Argument Against American Way of War based on the 1973 Russell F. Weigley and Brian Linn the Echo Battle, 2009
Introduction
The literature on the American Way of War remains a critical aspect of discussion over the years. Russell F. Weigley, the author of The American Way of War, (1973), and American Historians argued that the US never had a national strategy until WWII. The arguments are based on The American Revolution, The civil war, and World War II as waged by the United States, including confederacy. The explicit and implicit aspects concerning the literature involve overriding features when it comes to American Warfare. The features involve direct, aggressive, and direct approach focuses on attaining decisive victory. A Way of War involves a holistic strategy involved in dealing with conflict right from the stance of the pre-war condition-setting to the final accomplishments of the prevalent strategic objectives. Contrarily, American Way of war involves coercive operations, which mainly concentrates on destroying the foes’ regular forces on the battlefield. The argument focuses on Americans’ reactive national strategy as opposed to the strategic impulse for conducting war based on Weigley’s 1973 American Way of War.
Delegate your assignment to our experts and they will do the rest.
The argument for American Way of War based on the 1973 Russell F. Weigley
The phrase ‘Way of War’ as used in Weigley’s argument refers to the prevalent trends in conducting and preferred thinking when it comes to war. The American context bases the phrase on the fundamental expectations and ideas used by the military profession and the political leaders in the United States. The latter parties use the previous terms when dealing with war in their respective roles. Their expectations and ideas remain critical in informing military and political decision-makers when dealing with matters of doctrine and concept of development, budgeting, and strategic planning (Brady, 2005). The Defense Transformation is currently strengthened by an ever-acquisitive language that neglects the basic aspects of war logic.
The American Revolution is depicted in the controversial and authoritative literature done by Weigley as a prevalent feature in the American War of War . In the study, the military strategy mainly aimed at the destruction of the enemy, which started with the armed forces and ultimately the entire society’s fabric. Weigley (1977) main focus was on the tactics and strategies used in the American Military, which involved theory and practice. The strategy concept involves diplomatic, economic, political and psychological aspects prevalent when accessing war aims. The strategy concept aims at working well when integrated with the practical aspects used in applying the strategic thought on war. Some of the first American Strategists include Nathanael Greene, George Washington, and Winfield Scott, who experienced limitations based on their resources. The tempers of the times also meant that the strategists reduced their ambitious strategies to settle for more moderate aims.
Most of Weigley view on American Way of War can apply to British, French, and German methods prevalent in warfare. Elder Helmuth von Moltke, who is a German Chief of Prusso among the General Staff in 1857-1888, who used the American Approach described by Weigley. Moltke linked grand strategy with a policy where he held that policy has no rights to interfere with the conduct of the military operations. Despite policy’s right to create goals prevalent in conflict to the point of altering it whenever it considered the changes fit in the discrete statesmen’s province, it should never interfere with the operations of the military conduct. According to Clausewitzian’s clause, Moltke accommodates the initial value of the logic of war but acknowledges the value of grammar before the actual fight (Brady, 2005).
However, the period of the Civil war influenced a totalistic conception of war based on its culmination of the bloodletting. Ultimately, the climactic battle resulted in a state of a surprise based on the description provided by Jomini in the textbook West Point and Napoleon’s demonstration at Austerlitz. The book demonstrates Lee’s Strategy concentrated on the idea of offensive-defensive, which sacrificed thousands. Equally, Grant’s policy of annihilation was considered by most people, including Northerners as a butchery. The ultimatum involved surprise from the generals in gray and blue, who were shocked by the battle climactic (Brady, 2005).
Additionally, Brady (2005) asserts that WWI struggles involve inconclusive costliness prevalent in conventional land warfare. There were American Strategists, who secured alternative glories in the skies and seas. In the 1920s, naval cadets from the United States started staging mock battleships duels against the Japanese fleet. However, in the 1930s, most war planners in America anticipated the herculean one-theatre fight against the European ground Army. Consequently, WWII involved a change of tactics as the American strategy moved to bring the battle against the enemy’s army to annihilate it.
The strategy was based on the Wedemeyer’s plan embodiment as air power remained a valuable supplement in the plan. The strategy held that raining bomb on an enemy remained destructive because it could potentially break the stalemates between armies. Equally, it remained destructive because of its moral implications based on its capacity to stir hostilities, which might influence a speedy end. The intention of Americans remained to duplicate the success that was realized from WWII in Vietnam considering it as another Germany based on Weigley’s (1977) arguments.
America continues to experience new possibilities from the postwar missile age, including counterinsurgency. Nuclear war and massive retaliation aspects of escalation remain some of the post-war possibilities. However, Weigley argues that these possibilities provide minimal success promises. Based on the American involvement in Vietnam, Weigley concludes with the need for a serious discussion based on the reasons surrounding the traditional American Way of War . Weigley argues that the tradition is rarely appropriate because of the prevalence of nuclear weapons or towards the unconventional war as it never guarantees national liberation. Weigley’s narrative remains critical as it opens up to new perspectives when it comes to the approach prevalent in the cultural and military history in the United States. The text remains critical for analysis for the people that have practiced and doubt the American Way of War (Weigley, 1977).
Argument challenging Weigler’s Way of War
On the Contrary, Brian Linn, the Echo of Battle: The Arny’s Way of War (2009) is an update of Weigley’s works based on the new history on army anticipation concerning future wars based on the analysis of the past war. Linn challenges the arguments presented by Weigley concerning American War of War . Linn argues that there are three groups of army thinkers, including heroes, guardians, and managers. The Guardians prevailed in the 19 th century based on the strong defenses used by Americans to shore up its coastlines. Resultantly, the heroes involve the fighting qualities used by individual soldiers. Finally, the 29 th century, involved the managers, who understood the challenges prevalent in large-scale wars. Linn arguments remain enlightening based on the thoughts of the army prevailed during the post-cold war period.
In conclusion, a genuine war of war requires American political leaders and the military to address two main issues. The first problem remains in defining the respective responsibilities and roles of grammar and logic of war. The process of solving the first issues should also accommodate steps that will reduce the divergence in strategic thinking among Americans. Equally, the military and political leaders must make it a habit among themselves to think strategically concerning a favorable outcome in the course of its combat successes. The latter fixtures are not new but remain a rare occurrence among military and political leaders. The purpose of fighting war should be viewing the battle as a means rather than an end in itself. Military and political leaders need to view wars as battles of means as opposed to an end in itself.
My Explanation Concerning American’s Contribution to the Defeat of the Nazi of Germany, and Why the American War Took Too Long to Liberate Europe
Introduction
The Luxemburg city trip to the Cemetery of George Patton Jr remains critical based on his contributions towards the military army of the United States during his service from 1909 to 1945. Patton Jr. commanded the 7 th Army in the Mediterranean theatre during WWII in the United States. Equally, he took part in the 1944 Allied invasion involving the Third Army in Germany and France in the United States. His extensive military background contributed to the design of Patton Saber also termed as the M1913 Cavalry Saber. I think the Americans contributed to the defeat of the Nazi of German through the provision of military supplies among other assistance to its Allies in September 1940.
Contributions, and Why the United States took so Long
However, Pichardo Almanzar & Kulik (2013) suggest that the United States only entered the war in December 1941. The help involved the U.K among other nations, which were at war with Japan and Germany. The lend-lease program stood as an innovative program employed by the United States to help defeat the German Nazi. The war broke in Europe in 1939 during the reign of President Franklin Roosevelt. According to Roosevelt, the United States would remain neutral in law, but he required Americans to remain ‘active in thoughts.’ Roosevelt thoughts involved helping the nations that were struggling against the Nazi German through extensions of help through supplies.
Countries, including the United Kingdom, required help in supplies to fight against the Germans. They lacked raw materials, food, and military goods required for the successful completion of the war against the German Nazis. The United States supplied them with the hard currency they required to cater to the latter needs. Despite the desire to help the British, the United States was limited by the fears of the American public and American law. President Roosevelt realized that the help towards the British would draw conflicts towards the United States. 1939, Neutrality Act permitted belligerents to buy war materials from the United States only based on cash and carry. Equally, the 1934 Johnson Act also limited credit extensions to countries with non-repaid loans received during the WWI period, such as Great Britain (Mills, 2012).
Consequently, Pichardo Almanzar & Kulik (2013) asserts that the American Military remained in opposition to diverting military supplies towards the United Kingdom. According to George C. Marshall, the then Chief of Army Staff expected Britain to surrender after France collapsed. The surrender meant that the supplies from America would help the Germans after the British surrenders. Hence, Marshall among others held that the national security of the United States would rather be preserved by keeping its military supplies for the Western Hemisphere’s defense. The arguments meant that Roosevelt’s thoughts of assisting the United Kingdom and Britain remained limited based on the public’s opinion.
Most Americans remained in opposition to its involvement in another war. In as much as the American public supported the British against the Germans, President Roosevelt required creating an initiative that coincided with the legal prohibition against European conflict. The initiative required coinciding with the needs of the American public, which resisted the United States’ involvement in the European Conflict by restraining from the granting credit and meeting the military leadership needs. Roosevelt signed the ‘Destroyers for Bases’ agreement on September 1940 where the terms of the agreement allowed the British to receive at least 50 obsolete destroyers. The exchange meant a 99-year lease to territories of the Caribbean and Newfoundland, which passed as naval bases and U.S air (Mills, 2012). Winston Churchill, the then British Prime Minister, proposed that Roosevelt give British the destroyers as a gift. However, Roosevelt held that the Congress and the American Public would never buy into the deal. Hence, he used the long-term access deal to British base as a justified move to secure the Western Hemisphere. The reasoning remained critical in assuaging the military and the United States public into accepting to assist the British.
Despite the cash and carry option, the British notified the United States that they were not in a position to buy the military supplies required to fight the Germany, Nazis. The United Kingdom was among the 30 countries that implemented the Lend-Lease agreement with the United States. The latter agreement allowed the United States to dispense $50 billion in helping nations to fight against the Nazis. In as much as Winston Churchill describes the move as ‘the most sordid move pursued by a nation,’ the primary motivation was never a disinterested or an altruism generosity move. Contrarily, the Lend-Lease move was used as a move to serve the American’s desire to defeat Germany’s Nazi (Hoff, 2015). The move helped Americans defeat Germany’s without really entering the war unless the public and the American military was ready to engage.
In conclusion, the American War effort took so long to liberate Europe because of the concerns of the public and the Congress. The United States remained reluctant in the involvement of the European conflict, which made them withhold their support towards the United Kingdom and British until they consider the move harmless. Despite the desire to help the countries secure the Western Hemisphere the United States was blocked by the 1939 Neutrality Act and the 1934 Johnson Act, which held that countries with non-repaid loans towards the United States should not receive further credit extensions. The Lend-Lease Agreement remains a critical representation of Americans commitment to fight Nazi Germany. Ultimately, the joint action signed by the U.S under the Lend-Lease Agreement under article VII established the foundation for the postwar world and the New International Economic Order.
References
Brady, L. M. (2005). The Wilderness of War: Nature and Strategy in the American Civil War. Environmental History , 10 (3), 421.
Hoff, J. (2015). American Business and Foreign Policy : 1920--1933 . Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=938855&site=ehost-live
Linn, B. M. (2009). The Echo of Battle . Harvard University Press.
Mills, T. C. (2012). Post-War Planning on the Periphery : Anglo-American Economic Diplomacy in South America, 1939?1945 . Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=502839&site=ehost-live
Pichardo Almanzar, N. A., & Kulik, B. W. (2013). American Fascism and the New Deal : The Associated Farmers of California and the Pro-Industrial Movement . Lanham: Lexington Books. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=638431&site=ehost-live
Weigley, R. F. (1977). The American way of war: a history of United States military strategy and policy . Indiana University Press.
