Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, EAAN, is today considered to be among the most widely discussed arguments that target philosophical naturalism (Boudry & Vlerick, 2014). He argues that in the nonexistence of any God-like being to direct the process, natural selection is not likely to support true faith (Boudry & Vlerick, 2014). This is because natural selection tends to choose only for adaptive performance. Furthermore, people’s unreliable belief-producing or cognitive faculties cannot be trusted to bring about more honest beliefs than false ones. Simply put, Plantinga’s argument cites that the likelihood that people’s minds regularly deliver genuine beliefs if both naturalistic evolution and philosophical naturalism are true is inscrutable or low (Boudry & Vlerick, 2014). Secondly, it is possible that God created human beings in a way that is similar to him, particularly in a way that allows for individuals to reliably hold true beliefs.
Looking at this particular argument, I think that there is a problem with the EAAN. I believe that there is no non-arbitrary reason to think that God created human beings in his image. I also believe that ‘in his image’ should not necessarily incorporate the ability to establish dependable beliefs about the world. There are obviously various respects in which God did not consider making us alike to him, such as being omnipotent. I, therefore, do not understand why Plantinga assumes that reliability of beliefs is among such aspects. Secondly, natural selection is a single evolutionary system, and different things come into being in the genetic world as results of evolution. It does not make sense to argue that people’s ability to, say, read trashy novels, or solve a mathematical theorem, is the byproduct of natural selection. People’s brains evolved for the sole reason of reproduction and survival.
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Another thing I notice with Plantinga’s argument is with the definition of naturalism. He has failed in making the vital differentiation between philosophical and methodological naturalism. Surprisingly, naturalism is not that easy to define and what it sensibly entails would lead to more discussion. Plantinga confidently defines naturalism as the notion that there is no such individual as God or anything like him. However, he does not answer the question of which god he is referring to. I also believe that Plantiga has quoted Charles Darwin out of perspective. This means that he has failed in differentiating between different forms of beliefs.
Although biases may not be able to be conquered, they may be tampered enough to attain victory even in counterintuitive areas such as the quantum theory (Boudry & Vlerick, 2014). Plantinga did not take this particular fact into account of how philosophers together with scientists have, for a long time now, been looking at the implications of evolved cognitive biases on coherent thought. He goes on to suggest an alternative scenario where people rely on supernatural interventions. I do not think that being supernatural is a qualification for one to be trusted.
Placing our beliefs on supernatural sources does not necessarily mean that we should trust them. It is such sources that had in the first place established all proof of evolution and created human logic to which that proof seems credible. It they can make people believe that, I think that they may have other tricks up their sleeves. In the end, Plantinga’s argument can be compared to Descartes’ popular invocation of God as a sponsor of the reliability of people’s knowledge (Boudry & Vlerick, 2014). Notably, Descartes was writing at an era when no sensible alternative to the invocation of divine intelligence explaining particular facts about our existence, was present. However, Plantinga has no such excuse, especially because he is writing almost one hundred and fifty years after Charles Darwin. I, therefore, believe that I am right in rejecting his argument as a failed illustration of neo-scholasticism.
Reference
Boudry, M., & Vlerick, M. (2014). “Natural selection does care about truth.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science , Vol. 28, No. 1. Pp. 65 – 77.
