Distance had safeguarded Russia from the impact of the revolutionary war until Napoleon defeated the Prussia and Austria in the years 1805 to 1807. Those years caused much loss to the Russians who were only left with French armies and no neighboring allies to aid resistance. The French imperialism had already produced a power imbalance in the Europe continent, and its reconcilement with Napoleon made it a junior partner. The partnership created drove Russia into an economic war damaging their interests and in turn strengthened France all at the expense of Europe. This pressure undermined the France Russia relations. Therefore, Napoleon decided to declare war on Russia to ultimately gain control (Boсkeria, Glyantsev & Kolesnikov, 2012).
Among military scientists and strategists, it is argued that the generals are usually preserved for the last war. The sentiments expressed by this statement can be echoed through Leo Tolstoy’s book War and Peace . Tolstoy (2011) explores the differing views of “reality” in the historical context and illustrates how the differences not only brings about conflicts between nations and ideologies but also our approach to the historical context. Tolstoy, Pevear, and Volokhonsky (2011) state that the different ways the Russian and France people viewed reality, led to the ultimate demise of the Grande Armée. Tolstoy, Pevear and Volokhonsky (2011) asserted that the most significant ideological and theoretical disputes of the nineteenth century in Europe were focused on determining which group would have the power to decide the realistic representation of the social reality. According to Boсkeria, Glyantsev and Kolesnikov ( 2012), Napoleon's invasion was not in any way ideological or theoretical instead it was entirely based on national pride and worldly lust. Another ideological dispute was on how a war should be conducted . The Russian and French view on how to lead a war compromise both their realities.
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According to Napoleon, reality meant conducting a war in accordance to the game's rules, wherein the victory of an army in any battle leads to an increase of its nation’s rights, the way in has always been from the ancient days to the current time (Tolstoy, Pevear & Volokhonsky, 2011). However, the Borodino fight did not play out according to the old rules. Instead, after the successful invasion of Moscow by the French and their victory, Russia did not cease to exist instead of the six hundred French men (Tolstoy, Pevear & Volokhonsky, 2011). This victory happened because the French gathered their reality on the rules of the previous war. This argument may, however, be considered ironic, for Napoleon was very successful because of his defiance of the set rules . By establishing conscription and total mobilization in ways never seen before, the French men were able to gain dominance over entire Europe at least for a short period. Boсkeria, Glyantsev and Kolesnikov (2012) argues that in the case of the 1812 battle, the realistic position of French men showed the quintessence of naivety from the Russian perspective on a similar issue.
From the Russian view at some point, the war stopped to be a game and change from a matter of a sport to a means for survival. The fear of loss of their country and mostly death, motivated the Russian army and the entire population to adapt some techniques that made it impossible for the French men to survive the brutal winter at that time. In previous years, it was customary to concede defeat. However, the Russians continued to fight. Tolstoy views this usual break as a “duel by all the rules of the art of fencing,” where the fighters realized that this was not a joke it was a matter of life and death (Kuehn, 2008). By the French men continuing to “all of the rules of the art of fencing,” they failed to address the challenges with the appropriate realities responses.
According to Tolstoy, Pevear and Volokhonsky (2011), it is evident that the French could not anticipate any of the challenges. The desire to be realistic shows less the essence of realism as what it is to be unrealistic. Given that the world has its own set of rules on how it operates and functions, then the unrealistic are not within those rules, they have unlimited possibilities (Kuehn, 2008). The Russian war approach opened up and whole new option for the nations at war to not at all depend on their armies, nor in conquerors but something else. Tolstoy says that it was the people’s spirit that led them to burn their land rather than giving it to the French (Kuehn, 2008). Before the failed invasion, battles were always conducted by tactics, strategies and military science. Tolstoy, Pevear and Volokhonsky (2011) points out that the army’s spirit had a significant role in that the French men failed to account for when they went to war. It was, therefore, necessary for the French men to understand the war history before engaging.
More was involved in the battle than just a simple scientific method application to the data of the society’s history and the human nature. For in spite of their scientific orientation, the nineteenth-century realistic approaches by artists and thinkers were aware of the fact that any attempt to understand the prior world gave unseen or unexpected problems and difficulties not shown in the human effort to deal with the physical world. Therefore, both Tolstoy and White came to an agreement that while science can be used to explain the war concerning movements and troops, as well as their supplies, as Napoleon thought, the human nature and the morale of the army cannot be quantified (Boсkeria, Glyantsev & Kolesnikov, 2012).
References
Boсkeria, L., Glyantsev, S. & Kolesnikov, Y. (2012). Russian war surgery in 1812: 200 years since Russia's war triumph. International Journal of Surgery Volume 10, Issue 10. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijsu.2012.11.001
Kuehn, T. (2008). The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov. The Journal of Military History Volume 72, Number 4, October 2008 pp. 1295-1296 | 10.1353/jmh.0.0141
Tolstoy, L., Pevear, R., & Volokhonsky, L. (2011). War and peace . Vintage.
