieved https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/our-insights/what-makes-an-organization-healthy#
Pane, M. M., Siregar, C., Ruman, Y. S., & Rumeser, J. A. (2018, May). The Application of the Lencioni Model in Online Learning: A Case Study in Higher Education. In Proceedings of the 2018 International Conference on Distance Education and Learning (pp. 49-53).
