The Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) happened when the nuclear power plant at Westinghouse Corporation was fully operational. Once operations are at their fullest extent, the control rods are usually removed from the core completely and the plant functions at a point of equilibrium between decay heat and xenon (Joyce, 2018). The first indication of the accident was the rapid reduction of the pressurizer level, as the Reactor Operator (RO) noted. The plant continued losing its primary water as the operator failed to act. The Reactor Protection System automatically started scramming the plant to ensure the exposed reactor did not continue operating (Joyce, 2018). Both the pressure and the pressurizer level continued decreasing. The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) then activated after the plant reached the low-pressure set point where it directed additional water towards the core to eradicate increasing heat and ensure uninterrupted operation (Tipping, 2016). Operators failed to act in the simulator because the plant lacked operating procedures.
Engineering best practices and general industry knowledge, nevertheless, dictate that the RO ought to have quickly reported to the Shift Manager regarding the unfolding events after detecting a rapid decrease in the pressurizer level (Tipping, 2016). The RO was also required to scram the reactor manually to protect the core before commencing the required leak isolation process based on the scheme of that specific plant (Joyce, 2018). When isolating the leak, the RO should have stopped the rapidly cooling reactor loops by ensuring that the steam header was detached from the steam generator, isolated each reactor loop individually to find the source of the leak, and if all other loops were intact, isolated the pressurizer surge and spray lines (Tipping, 2016). The other staff should have simultaneously activated the ECCS to ensure the availability of water for eliminating the decay heat besides preparing to change into the mode 5 condition and ensuring that the primary system cooled down to less than 200 degrees F (Joyce, 2018). These actions would have prevented damage to the cores and established a suitable setting for the inspection of the reactor coolant system and future repairs.
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Besides creating a safe working environment, the staff should assess the whole accident. They should focus on Surveillance 3.4.13.1 to examine the RCS water record data and identify the quantity of the lost radioactive coolant from the LOCA (Westinghouse, 2012). The staff can use different radiation monitoring gadgets to gather data and determine the possible release of fission product besides jointly examining contamination issues (Tipping, 2016). They will use the information from these items to determine the general environmental effect on the neighborhood. They can then conclude that the surrounding environment was not exposed to any radiation or contamination after verifying the integrity of the containment structures. The lack of operator action would have led to substantial environmental exposure.
While the team had to ensure the facility was secure, they also had to formulate vital verdicts that could significantly affect the whole community. Most of the decisions were essential because of their basis in regulations and good morality (Tipping, 2016). The team could have, nonetheless, placed the environment and the neighborhood at greater risk if they ignored these regulations. Evidence of the release of radioactive material to the environment would be lacking if the Shift Manager had failed to verify the integrity of the containment building. The public would also be sure that the radioactive liquid contaminated their water source if the team had failed to take the RCS inventory either before or after the event.
The plant would also have placed the neighborhood at serious risk if it did not comply with the established safe processes of disposing of waste (Westinghouse, 2019). It was also vital for stakeholders at the plant to decide when, as the events unfolded, they had to notify the public. Widespread panic would have emerged if the notification was too early as nobody could know the extent of the accident during that time. If the stakeholders, however, withheld the information for a very long time, false rumors would have emerged, which would have discredited any information the stakeholders intended to offer. The possibility of these societal issues required that the plant leadership issue an official statement sooner to the public to verify that no contamination or radiological release happened. In turn, this would ensure that the public understands that they are not at risk, which will calm them and ensure that the plant focused on repair work without the need to deal with inaccurate rumors.
The issues regarding radioactivity would stay in the containment structure provided that plant stakeholders take all the immediate actions including securing the condition of the facility and creating a nontoxic environment for maintenance purposes. In turn, this would lead to a low radiological impact on the stakeholders and minimize the impact on all workers involved in repair or clean-up work through meticulous radiation monitoring. Workers will not receive doses high enough to lead to any substantial effect on their health if they follow all the established federal or local exposure limits.
References
Joyce, M. J. (2018). Nuclear Engineering : a Conceptual Introduction to Nuclear Power . Butterworth-Heinemann/Elsevier, Cop.
Tipping, P. G. (2016). Understanding and mitigating ageing in nuclear power plants : materials and operational aspects of plant life management (PLiM) . Woodhead Publishing.
Westinghouse. (2012). Standard Technical Specifications-Westinghouse Plants: Specifications. Westinghouse Electric Company LLC. Retrieved from https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1210/ML12100A222.pdf
Westinghouse. (2019). Nuclear Safety-Unequaled Design. Westinghouse Electric Company LLC. Retrieved from http://www.westinghousenuclear.com/new-plants/ap1000-pwr/safety
