In the recent past, most philosophers including Dworkin, Hayek, Rawls, and Nozick attempted to determine a close relationship between justice and equality: they pose the question "what type of equality justice demands?", And to that, a plethora of conflicting answers have been given. However, researchers must not be too quick to think that what justice requires is always equality, whether of treatment or consequence. Maybe it does not so solely in a formal way. As the resources from the syllabus demonstrate, justice demands the neutral and constant application of rules, and therefore when two individuals are the same in each relevant features, they should be treated equally. However, philosophers such as Aristotle believed justice also encompasses the concept of relative treatment, which suggests an individual receiving different amounts of whatever good is at stake. From here it follows that equality of treatment results in an unequal outcome. On the other hand, Rawls advances two critical principles of justice as being constitutive of any sensible explanation of justice and equality. Rawls's first doctrine of justice requires that each becomes entitled to an equal right to the most extensive liberty. The second doctrine focuses on the primacy of taking full advantage of the successful person. In this perspective then, equality and freedom are the keystones of all foundational conceptions of justice. Given this, the purpose of this paper is to discuss the tension that exists between fairness and equality.
Meadowcroft (2011) posits that there is no doubt that Rawls’s theory of justice is rooted in a specific model of the social agreement in which people are assumed to enter an “original position” from which they will accept the institutional arrangements that will serve as their guides in their closed society from the current time going forward. People are believed to be rational and egoïstic, but owing to the fact they cannot possess an idea of their future social and professional status they cannot choose arrangements will suit their interests. However, they must instead select an outcome that will be acceptable to any individual despite their traits or social status (Meadowcroft, 2011). In that perspective, Meadowcroft (2011) further argued that economic inequalities could be tolerated solely if there are to the advantage of the least fortunate group in a society, which Rawls defines as those whose relatives and class heritages are more disadvantaged than others. The preference that Rawls offers to the fundamental rights in his theory of justice implies that his interpretation has a vital liberal scope and thereby is a simple model of social democracy. Instead, his argument can be precisely classified as an example of radical egalitarianism (Meyer & Matravers, 2010).
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Although the disconnectedness of individuals results in Rawls developing a theory of social contract that that presents fundamental redistribution of income and wealth by the government, Nozick argues that any government more widespread than the nominal state should infringe on individual’s rights and this cannot be justified (Meadowcroft, 2011). In his critique of social Rawls’ rationale, Nozick contends that it is not impossible to assert that, as each member of a community can gain from social cooperation, the disadvantaged ones are inevitably entitled to a share in the income of the rich people (Meadowcroft, 2011). Nozick seems to argue that if justice includes the pattern in which income and wealth are distributed, then giving ─which changes the process will be unjust. Therefore, pattern theories do no improve the adjusted redistribution which supposedly takes place under an entitlement theory. Besides, they also change the idea of possession. According to Nozick individuals often realize that income is inequitably distributed, and progressed instantly to explain how it can be made more equal. However, on the entitlement theory, one cannot decide whether redistribution is needed merely by examining the predominant pattern of distribution. On the other hand, Rawls argues that the veil of ignorance must cover the distribution of inborn talent, as rules mirroring the distribution would not be fair. Nozick counters this by claiming that it is not correct that an individual deserves something only if he deserves if solely he merits whatever he used, comprising inborn talents (Meadowcroft, 2011).
On the other hand, according to Lister (2013) Hayek defends Rawls by agreeing on the essential point, in that principles of justice apply to the rules of the institution and social practices. Besides, Hayek does not renounce that people might have a moral obligation to mitigate suffering influenced by others or by nature. In simple terms, Hayek states that it may be that individuals also have duties to assist alleviate inequality caused by others, or to share equitably in the benefits of cooperation (Lister, 2013).
According to Arneson (n.d.), egalitarian philosophy then interprets the concept of equality and the social connection upon which it relies. This is illustrated by Dworkin who claims that central to justice is the principle of equal concern and respect for individuals. Dworkin suggests that the luck egalitarian stance is tricky not least because an individual is incapable of distinguishing luck and obligation in both principle and praxis to the extent that philosophers have supposed (Meyer & Matravers). The idea of luck, in effect, is hard to unravel. Meyer & Matravers (2010) comment that Dworkin believes that it is best interpreted in line with the value of outcomes. What this implies is that the whole emphasis of the egalitarian theory requires to shift. Luck egalitarian begins with the concept that it is possible to differentiate between brute luck and obligation. In doing, people then question which outcomes belong to which, and then contribute to redistribution to offset processes associate with brute luck (Meyer & Matravers, 2010). Therefore, the emphasis of egalitarian perception must be the compensation system, which is to suggest people must be questioning concerning the degree of specific duty and discrimination that humans are designed to admit (Barry, 2008). The thoughts on social justice that Dworkin seems to champion attracted criticism. Its point of departure is that governments have the responsibility to treat all citizens under their jurisdiction with equal concern and respect (Arneson, 1999).
This calls for action from the multipart belief that it is significant that the life of each member of the potential community must be successful, and equally substantial that each member's life turns out well. Some detractors object to the personal responsibility component of luck (Arneson, n.d.). They believe that luck egalitarian canons promote wrongfully moralistic, ungenerous rules towards a person whose choices and conduct have found them on the wrong side of the law (Arneson, n.d.). Individuals in misery merit assistance and surely frequently have a moral right to be assisted although they could have prevented their current plight by appropriately being careful about their behavior. Still, others think that that luck egalitarian doctrines are counterproductive to uphold a view of justice that needs categorizing individuals into the deserving from the undeserving least-advantaged and the worthy from the undeserving rich for the goal of establishing what treat persons are owed (Arneson, 1999).
Conclusion
One way to loosen up our views concerning justice is by focusing on the history of the concept. We can improve our understanding a great deal by reading more extensively what Rawls, Hayek, Nozick, Aristotle, and Dworkin, have to say regarding the concept. Rawls and Nozick pay more significant attention to the modern debate about justice in the distribution of income and wealth. The latter has provided a striking counterpoint to the former's theory of justice as equality derived from questionable choices of individuals within the original position. Dworkin formulates complex arguments supporting his thought integration of any practical personal responsibility norm in the theory of social justice dismisses welfare.
References
Arneson, R. (n.d.). Dworkin and Luck Egalitarianism: A Comparison . Retrieved from http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/2016papers/dworkinluckfinal.pdf
Arneson, R. J. (1999). “Equality of Opportunity for Welfare Defended and Recanted.” Journal of Political Philosophy , 7(4), 1-17.
Barry, N. (2008). “Reassessing Luck Egalitarianism.” Journal of Politics , 70(1), 136-150.
Lister, A. (2013). The “Mirage” of Social Justice: Hayek Against (and For) Rawls." A Journal of Politics and Society , 24(3-4), 409-444.
Meadowcroft, J. (2011). Nozick’s Critique of Rawls: Distribution, Entitlement, and the Assumptive World of A Theory of Justice . Retrieved from https://sci- hub.tw/10.1017/CCOL9780521197762.011
Meyer, L., & Matravers, M. (2010). “Introduction: democracy, equality, and justice.” Critical Review International Social and Political Philosophy , 13(1), 1-15.
