China’s navy is the fastest-growing fleet than any other major fleet globally, with a notable advancement in controlling the seas off its coast. China’s naval expansion is a major cause of escalated tension with the United States as it challenges its dominance of the global oceanic commons and particularly the East Asia waters. China’s advancement in oceanic dominance has caught the United States unawares, thus eliciting varying responses (Fanell, 2019). The saying that whoever rules the waters controls the world is because controlling the waters implies a dominant naval control that increases the nation’s security capabilities and control of sea routes, which is essential; in controlling global trade. The current building of China’s naval capabilities by the Chinese elites is similar to what imperial Germany and Japan did. The Chinese elites are aware of the crisis and situation of self-encirclement that the process may cause and use a 3-prong approach of economic, political, and diplomatic dominance (Heydarian, 2020).
The Chine elites are irrefutably building naval capabilities like in the case and times of imperial Japan and Germany. However, China's methods are different from those used by imperial German and Japan. China is resorting to coercion and economic dominance to build its naval capabilities, unlike the historic imperial German and Japan that primarily depended on their neighbors' subservience. China’s naval modernization efforts are a part of the country’s 25 years’ plan from the mid-1990s to develop a globally formidable navy in regions surrounding china and over-seas (Wu, 2019). Therefore, the Chinese elites are conducting an increasing number of operations in near and distant waters such as the western Pacific waters, the Indian Ocean, and the waters around Europe. China’s strategy of global dominance is through economic, military, and diplomatic expansion globally. The Chinese Elites' strategy aims to help the nation gain comprehensive global power dominance in the military, diplomacy, and economic might. In the German imperial era, Germany was performing well much better than the United Kingdom, similar to the current state of China compared to most developed nations. However, Germany’s imperial leadership failed to recognize that Britain had a stronger army, and thus, Germany failed when they tried to challenge British sea power (Collin, 2019). The outcome of the attempt was Britain building alliances with Germany’s rivals Russia and France.
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The Chinese elites are aware that their navy's growth and development might lead to spiraling confrontations with the USA and East Asia's coastal states. As a result, they make efforts to create alliances with neighboring nations and others overseas to have global support if things worsen. In other cases, the Chinese elites attempt to control strategic naval resources in subtle ways by force or economic dominance. There is an existent US-China strategic competition in global naval dominance as the various nations take sides with foreseen possible benefits (Strangio, 2020). Despite several international dialogues between China and the US, there seems to be a persistent misunderstanding between the two nations with failing to comprehend the impact they have on each other. The Chinese elites are aware of the several “crisis” incidents triggered by their naval and air buildup evident in the trade tensions between China and US. The Chinese elites are aware that such crises can lead to self-encirclement for china and implement countermeasures to ensure that they have excellent relations with their neighboring nations and overseas states (De Ninno, 2020).
China’s naval developmental milestone presents a significant challenge to the US navy’s capacity to achieve and maintain wartime control of the blue-water, particularly in the Western Pacific regions. The Chinese navy is the largest in East Asia. It surpasses the USA's navy by force battleships and numbers, a similar trend with imperial Germany and Japan that increased their navy personnel and machinery (Stevens, 2020). China’s shipbuilding effort is fats and raising concerns among US observers, especially the building larger surface ships. Stevens (2020) affirms that China's naval ships, weapons, and aircraft are much modern and capable of the level of those of Western navies and better than those used in the 1990s (p.17).
China’s elites understand the historical analogies, and they are taking every measure to avoid them. Unlike in the time of imperial Germany and imperial Japan, the world is more interconnected today. Information spreads very fast globally, and there are more sophisticated weapons and naval machinery. The Chinese elites have opted to take an indirect approach to build their global naval dominance, such as using phenomenal rapid economic growth. Chinese elites create critical strategic alignments globally to advance its nautical capacity. China's immense financial capacity extends its influence to regional and world affairs, strengthening China’s armed forces. China’s foreign policy is also incoherent with the existing global policies and conflicting with the United States’ stand on foreign policy. China may hope for subservience from those around them but certainly does not expect neighboring nations to willingly obey them unquestioningly (Pu & Wang, 2018).
Historical events such as the slave trade, World War 1, and World War II, coupled with several ethnic wars and terrorism, have heightened global sensitivity to spur war actions. As a result, nations are careful to avoid war, especially if they know they do not stand a chance to win. China’s elite does not expect subservience from the neighboring and other global nations with their interest's strategic water naval resources. However, China is building capacity in developing the military might to force such subservience if need be to ensure it gains global dominance (O’Rourke, 2020). China may be falling prey to Luttwak’s concept of “great state autism.” Currently, China appears to be incrementally gaining dominance through strategic alignment, especially with African countries and countries on other continents. It will be difficult for the Chinese elite to achieve economic, military, and diplomatic dominance and choose one way to dominate or risk losing all.
References
Collin, K. S. (2019). China-India Rivalry at Sea: Capability, Trends, and Challenges. Asian Security, 15(1) , 5-24. https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1539820.
De Ninno, F. (2020). The Italian Navy and Japan, the Indian Ocean, Failed Cooperation, and Tripartite Relations (1935–1943). War in History, 27(2) , 224-248.https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0968344518777270.
Fanell, J. E. (2019). China’s Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure. Naval War College Review, 72(1) , 10-55. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26607110.
Heydarian, R. J. (2020). China’s Inchoate Hegemony: Small Powers’ Struggle for Autonomy. The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China, and the New Struggle for Global Mastery , 263-322.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9799-8_8.
O’Rourke, R. (2020). US-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress , 7-104.
Pu, X., & Wang, C. (2018). Rethinking China's rise: Chinese scholars’ debate strategic overstretches. International Affairs, 94(5) , 1019-1035.https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy140.
Stevens, F. M. (2020). China’s long march to national rejuvenation: toward a Neo-Imperial order in East Asia? Asian Security , 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1739651.
Strangio, S. (2020). In the Dragon's Shadow: Southeast Asia in the Chinese Century. Yale University Press.
Wu, Z. (2019). Towards naval normalcy: ‘open seas protection and Sino-US maritime relations. The Pacific Review, 32(4) , 666-693. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2018.1553890.
