A Federal Express Corporation (FedEx) flight 647, Boeing MD-10F (MD-10), N364FE, while landing at the Memphis International Airport, Memphis, Tennessee state, experienced a fatal crash that has remained in the history until date. Just close to its touch down, the plane loses control over its gear, after which an emergency fire erupted on its far right side of the plane's body. The flight had of its crew team and five other FedEx nonrevenue pilots on board (Crider, 2017). Every pilot had fatal experience as the outcome of the plane crash. The fire caused severe mechanical damages with the plane's right-wing and other portions destroyed.
From the records, flight 647, Boeing MD-10-10F (MD-10), N364FE had its departure from the Oakland International Airport (OAK) in California, nearly, 0632 Pacific Standard Time (PST) and working under code of regulations, the 14 CFR of Part 121 based on flight rules, flight plan.
Delegate your assignment to our experts and they will do the rest.
Captain and Co-Pilot (First Officer) Experiences
The accident occurred when the captain of the flight, also referred to as a company check airman, was line checking for his first officer. It happened on the last day, day 4 of the 3-leg trip. The first leg trip was a departure at MEM around 2100 in December 2003 and then arriving at IND (Indianapolis International Airport) at Indiana about 2215 the American time. For this leg, the captain was identified as the flying pilot entirely. On the second leg, when the trip had departed from IND at 1431 on December 16, she had the first officer in control. The plane then arrived at the Oakland International Airport (OAK) at around 1650 PST.
Below 10,000ft MSL, the crew experienced slight turbulence, though it would appear and reappear more often. The captain started to have received the weather update at Memphis via the automated terminal information service immediately before they had landed at Memphis International Airport (MEM). The captain gave an insight into the first ATIS broadcast with alternative records on wind frequencies (Roelen & Blom. 2013). From the indication, wind from 290 degrees at about 18 knots, inclusive of the gusts, moved up to 23 knots. The captain automated the flight management (FMS) in the preparedness of landing on runway 27. When making the landing, the captain was ATIS-updated indicating 320 degrees wind at 18 knots, with inclusive gusts to 23 knots. The captain claimed that there were effects from the wind shear advisories.
On different timelines from the time the captain obtained the MEM ATIS, details at about 1200, when the winds were at 320, 16 gusts to around 22. The captain then at 1204 claimed that 29 was the automatic or default speed. The record was acceptable at all considerations. The captain went ahead to confirm with the first officer the settings on the altimeter, which was also a part of the in-range checklist. He later announced the completion of the in-range checklist, where he alerted the MEM approach control as Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center had informed the pilots to do so (Rangan et al., 2013). The captain was responsible for ascertaining the clearance with the officer’s corporation.
At 1222, the captain instead stated about the four extra knots. He conversely explained about adding more speed as it is not a preferred way. But instead, he insisted on 3 or 4 knots as a much-preferred option of making a difference and only when making or bumping the back and forth rounds. According to Crider (2017), the checklist was more vital before they could gear down and land. Until 1226 of the standard time, the last captain's experience was almost a gap of 14 seconds after the touch down it is when the plane had a veer off and came to a stop onto the right side of the highway.
The Weather
As per the full investigation by the National Transport Safety Board (NTSB), before flight 647, Boeing crashed, it encountered an intensified crosswind. Crosswinds are winds with perpendicularly entailed components lying within the direction or line of travel. The non-parallel movements made within the course of the winds are the risk factors that create a crosswind element on the object or the plane and increasing the wind frequency on objects (Cider, 2017). The condition may be an advantage of crafting and sailing as well. Away from that, crosswinds are prevalent in moving the path of flights/crafts or objects on the sideways direction, and the outcome can be hazardous. The researches stated that as much as the plane encountered the condition during landing, it was still considered safer within the capabilities of flight 647, FedEx Boeing MD-10-10F.
Probable Causes
Negligence from the first officer, inability to properly align the plane within the direction or line of travel, before the descent, neither had she slowed down the aircraft before it landed. The flight had to descent with a hard or excessive thud. Before it landed, the right-wing was damaged, and it had to be blown six degrees away. The design capabilities of the right primary gear were below expectations depending on the damage. From the NTSB report, the accident was likely to have arisen due to the captain's failure to supervise the first officer's work. From different unfolds before the plane crashed, the captain did not take to her responsibilities of managing technical controls and inputs adequate for the plane's safe landing. The officer neither applied the rudder inputs nor the control wheels to ensure that the flight 647 adequately aligned with the runway direction or centerline (Rangan et al., 2013). Neither was the captain in cover to directing the initiation of proper back pressure within the control column to put to halt the descent speed before the flight could finally land/touchdown. For that matter, the plane had to touch down with extremely massive thud when still in a crab. On a similar note, the captain was to blame for not monitoring his colleague's performance, especially during the last stages of touchdown at Memphis International Airport (MEM). The captain would have taken up the corrective measures to guiding the first officers on purposefully in applying the corrective actions to preventing the aircraft from crashing or the accident.
Apart from first officer’s improper landing techniques leading to the crash of flight 647, FedEx Boeing MD-10-10F at Memphis International Airport and the lack of the captain’s commitment to the supervision of officer’s performance, inadequate training among the crew members became another primary cause to the crash all together (Roelen & Blom, 2013). The National Transport Safety Board discovered the accident outcome would have been prevented by providing exceptional skills or training programs to the entire cabin team. They demonstrated some levels of incompetence on their overall performance, training failures, and deficiencies.
Recommendations
According to the findings of causes leading to flight 647, FedEx Boeing MD-10-10F crashing at MEM, the NTSB recommended for the FAA to encourage oversight on cabin crew training and to correct the deficiencies that are likely to come alongside (Grace & Wright, 2017). The approach is adequately essential to monitor all the members’ performance, including the first officer roles. It would be part of the command to making corrections and directions to safer landings/touchdowns. A recommendation on improving emergency exit processes or procedures can prove to be critical. The accident resulted in the door slide unraveling off the plane, specifically during inflation. It initiated an emergency exit through the cockpit window as it happened to the plane occupants. Besides, it was used as an alternative or evacuation option for the occupants to throw their pieces of the luggage off the plane (Grace & Wright, 2017). From experience, it is out of FedEx order highlighting to pilots the importance of evacuating expeditiously from a crashed airplane.
The Federal Aviation Administration should provide incisive measures to quick response on the plane’s mechanical or technical failures. Pilots should embrace keeping up to date uncertain complications starting from emergency landing, change in weather, and other natural drivers to safe landing directions. Acknowledging information and following up or requesting for the in-range checklist helps in staying objective to the flight operations. There were minor injuries from one nonrevenue FedEx pilot and first officer who were on board, but when they were evacuating. While other passengers and the captain safely escaped without succumbing to injuries. The captain retired, and other officers got suspensions waiting for the disciplinary path on the matter.
References
Crider, D. A. (2017). The Use of Data from Accident Investigations in Development of Simulator Training Scenarios. In AIAA Modeling and Simulation Technologies Conference (p. 1078).
Grace, K. A., & Wright, C. J. (2017). Recent Developments in Aviation Law. J. Air L. & Com. , 82 , 253.
Rangan, S., Bowman, J. L., Hauser, W. J., McDonald, W. W., Lewis, R. A., & Van Dongen, H. P. (2013). Integrated fatigue modeling in crew rostering and operations. Canadian Aeronautics and Space Journal , 59 (01), 1-6.
Roelen, A., & Blom, H. A. (2013). Airport safety performance. Modeling and Managing Airport Performance , 171-208.
