In any military operation, a commanding officer is normally required to assert the correct decision while at the same time working under extreme pressure to perform and get the job done in the right way. Currently, military operations are becoming more uncertain and complicated in the sense that wrong or untimely actions result in the loss of lives or other consequences pertaining to the non-accomplishment of national goals. Subsequently, the military commander needs to be efficient in the delicate art of command and the precise science of mission command that results to sound and timely controls. In the Battle of Dong Ap Bia, commonly referred to as the Battle of Hamburger Hill, the United States of America saw one of the fiercest resistance in all of the Vietnam war. This battle went on to determine America’s commitment to its war efforts in Vietnam and ultimately garnered anti-war protests in the homeland.
At the time of General Westmoreland, the concept of the attrition war was solely based on numbers and not territory gained. Because the American army faced a guerilla force that had no fortifications and landmarks, they had to rely on the belief that if they killed enough enemies in terms of numbers, then they would comfortably pacify the country and rid it of invaders 1 . In addition, this war of attrition accorded the second and most significant belief that it would accord an easy and necessary measure of effectiveness against the Viet Cong. In turn, the politicians and commanders in Washington D.C. comprehended the war through the perspective that the more the North Vietnam Army (NVA) were killed, the greater the overall result on the population pacification and the creation of stability in a country marred by war. Nonetheless, although this was the overall idea in the Vietnam War, the northern workforce, the Ho Chi Minh Trail and arms and material support from the Soviet Union and China that flowed unswervingly and unabated despite persistent U.S efforts, thwarted this presumption of effectiveness. After the Tet offensive that happened in 1968, a replacement to General Westmoreland, General Abrams Creighton changed the war tactics, which saw combat units, take the mantle of creating secure areas to allow the rebuilding of institutions. It was for this reason that the context of the operational status of the Apache Snow Mission that took on Hamburger Hill was formed.
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The Battle of Hill 937, as was the name of Hamburger Hill, happened from May 10 – 20, 1969. This particular battle is well known in history as one of the bloodiest encounters in the Vietnam War. The epithet “Hamburger Hill” comes from the fact that it presages quite the negative reference as the hill that acted as a meat grinder, in that it turned the American troops into hamburgers 2 . In the eyes of many Americans, this battle became a bloody tactical victory, which later was a strategic defeat since the troops withdrew and the North Vietnam Army (NVA) later took the hill. The battle was fought between close to 900 NVA regular troops and about 1800 American troops. Located in the province of Thua Thien in South Vietnam, the conquest of 937 Hill took place in a bloody frontal assault ordered by the then commanders. This brazen assault later resulted to public outcry by the American people that eventually led President Nixon to order the immediate and untimely decision of withdrawing the U.S. ground troops and the subsequent initialization of a “Vietnamization” program. This enabled the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) to learn advanced military and leadership from the United States and take control of their own country.
The battle of Hamburger Hill was code named, Operation Apache Snow. The second part of a three-pronged strategy initiated by the 101 st Airborne Division, this battle was designed to neutralize the efforts of the NVA in a valley known as the A Shau Valley. The valley was 45 Km long and was heavily covered by jungle. It was located close to the border with Laos. In this battle, the commanding general was Major General Melvin Zais, commander general of the 101 st Airborne Division. Through the Major-General, a direct order was issued to the 3 rd Brigade of his division to organize the main attack of the capture of Hill 937. The 3 rd Brigade included the 3 rd Battalion of the 187 th Infantry and was led by Lieutenant Colonel Weldon Honeycutt; the 2 nd Battalion of the 501 st Parachute Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Robert German; the 1 st Battalion of the 506 th Parachute Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel John Bowers 3 . Supporting this brigade was the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, (ARVN) specifically the 4 th and 2 nd Battalion that hailed from the 1 st Division led and under the command of Colonel Joseph Conmy Jr.
In the battle of Hamburger Hill, the U.S. forces went up against one of the most elite forces in the North Vietnamese Army, the 29 th Regiment. These NVA forces had reverence as being brave and were commonly referred to as Ho Chi Minh’s pride 4 . At the time, intelligence gathered placed their operations at the A Shau Valley. The sole purpose of the Americans was to seek and destroy these NVA forces. Another important command deemed for the sole purpose of the mission was the capture of Ap Bia Mountains that dominated the valley. This was of strategic importance because it would ensure the successive establishment of the U.S. Army, which would overlook the NVA and in turn prevent and stop any advances of the NVA to the neighboring towns and cities. Colonel Comny aptly termed the whole operation as that of being a reconnaissance one. According to Comny, the concept of operation was that each of the five battalions would assault the valley through combat and clear all ground forces in the area of operation. In the battle, the first Battalion of the 506 Infantry and the second Battalion of the 501 were the first to be deployed into the valley and search for enemy troops within their operational area. In addition, they were to cut off any escape routes that the NVA used to get into Laos. This was easy compared to the third Battalion of the 187 th Infantry, known in military jargon as 3/187, who had the most intense assignment of confronting the 29 th NVA Regiment through a frontal assault. Their mission according to command was to assault through the air, landing 2km north-west of Ap Bia Mountains and swiftly move through the country in thick jungle, clearing and taking occupation of the mountain.
H – Hour, which is the hour that combat attack started on Hill 937, was at 0730 hours. Before the ground troops landed, there was constant artillery fire in the area to predetermine the landing zones of the helicopters and to soften the enemy and their positions in the theatre of operations adequately. By 0800 hours, three companies of 3/187 also referred to as the ‘Rakkasans’ took their place in their assigned positions. Bravo Company took their position at the Fire Blaze, which was close to 20 km from Ap Bia Mountain and had the task of acting as a reserve for the 3 rd Brigade. Nonetheless, through situational feedbacks from commanders of the company who were on the ground, several reports reached the control centers that the troops had spotted numerous trails, bunkers and enemy huts, all through their advance axis. This prompted Lieutenant Colonel Honeycutt to perceive that his troops had landed in an area that was active with NVA operation. The Lieutenant contacted Colonel Conmy requesting the release of Bravo Company with immediate effect and in turn ordered them to rejoin 3/187 and continue with their mission in the A Shau Valley. At 1600 hours, Bravo Company was placed and Captain Littnan, who was the commander of Bravo Company, was given the task of moving south-east towards Hill 937’s peak. In under thirty minutes, while Bravo Company was moving along their axis of advance, they made contact with the enemy. A short but sharp engagement ensued that made the Lieutenant Colonel order defensive positions and the resumption of combat attack the following morning.
The next morning, Bravo Company was at the front of the assault that thundered up the mountain. Shortly after the commencement of the assault, the company encountered an enemy sniper who caused multiple casualties within the ranks but was later killed by the skilled specialist Donald Mills. As the fight went on, recovered documents from a dead enemy revealed the 29 th NVA Regiment contingent of 800 to 1200 soldiers who were heavily armed. This precarious situation led to a friendly fire incident when the Lt. Colonel, Honeycutt, called for fire support and a Cobra gunship shot at friendlies mistaking the command post as the enemy. This incident led to the death of two ‘Rakkasans’ and thirty-five injuries as well as the commander of the battalion 5 . In addition, the friendly attack incident led to a complete hysteria within the ranks of Bravo Company due to the complete disarray of the command post. The attack effectively resulted in their inability to advance, subsequently making the battalion commander to order a defensive retreat for the night while they were just one kilometer from the summit of the mountain. On May 12, several artillery and air strikes pounded NVA positions that were dug on Hill 937. After the air assault, Bravo Company resumed the attacks, which saw the blasting of quite a number of enemy bunkers with the use of recoilless rifles, making the NVA retreat, abandoning their positions. As night fell, Delta and Charlie Companies joined Bravo Company. The next morning saw more air strikes as the focused soldiers in 3/187 marched on up the mountain. Not only were they facing a fierce enemy, but they were also confronted with a harsh climate of torrential rains, tropical dangers and the gradually increasing altitude.
As the 3/187 regiment pressed more deeply and harder into the enemy’s defensive positions, they encountered the fiercest resistance in all of the Vietnam War battles. The battalion’s progress was at a snail’s pace, moving a mere 30 feet in one hour. Realizing the intensity of the battle, Lieutenant Colonel Honeycutt immediately contacted the brigade commander, Colonel Comny, and requested that the first Battalion of the five hundred and sixth regiment of parachute infantrymen to join forces with the 3/187 and act as a reinforcement to this attack. By the dawn on May 14, the ‘Rakkasans’ resumed their attack but encountered fierce confrontation from the enemy. The NVA pounded them with mortars, grenades and RPGs. At this point, the total number of soldiers who were dead was many 6 . The next day, as Alpha and Bravo Companies reached 150 meters of the Summit, there was another friendly fire incident that took the life of one 3/187 and injuring others. By this time, the number of the dead in the two companies was 36, effectively halving their total strength. By May 16, the battle had intensified considerably, and the Lieutenant Colonel Honeycutt suspected that the NVA was bringing in reinforcements from their base in Laos. On May 17, the personnel were utterly exhausted due to their consistent engagement of previous days.
On May 18, the fire of artillery and air strikes plummeted the mountains. This made Lt Colonel Honeycutt decide not to wait for the 1/506 to arrive when the enemy was receiving more reinforcements. He decided to commit three companies so that they would prepare for the final assault on Hill 937. Conversely, thunder interfered their advance causing a reduction in visibility consequently forcing the ‘Rakkasans’ to withdraw from the mountain. As the 1/506 advanced to the position of 3/187, they encountered fierce resistance making them sustain numerous casualties. In the battle, the casualty number suffered by the 3/187 was a little above 60%. This made the Commander of the 101 Airborne Division relieve 3/187 by tasking the 2/506 with the final assault on the hill. Through careful consideration, the overall commander Major General Melvin Zais agreed to give Lt. Colonel Honeycutt a second chance owing to the high number of casualties the 3/187 suffered as an extension of honor of taking the hill. This command was followed by the reinforcement by soldiers of the Alpha Company of the second battalion of the 506 th infantry. As the reinforcements arrived on May 19, the day was largely spent taking fresh positions for the final push and resupplying. On May 20 early morning, air strikes plummeted the mountain for hours, and at 1000 hours, the 3/187 commenced their assault up the mountain, this time, reinforced with Alpha Company of the 2/506 7 . They were met with little resistance since on the previous night; most of the NVA contingent had withdrawn back to Laos. The Army honored the ‘Rakkasans’ by giving them the Presidential Unit Citation in respect of their bravery.
In this battle, facts indicate the intensity of its undertaking and the dedication of the U. S. military to a course that it would later abandon, and one that had no strategic advantage whatsoever. In the course of the 10-day battle, the total number of those who were killed was 72, and the wounded reached 372. To solidify the position, the Airborne Division committed five battalions and ten artillery batteries. Moreover, the air force flew 272 missions in total and spent close to 500 tons of ordinance. With such losses and no strategic gains in their war efforts, the public outcry was immense, and this led to demonstrations against the war and the demand for the return of the soldiers from Vietnam. Eventually, a public perception ensued that instead of taking the hill through other means such as the use of aerial bombardment, the commanders had failed to preserve the lives of its soldiers while not having an important gain in their blood-soaked advance.
In this battle for Hill 937, the public outcry was immense. Through two critical articles posted in the Washington Post, that relates this battle to that of Pork Chop Hill in the Korean War, the name Hamburger Hill was coined. Ultimately, the American media adopted the phrase since it effectively described the killing of American soldiers as the grinding of meat due to the high number of deaths experienced on the hill. A well-articulated and heartfelt message by Edward Kennedy surfaced expressing the disgust American people had for the battle of Hamburger Hill. In the message, Senator Kennedy expressed himself saying it was irresponsible and senseless to send young men to their deaths to capture positions that had no relation whatsoever to the conflict’s end. This resonated among the hearts of Americans as most of then decided they were not for the war.
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