Frankfurt identifies the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) as a role that has been dominant in all the inquiries that concern free-will. The principle of alternate possibilities is expressed when a person is said to be morally responsible for their actions only if they had an alternatives that they could have chosen from but still go ahead and carryout a given act. However, this meaning is highly contested by Frankfurt. He describes it as a controversy especially when it involves an individual who accepts this principle, and strongly holds to the belief that determinism is irreconcilable with mora responsibility. Frankfurt further questions this principle by pointing out that people whose opinions of free-will and moral responsibility are dramatically different often use the principle as a common ground to fiercely defend one’s opposing stand. This paper seeks to review the principle of alternate possibilities as well as the argument posed by Frankfurt against this principle. The paper will also provide an individualized opinion on whether Frankfurt’s argument was convincing or not.
Aaccording to Werther (n.d) , it is typically accepted to state that an individual who is forced pressured carryout out a certain act, is deprived of free will and thus, and such a person engages in the given act without free will, and therefore, one cannot be held as morally responsible for their action. This translates to imply that a coerced person in most cases, is often faced with no choice and thus are denied the freedom and mora responsibility by not having the opportunity to make a choice out of the alternatives. Therefore, some people tend to genuinely accept the principle of alternate possibilities to be true especially in scenarios where an individual is pressured to perform a certain task after being deprived of the freedom to choose from the existing alternatives. Frankfurt explores this fact by giving two practical examples, although critics may argue that the principle of alternative possibilities may not be accepted in either of the examples. The first example Frankfurt gives entails a guy called Jones. Jones had made a decision to do a morally accepted particular task. However, he is coerced into engaging in a morally wrong activity through threats of facing stiff penalty. The second example is of a situation where an individual is impelled through an inner compulsion or a hypnotic suggestion which drives him/her to make a particular decision. These compulsions make it difficult for the individual to make an alternative decision.
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Frankfurt argues that the principle of alternate possibilities is false since alternate possibilities are not a prerequisite for moral responsibility. He claims that individuals are responsible for every action they make whether they had an alternative or not. When looking at the principle of alternate possibilities, it is important to consider situations that have the same conditions and both make a person to do something and this person has no choice of avoiding it (Frankfurt, 1969). Frankfurt uses three possibilities to assess the situations in which the principle of alternate possibilities was accepted. For example, when a person is forced to something as in the case of Jones or where someone is driven by a fascinating suggestion or drive. The case of Jones shows that some people can be against the principle of alternate possibilities. This is because jones could not have done what he did because he is reasonable. However, he encountered a threat which can affect the decision making of any reasonable man. Additionally, Jones is aware that he can suffer a stiff penalty, but this should not prevent him from doing what is right. In this case, Jones has a choice to either do what is right and faces the threat or do what the wrong thing and face a stiff penalty. Additionally, the fact that Jones is unable to resist the threat shows that he can do the right thing as this does not lead to the reduction of his moral responsibility because of his actions (Frankfurt, 1969).
In the first possibility, Frankfurt suggests that Jones is not a reasonable man as he is a man who does what he has decided to do regardless of what will happen next. Through this context, it can be identified that the threat had no effect force on Jones as he may have acted in the same way had there been no threat. If this situation is true, then there was no coercion in this situation as the threat did not force Jones to do what he did and it could not have prevented him from making an alternative. Therefore, the threat which Jones faced did not reduce his moral responsibility in this situation. Werther (n.d) points out that the second possibility is where Jones was rushed by the threat. In this situation, Jones would have performed the same action irrespective of what decision he had made. The threat may have upset him to an extent that he forgot his own decision. The fact that Jones had made an earlier decision is enough to evaluate his behavior before the threat. Thus, he is liable for full mora responsibility for having made the decision. The third possibility can be that Jones never fled the threat or was cold to it as it impressed him, the way it could do to any reasonable person. As a result, he would have whole heartedly submitted to the threat if he had not made a demanding decision. He acted in a way that was not motivated by the threat but according to his initial considerations before being threatened .
According to Werther (n.d), t he argument presented by Frankfurt is very convincing as it demonstrates a case in which it is natural to deliberate that the individual is responsible for the decisions they have made even though they did lacked any alternatives. It is a significant argument which counters the excuse “I did not have any other choice” or “I could not have done otherwise.” Jones could have made the decision to not succumb to the threat and face a penalty which is less stiff than that which he may have faced in choosing the alternate decision. Frankfurt’s argument is more effective as it refutes the principle since it is unlikely that those who support the principle of alternate possibilities will only accept the alternatives in which the individual will not be blamed for selecting them. There is a possibility that the supporters of this principle would reject the possibility of any moral dilemmas as they are concerned with moral wrong doings and not moral responsibilities.
References
Frankfurt, H. G. (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. The Journal of Philosoph9 , 66 (23), 829-836. doi:10.2307/2023833.
Werther, David. (n.d.). Divine Foreknowledge, Harry Frankfurt, and ‘Hyper-Incompatibilism’ . (Igitur.) Igitur.
