The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) urges all states to provide adequate internal national security. Before 9/11, the US lacked a comprehensive system for addressing individuals using the aviation system on a daily basis including employees of airports, airlines, contractors, passengers, vendors, and other tenants (Price & Forrest, 2016, p. 156). Price and Forrest (2016) contend that the intelligence community (IC) carries out intelligence activities necessary for identifying threats and protecting national security in the US (p. 172). The IC has access to controlled unclassified information, which is information that does not meet standards under the national security classification under EO 12958 (Price & Forrest, 2016, p. 175). Such information is classified under “for official use only.” The text clearly depicts how aviation security practitioners discern threats based on credibility and reliability. Such practice is important because it enables personnel to prioritize on information that is useful to a specific operation. Threat information available at the unclassified level must be classified into either secret or top secret. IC uses language such as “we indicate” and “likely” to assert that there is an increased chance of an imminent threat (Price & Forrest, 2016, p. 177). The NTSC gathers international information pertaining known and suspected terrorists. Chapter 4 of the text provides in-depth explanation of how intelligence is relayed from the NTSC to various agencies for threat preparation processes. Therefore, aviation security operations are highly dependent on information from the NTSC in combating security threats. Without the NTSC, most agencies would be vulnerable to attacks from both terrorist and non-terrorist attacks. According to Price and Forrest (2016), the TSA notifies airline security of imminent threats to enhance preparation mechanisms (p. 168). Aviation security operators must pay close attention to worldwide terrorist threats to ensure they protect flight crews, passengers, and aircrafts (Price & Forrest, 2016, p. 178). Indeed, having prior knowledge of non-terrorist threats such as avian flu and Covid-19 prepares the US on ways of handling personnel and passengers who may be infected and prevent mass casualties. Aviation security must pay equal attention to domestic threats that are likely to jeopardize domestic airline operations. Air transport is among the most used transportation means in the US. However, it poses highest risks in casualties in the event of a terrorist attack. Chapter 4 clearly shows why aviation security must establish working relationships with local, state, and federal law enforcement, to ensure they acquire information on threats in a timely manner. The FBI and DHS share information from the broad watchlist with security agencies and aviation security with need-to-know access (Savage, 2019). The list, consisting of more than 1.2 million people flagged as potential threats, restricts individuals from accessing airline services, greater scrutiny by the police and denial of government benefits and contracts (Savage, 2019, p. 2). Federal Judge Anthony J. Trenga deems such restrictions as direct violation of American citizens (Savage, 2019, p. 2). Judge Trenga’s contentions are wrong because the watchlist is compiled based on clear evidence that a certain adversary poses a threat to other citizens. Without the watchlist, people acquitted of terrorism related crimes might be inclined to conduct similar attacks. Recently, the American-Islamic represented 19 Americans in filing a lawsuit charging their unlawful inclusion into the due process rights (Savage, 2019, p. 2). The plaintiffs indicate that the FBI terrorist screening center did not inform them of their inclusion in the list thus denying them the opportunity to contest derogatory claims (Savage, 2019, p. 2). The article depicts real scenarios on the negative implications of the watchlist on those included. Despite often being seen as an inconvenience, the No Fly list ensures that passengers access safe travel and limits recurrence of catastrophic events such as 9/11 attacks. Price and Forrest (2016) indicate that aviation security personnel must maintain high levels of awareness to promote identification, assessment, and response to early warning indicators (p. 179). Judge Trenga asserts that the TSDB places individuals on wide-ranging consequences by including citizens in such lists (Savage, 2019, p. 2). Despite his justifiable claims, the FBI has mandate under the freedom of information act to include people on the watchlist even after they are acquitted of terrorism related crimes. To reduce the suggested implications on citizens, law-enforcement agencies must show plausible cause of adding individuals to the list and inform them once they are included.
References
Price, J., & Forrest, J. (2016). Practical Aviation Security: Predicting and Preventing Future Threats (3rd ed.). Elsevier.
Delegate your assignment to our experts and they will do the rest.
Savage, C. (2019, September 4). Judge Rules Terrorism Watchlist Violates Constitutional Rights. The New York Times , 1-2.
