Intelligence in the army force is the capability to collect information and analyze it using different approaches to provide direction and guidance to commanders to make informed decisions about situations that may be posing a risk to our country or the world. In this research paper, I will give a broad review of section one of chapter 2 of the ADP 2-0 report, a section that discusses the purpose of intelligence in detail. I will expound on the three functions of the intelligence – the collection and analysis of intelligence information and also the covert actions handled by the intelligence in the US.
The army relies heavily on the intelligence to perform its operations as it is the product of all the information collected and analyzed. The commanders and other staff in the army use intelligence to counter-terrorism threats and attacks or even to provide high tech security to the VIPs (ADP 2-0).US intelligence performs a wide variety of roles that are categorized into two functions; the collection and analysis (JP 2-0, 2013). Despite having categorized the roles into two, there is a minor one that is covert action, but it is less accepted as a function of intelligence.
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The intelligence widely collects information about persons, activities, and events through established intelligence agencies as directed by the government. However, they cannot obtain information through diplomacy contacts or resources that are available publicly (Richelson, 2015). Even though they should not collect information from the publicly available resources, the commission of intelligence believes that publicly available information should be used as a security side product in the process of collection of data. Similarly, publicly available information should be used to support intelligence analysis and collection (JP 2-01.3, 2009). Lastly, the intelligence collection should be measured, considering the US foreign policies of interest. Besides, all senior policy officials must be involved in the process of collecting the information.
Another critical function of intelligence is to analyze the information collected to make better decisions. The analytical role brings out almost the same practical issues compared to the collection of information (Immerman, 2011). Theoretically, analysts use the information provided by all the intelligence agencies and information from public sources to give out analysis to their clients. This raises a question on whether the intelligence analysts should use the publicly available resources to provide analysis in case there is no information available on a specific intelligence subject (JP 2-0, 2013). Similarly, should analysts also use the publicly available resources if they know that the information provided by the intelligence will give little or no relevance to the whole analysis of a subject to satisfy the client? (Immerman, 2011). Research shows that practically these issues are solved out on an agreement between analysts and their clients.
The commission also believes that the intelligence agency mandated should not satisfy the urge for analysis in the case when the study can be done using the publicly available resources. The analysis from the publicly available data should be made confidential (Immerman, 2011). Also, the intelligence agencies should not accept information for interpretation when it is evident that the information may not have a marginal impact on a particular subject unless exceptional circumstances require it to be handled as an intelligence issue.
Intelligence also plays the role of covert action that is used in the influence of military, economic, and political situations in a country or overseas where the US is the one to discharge the duties (ADP 2-0).Covert actions can consist of propaganda activities, support to military or political situations within us, or giving aid to other governments to combat problems that may threaten the interests of the US, for example, terrorists. In the US, the role of covert actions is bestowed on the CIA that comprises a director charged by the National Security act of 1947 (Immerman, 2011). CIA undertakes covert activities that are personally authorized by the president of the US, although the president can direct other agencies to perform or support covert actions. Also, since the end of the Cold War, covert action plans have been withered off, showing the extent they have affected the struggle to become a superpower (Gentry, 2016). Research shows that covert action programs have been abused, and they possess some dangers, but they cannot be abandoned and should be employed in places that it is essential to the United States (Talbert, 2012). The Covert actions must be in line with US foreign policy objectives. Also, the covert paramilitary activities which typically involve training, the arming, and advise to external forces should not be carried out by the CIA but the department of Defense.
My question for the future training event of the military is, what should an analyst do in the case the information obtained by the intelligence agency is not enough to be analyzed on a given subject? Similarly, should the information available in public resources examined and used in making decisions by the intelligence agencies?
In conclusion, intelligence plays a vital role in the political, economic, and social stability of a country. Intelligence helps in making important decisions about the military operations of a nation. If the intelligence uses the publicly available information to analyze a given subject, the source should be made confidential. Also, the government should spell out clearly when to use the publicly available information for intelligence analysis. Covert actions of a country should be implemented after considering foreign policies.
References
Gentry, J. A. (2016). Toward a theory of non-state actors' intelligence. Intelligence and National Security , 31 (4), 465-489.
Immerman, R. H. (2011). Transforming analysis: The intelligence community's best kept secret. Intelligence and National Security , 26 (2-3), 159-181.
Joint Publication 2-0. (2013, October 22). Joint intelligence. https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp2_0%2813%29.pdf
Joint Publication 2-01.3. (2009, June 16). Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment. https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp2_01_3%2809%29.pdf
Richelson, J. T. (2015). The US intelligence community . Hachette UK.
Talbert, R. (2012). Negative Intelligence: The Army and the American Left, 1917-1941 . Univ. Press of Mississippi.
US Department of the Army. (2019). ADP 2-0. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/adp2_0.pdf
