An Analysis of the Strength of the Syrian-Iranian Alliance

Abstract 

This paper will focus on the strength of the Syrian-Iranian alliance which has lasted the past few decades with a fcdating back to the transformative politics of Iran during the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The studies reviewed suggest that Iran and Syria, though different in their political structures, national values, and systems of governance, have an intersection point in their foreign policy. Two major events in the histories of the two nations have improved their relationship since they first worked together Iraq-Iran War. First, they dislike the influence of the US in the Middle East, especially through its ally, Israel. Secondly, their activities for each other caused most of the Arab world to isolate them, which meant that their unity would only grow stronger because they needed to surmount challenges. The current civil strife in Syria is the most recent indicator of the strength of the alliance between Syria and Iran. 

Introduction 

Increasingly connected by the numerous and intersecting interests within the Middle East as well as their collective antipathy towards the West, Iran and Syria have managed to create an enduring alliance that supersedes their national differences. The nations have been allies for the last quarter a century or more, and their connection appears to strengthen, especially through the last few years during which both nations have continued to be isolated by the West. For this reason, the emergence of the Iran-Syria alliance in 1979 and its perpetuation through the modern time is among the most fascinating developments that the Middle East has experienced in a long time (Goodarzi, 2015). The Damascus-Tehran axis has been baffling to many observers for several decades now. In this case, the most interesting factor in the alliance between the two nations relates to the fact that they have different national ideologies as well as political structures and foundations. For instance, the Persian v. Arab, theocratic v. secular, and Shiite v. Sunni characteristics that separate the two nations would have been factors explaining the political differences of the two countries (Goodarzi, 2015). However, to the surprise of many analysts, the stance of the two nations on the foreign policy of the US in Iran, their support for the Hamas in Palestine, and their unrented sympathy for the Hezbollah of Lebanon is something that invites studies on their relationship. 

The collaboration between the two nations has improved in numerous spheres. For instance, in 2006, the militaries of the two countries entered into an agreement that would make them a mutual defense pact (Yacoubian, 2007). The 2006 agreement was succeeded by a 2007 military cooperation agreement that enhanced the military assistance between the two countries. Other sources suggest that the corporation between the two countries entails the sale of missiles from Iran to Syria in addition to current cooperation between Damascus and Tehran for the provision of training and equipment to operatives in Syria (Goodarzi, 2015). Literature also reports an economic alliance between Syria and Iran. For instance, according to Goodarzi (2009), Iranian direct investment in the Syria has risen to record proportions in the recent years. It is further reported in the cited literature that the two countries entered into agreements on economic cooperation that spanned many sectors of their economies ranging from agriculture to petroleum, to telecommunications and other industries that worth between one and three billion US dollars (Yacoubian, 2007). Literature still indicates that joint Iranian-Syrian ventures have grown to include new projects, such as a $60 million car-manufacturing project, which is the first automobile production plant in Syria. The future of the economic cooperation between the two countries suggests that they are likely to construct joint infrastructure in wheat storage, cement manufacturing, oil refinery, and other projects that would strengthen their collaboration. 

The cooperation between the two countries has also resulted in increased cultural exchanges between them. For instance, literature indicates that presently, Iran runs two cultural centers, one in Latakia, and another one in Damascus in addition to contributing immensely to the reconstruction of Shiite Shrines across Syria. It is also reported that approximately one million tourists from Iran make pilgrimages to the religious centers per year. For this reason, it is critical considering that the cooperation between the two countries is more than any other alliance the Middle East has experienced in the past years. The objective of this essay is to examine the strength of the Syrian-Iranian Alliance and the current Syrian Civil War and the role of Iran in it. In striving to meet this objective, the author analyzes the history of the relationship between the two countries, including events in which they supported each other and the reasons Iran is still in Syria in the wake of the Syrian Civil War. 

Transformative Politics in Iran and its Contribution to a Relationship with Syria 

Demonstrations in Iran staged against the reign of the Shah became a significant force in the country because of dissatisfactions that occurred among the different units of the nation’s society, such as technocrats, middle class merchants, students, workers, clergy, and others. The discontents entailed the consideration that the policies of Shah during the 1970s were not supportive of the community ( Long & Muharrem, 2017 ). Consequently, the Shah were forced to flee the nation in January 1979, something that allowed Ayatollah Khomeini who had left the nation to return only two weeks later (Von Maltzahn, 2015). He did not wait for long before his establishment of an Islamic Republic and causing its proclamation on April 1, 1979 (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2012). 

The creation of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 resulted in a new chapter in the politics of Iran. In this respect, the issue concerning whether the new chapter meant a rapture from the political past in the country has received different approaches from historians. As much as revolutionary decision-makers commonly contest that the Islamic Republic constituted a move away from the Shah regime, a consensus on the same is yet to be achieved among scholars who studied this issue. For instance, some scholars, such as (Ehteshami & Hinnebusch, 2002) argue that the foreign policy of Iran did not seek to vary from the past because of the continued geopolitical, economic, and historical issues that bound its relationship with the external world. Contrarily, other schools of thought suggest that the variations between the Islamic and empirical regimes in the country culminated in observable differences (Deeb, 2013). They note that the change in the Iranian perspective of the West was one of the most notable changes that Iran experienced in its foreign policy. For example, Iran had maintain strong ties with the West in a broad spectrum of ideologies, especially with the US (Goodarzi, 2009). However, the Islamic Revolution declared that it would prefer neither the West nor the East, which meant that it had transformed the nation both ideologically and politically against the superpowers of the world that would help the interference of Islam by alienism (3). Therefore, even in the arguments that exist concerning the new political regime in the country, it is quite notable that the Islamic Revolution resulted in a significant change in the perspective of Iran of the outside world. 

Understanding the history of the relationships between Syria and Iran would be critical in the comprehension of the foreign policies of the two nations. First, the two counties have different systems of government and political beliefs, yet they have managed to spark one of the most surprising relationships in the Middle East. The origin of their relationship has a decades’ long history. It is already mentioned that the two nations improved their ties during and after the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that changed the perspective of the country towards the West. It should be noted, as Long and Muharrem (2017) argue that Hafez Al-Assad, the then leader of Syria, had expressed concerns over the influence of the West, Israel, and Iran in the region since he thought that a close relationship between Israel and Iran would result in significant control of the region (Von Maltzahn, 2015). Therefore, the new regime under Ayatollah Khamenei and the transformation in the foreign policy of Iran meant that Syria would have an easy chance of advancing its interest in the geopolitics of the Middle East. 

Al-Assad started considering Iran as a strategic ally soon after the foreign policy transformations that came along with the 1979 revolution. In fact, the leadership of the two nations started developing similar concerns on the position of Israel in the region. In this case, Al-Assad feared that the Israeli military would be more powerful compared to his own, which threatened the position of Syria in the Middle East ( Long & Muharrem, 2017 ). Several factors were centrals to Al-Assad’s concerns, including the economic hegemony of Israel, Israel’s interests in Lebanon, the claims of Syria to the Golan Heights, and other issues that would compromise the position of Syria geopolitically. Therefore, when the two countries, Iran and Syria, formed an alliance, it is because they found themselves on the same side in their perceptions of Israel. The Syrian-Iranian alliance, therefore, has been manifested in many forms, which the subsequent sections of this essay discuss. 

One of the circumstances that highlighted the strength of the ties between Syria and Iran was their cooperation during the Iraq-Iran War. Saddam Hussein, the then leader of Iraq, had nullified the Algiers agreement that had existed between his nation and Iran and declared war on Iran in 1980 (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2012). The issue in the conflict concern Syria as much as it did to Iran. For example, Syria’s issue in the conflict was its perspective of Iraq as one of the most powerful and largest Middle East armies. The two countries considered themselves as competitors of each other for the political, economic, and military significance in the region as opposed to being allies under the Baath Party (Deeb, 2013). In fact, the split of the party in 1966 resulted from ideological differences between Damascus and Baghdad. Additional events in the relationship between the two countries had only worsened their perception of the role of each other. One of the examples was the fact that Iraq granted asylum t Michel Aflaq who had exiled from Syria for political reasons (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2012). Enmity between Damascus and Bagdad worsened after Iraq blamed Syria for a coup plan that had been uncovered just before the Iraq-Iran War. Therefore, the objective of Syria was to support Iran in weakening Iraq during the war. 

Literature reports a complicated connection between Syria and Iran during the Iraq-Iran conflict. The war had taken the concentration of Iran away from Israel and its concerns in Palestine, which had been a greater concern for Al-Assad. At the outbreak of the war, most of the nations in the Middle East stopped their interest in the influence of Israel to focus on what would be the start of an Iranian uprising that would affect the region in the future (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2012). A significant majority of the Arab world showed their support for Iraq, and Al-Assad knew that he would not get the same support if he wanted to attack Israel. Meanwhile, Iran was developing an offensive against Israel, and Syria used the chance to support Iran in dealing with Iraq through supplying weapons, technical supplies, and medical products that would allow Iran to manage the situation. During this time, it is notable that Syria also supported Iran through launching an economic sabotage on the supply of oil from Iraq—it actually cut off an oil supply route from Iraq (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2012). 

Iran and Syria have also demonstrated their solidarity for each other during the war in Lebanon. It is reported that in 1982, Israel advanced its forces into Lebanon, waging war on the Palestinian Liberation Organization in addition to supporting the Phalange in Lebanon (Yacoubian, 2007). Therefore, in response, Syria offered to help most of the forces that opposed the invasion of Israel, and Iran was ready to send its forces into the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon to support ant form of resistance against Israel (Goodarzi, 2015). Syria also played a critical role in marshaling support that would frustrate the Lebanese-Israeli peace treaty that had been entered to end the war later. The country also asserted its influence in the area through providing its military support to different Druze, Palestinian, and Shiite factions, which was detrimental to Israeli and American interest (Goodarzi, 2009). The withdrawal of the US and Israel from the war because of the rising numbers of causalities—the battle had resulted in more civilian casualties than expected—meant that Al-Assad had succeeded in his ambitions, which elevated his status in the Middle East from pariah to hero. 

As much as the Syria and Iran collaborated in the eventual ‘win’ over Israel, it is critical noting that they did so through different lines of support. For instance, Syria fought the advancement of Israel through the Amal, which was a group that opposed the existence of Israeli troops in Lebanon in addition to criticizing the activities of Palestine in Lebanon (Goodarzi, 2015). On the other hand, the cited literature suggests that Iran advanced its help for Lebanon through Hezbollah, which is a Shia Islamist organization that was established with the objective of forcing Israeli troops out of Lebanon. However, Al-Assad turned his support to Hezbollah later through the conflict because he realized that he would have greater influence in fighting Israel than he would have done through the Amal. It is imperative noting, therefore, that the decision strengthened the Syrian-Iranian alliance further. 

Syria and Iran have strengthened their relationship further through their collaboration in dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama. Political developments were in Syria were useful in enhancing the unity that the two countries had forged. This idea suggests that the conflicts that the Middle East had experienced were not the only contributors to the development of the Syria-Iran alliance. The Syrian government, for example, needed to respond to the issue of Muslim Brotherhood in the country, which prompted Iran’s involvement. While the group had originated elsewhere in the Middle East, in Egypt to be precise, its influence had spread to Syria in which its members criticized Al-Assad’s policies. The government resorted to the application of force in dealing with the group’s protests in 1982, which resulted in mass killings of members of the group in Hama. Iran was keen to spell out its support for Syria in dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood as well as any other groups that would rise to resist the government of Al-Assad (Von Maltzahn, 2015). The significance of the relationship between the two countries is depicted in the fact that Iran sacrificed its reputation to attack the Muslim Brotherhood when it is an Islamic theocracy. 

The collaboration between the two nations experienced issues following the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. During this time, Syria wanted to advance its foreign policy considering that the country had already suffered humiliation when they were forced to reverse their support for Iran because of the criticism they faced from the rest of the Arab world during the Iraq-Iran war. The fall of the USSR also affected the stability of Syria because it meant that the country would not continue receiving aid as it had been doing the years of stability in the Union. Syria also lost its ability to continue influencing the politics of the Palestinian cause, which continued weakening Al-Assad’s position in the region and what he had purposed to depict as a contributor to the politics of conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Government (Yacoubian, 2007). Additionally, Syria continued to fear that its neighbors, including Israel and Iraq, were continuing to strengthen their positions in the geopolitics of the region at the expense of Al-Assad in his Syria (Deeb, 2013). 

Iran remembered the activities of Syria during the Iraq-Iran war and in addition to a recluse Syrian state implied that Iran would not be actively involved in the provision of support to its ally because of their differences in geopolitical ideologies. Therefore, in a desperate move to elevate its status, Saad-Ghorayeb (2012) argues that Syria was quick to ally with the US during its attempts to stop the Invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein. Syria hoped that it would weaken the position of Iraq and result in his removal from power and cause the association between the Middle East nation and the US to flourish, culminating in foreign aid. In addition, supporting Kuwait, as Al-Assad thought, would be effective in reestablishing proper ties between Syria and the rest of the Arab world (Von Maltzahn, 2015). All the movements that Syria made cost its relationship with Iran. In the meantime, Iran was busy in enforcing its effect in the region, which entailed its tension with Israel through supporting militia groups that were opposed to Israel. However, Syria was willing to mediate the end of the Israel-Palestine conflict because of its interests in the US after the end of the Gulf War. The US used Syria in attempting to establish peace between the two countries through the Madrid Framework. Although Israel and Syria attempted to establish peace,—Syria demanded Israel’s withdrawal from the Golan Heights—they were unable to establish real peace. 

Even in their differences on the issue of Israel, the relationship between Iran and Syria did not collapse. For example, according to Deeb (2013), Hafez al-Assad visited Iran after the 2005 inauguration of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for the first time following the Islamic Revolution that would see their cooperation increase. Specifically, the meeting resulted in the development of the Iranian-Syrian Higher Cooperation Committee one month later that would be concerned with facilitating further meetings between the leaders of the two countries. Among of the most significant developments of such meetings was the creation of policy concerning Hezbollah and unified production of ballistic missiles in collaboration with North Korea. The new form pf collaboration bolstered the Syrian-Iranian alliance for the most part of the 90s. 

The September 11 attacks on the US are also identified in literature as among the most significant contributors to the strengthening of the Syrian-Iranian alliance. In this case, according to Yacoubian (2007), the US searched for allies throughout the world in its devotion to deal with terrorism. During the initial stages of the efforts in doing so, Syria and the US worked closely in searching for terror organizations such as the Al Qaeda. However, Syria’s concern of the US plans to attack Iraq caused the relationship to be short-lived. Syria understood that the US would require it to terminate its association with Hamas and Hezbollah and that the move to remove Saddam Hussein from power would have negative implication on Bashar al-Sadd’s leadership since he feared that would be annexed in the same way Hussein would be removed from power (Yacoubian, 2007). 

Literature suggests further that the US also turned to Iran with concerns over its nuclear activity. President Bush of the US heightened the tension further when he labelled some countries in the Middle East, including Iran, as the axis of evil because of suspicion that was contributing to the emergence and perpetuation of terror groups (Goodarzi, 2009). The priority of the US was on the need for Syria to leave Lebanon and its focus on Hamas and Hezbollah. Nevertheless, the historical relationship between Syria and Iran would mean that the US was isolated because of its foreign policy. Therefore, the US continued labelling some countries as sponsors of terrorist activities, including Iran and Syria. Most of the countries avoided contact with Iran and Syria, which caused them to feel the need to strengthen their collaboration (Yacoubian, 2007). 

With no other country to turn on for support, the connection between Syria and Iran has improved in the recent years more than it did in the past three decades. For instance, Bashar Al-Assad was the first of the foreign delegation to visit the president of Iran after his inauguration in 2005. On the reverse call, the Iranian president has made several visits to Damascus, which reveals the depth of the connection between the two countries. The connection led to the establishment of several mutual agreements between the two leaders. 

The Present Existence of Iran in Syria and the Significance of their Close Ties 

Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in 2010 in Tunisia resulted in a massive uprising in Tunisia and the rest of the Middle East and North Africa regions. The protestors wanted the removal of the authoritarian leaders from power and their immediate replacement with leaders who valued democracy. The protestors were more demanding in Damascus and the rest of Syria in 2011 during the Arab Spring and they wanted the annexation of Bashar Al-Assad. However, instead of following in the footsteps of other leaders in places like Tunisia and Egypt who had stepped out of office, Al-Assad did not quite office since he defended his position at all costs. The protests resulted into a civil strife that grew into a large-scale international conflict that included several countries, including but not limited to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the Us, Iran, Russia, and Syria (Aras, & Karakaya, 2012). 

Iran backed the protestors during the Arab Spring specifically because the leaders that the protestors targeted were pro-Western and anti-Islamic. Therefore, in its attempt to justify its position in support of the protestors, the country labelled them as pro-Islamist and that such a movement would be effective in the development of a new regime in the Middle East as well as North Africa that would see the replacement of all authoritarian regimes by democratic ones. Therefore, Tehran realized that it had succeeded in turning the tide against the West as it had been wishing for years. However, Iran changed its stance quickly upon realizing that Syria was a target of most of the anti-government protests. 

Many regimes have used the conflict in Syria as an opportunity to advance their military and political interests in the region and the country. Specifically, the Syrian Civil War has been used as a critical entry point for most of Assad’s sympathizers to offer their support for his regime. For instance, none of such allies has been stronger in its support for Syria than Russia, which was interested in overpowering the Islamic State and preventing a possible change of regime that would be occasioned by alien forces, such as the US (Stent, 2016). President Putin has been open in the provision of support in different dimensions, including weaponry and financial aid that would have been effective in ensuring that Al-Assad remained in power ( Long & Muharrem, 2017 ). 

At the base of all arguments, the Syrian Civil War has been one of the best indicators of the strength of the Iran-Syria connection. Iran’s concern was to ensure that Al-Assad remained the president of their allied nation. It is interesting to note that neither Hezbollah nor Iran came to the rescue of Syria by sending troops to the ground during the first few months of its conflict. For instance, Tehran had thought that Syria would manage its conflict through the support that Iran would offer to the Ba’athist regime. For such a reason, Iran was the first to support the movement by Assad to crush the efforts of the protestors through the provision of technical expertise and support that would be useful in neutralizing the pressure from the opposition. In this case, Iran offered equipment and advice to the security forces of Syria to assist them in containing and dispersing the groups of protestors (Deeb, 2013). The country also helped its ally through the provision of technical guidance and support on the manner in which it would monitor and deal with the utilization of mobile telephone networks and the internet by the protesting groups (Von Maltzahn, 2015). Nevertheless, it was critical for the Iranian government to dispatch its Revolutionary Guards to its ally to ensure that they provided the required levels of support that would continue keeping the president in power (Pantucci & Tabrizi, 2016). Iran increased the number of its forces sent out to Syria with time because the conflict did not dissolve as soon as Tehran had hoped it would do and eventually this role was taken by Russia. 

Hezbollah and Iran had argued they were not interested in helping Syria for the sole purpose of their fighting Israeli advances in the region. They stated that they were interested in the protection of Shia minorities and their shrines that were under constant danger of demolition from the Islamic State. Nevertheless, the intention on the Iranian side goes beyond the two issues. The country sought to preserve their ally in President Assad because of the strategic importance of Syria to Iran’s foreign policy, which includes maintaining a land bridge to Lebanon. For this reason, the government and military of Iran was determined to keep Assad in power. 

When Iran realized that Assad’s chances of surviving the continued bombardment from protestors was dwindling, it opted for negotiated settlement of the conflict in 2013 (Fulton, Holliday, & Wyer, 2013). Russia also thought that the approach would be effective. A break down in the negotiating process caused Russia to increase its support for Syria through sending in more troops, which Iran replicated. From 2013, Iran’s approach was to increase the number of its soldiers in Syria to resist the pressure from protestors and their allies. At one time during the conflict, chances indicated that the engagement of external forces in the conflict would result in both Assad leaving and him retaining control over most parts of Syria. Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah have been prepared to meet any consequences that would come their way because of their commitment to intervene in the state of Syria. The conflict has strengthened the relationship between Iran and Syria because of the history that the two nations have shared over the past three decades. 

It should be noted that Iran has been concerned with a political settlement to the civil strife in Syria since 2014 through four primary issues. First, Iran has been pushing for a ceasefire. In addition, the country has been pushing for constitutional reforms that would safeguard minorities in Syria, the creation of a state unity government that would be founded on new constitutional institutions, the establishment of free elections that would also be supervised internationally (Tehran Times, 2016). As much as Iran has been stating its desire to create a diplomatic solution to the issue of Syria, it has physically present on the ground in its allied nation. In the wake of the nation’s investment in ideological capital, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, men, and material in Syria, it is clear that it has been seeking to actualize its political agenda in the region. It is argued that Iran will maintain a strong presence in Syria and will only disengage after the realization of three outcomes of its foreign policy (Stent, 2016). 

The first outcome that would result in Iran’s withdrawal from Syria would be the fall of Daesh and Jabhat Al-Nursa—arms of the ISIS. According to Dagher (2018), Iran has indicated to the rest of the world that its involvement in Syria has a relationship with its intention to fight extremism and terrorism within the Middle East. Tehran feels that Al-Nursa and Daesh are part of the terrorist groups that Iran should dedicate its military resources to suppress (Bassiri & Pantucci, 2017). The cited literature indicates that Iran has been considering the positions that Daesh and Al-Nursa hold as a threat to the political stability of Iraq, which means that it is an immediate concern for security. Consequently, as much as Iran has been committed to ensuring the stability of Syria through diplomacy, it has maintained its troops in the country to fight Al-Nursa and Daesh until they are no longer in Syria (Bassiri & Pantucci, 2017). In fact, Iran has been disinterested in any attempts that would include the terror groups in negotiations concerning the future of its ally. Despite any ceasefire calls, Iranian forces are unwilling to cease their strikes on the militia groups. It is even feared that while the civil strife in Syria might be solved in the long-run, Iran is likely to use the slightest remnants of Al-Nursa and Daesh to justify their continued presence in the country, especially through overseeing Shia and NDF militia groups ( Long & Muharrem, 2017 ). 

Iran is also in Syria because it seeks to restore the status quo ante in their allied nation. From another perspective, it suggests that Iran supports Syria’s territorial integrity in which it sought to stop the Lebanonization of Syria—the division of Syria into rival regions and quasi-independent sections (Stent, 2016). It should be noted the activities of Iran in Syria do not always work in line with the overall objective of Tehran of stabilizing the former centralized state of Syria—especially because of the existence of a large number of militia group. However, its plans appear to be motivated by the desire to have an effective plan B just in case it would be impossible to restore the status quo ante (Bassiri & Pantucci, 2017). 

The existence of Iranian forces in Syria is part of a strategic move to suppress the influence of Israel in the region, especially through Lebanon. Iran has been concerned with maintaining its military existence in Syria because of the significance of the latter country in the case of Lebanon. For instance, Iran does not want to shift its route to Lebanon in which it has maintained interests for a long time. The country believes that it should strive to maintain the territorial integrity of Syria because of the strategic connection between it and Lebanon—it provides a land bridge that allows the transfer of arms to Hezbollah in the resistance of Israel (Dagher, 2018). In addition, it is thought that Iran would like to prevent the possibilities of Israeli attacks on the Shia movement of Lebanon through Syria ( Long & Muharrem, 2017 ). 

Further literature suggests that Iran fears the possibilities of the establishment of the independence of Kurdish found in the northern region of Syria. As much as this group is not a terrorist movement—at least in the perspective of Iran—Tehran does not support its activities because they appear not to support its move to keep the Assad regime (Bassiri & Pantucci, 2017). The country has been fearing that the independence of this group would result in a division of Syria, which is why it moved quickly to supporting Turkey to reject the declaration of a federal structure of the group in northern Syria. The involvement of Turkey in the case has been because of the concern that the Kurd would spread their influence to Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. 

Another issue that has kept Iran in Syria is the desire for the former nation to preserve Syrian institutions, including intelligence services and the military. Specifically, an implosion of the Assad regime would result in ascendance of Sunni extremist movements that would fight against the Shia and the Hezbollah (Bassiri & Pantucci, 2017). The Iranian leadership believes that institutional stability could only be attained when Assad continued to be president of Syria. Therefore, Iran was unwilling to engage in talks that would culminate in its disengagement from Syria until they had attained a stable system of governance ( Long & Muharrem, 2017 ). It is even reported in literature that Iran indicated its willingness to replace Assad but failed to actualize their idea because of the lack of an alternative (Stent, 2016). The transition between one regime and another would result in institutional collapse. As much as Iran favored replacing Assad with a person from the Ba’ath Party, the cited study indicates that it was unsure of whether this move would ensure the stability of Syrian institutions. 

One should understand that as much as Iran publicly suggested that it was willing to allow the Syrians to decide the state of their nation, it was secretly unwilling to support any moves that would end Assad’s regime. Therefore, the Syrian president was to remain in power at least until the end of his regime since his removal from power would result in a leader who could compromise the Iranian-Syrian relationship. In fact, the country is willing to support Assad’s re-election if necessary because of its strategic interests in the country. This fear is also connected to the fact that Iran thinks that a new leader for its ally would move Syria’s strategic plans to Saudi Arabia, which is ideologically different from Iran. Some other studies suggest that Iran is also prepared for the worst scenario—a likely failure of its attempt at restoring the status quo ante in Syria. In this case, the country is concerned with the maintenance of its position in Syria, especially in the south that would be aimed at establishing significant control of the Shia regions of south Syria that are controlled by the Shia. The approach in this case would through supporting non-state actors while anticipating that it would continue its pursuance of critical interests and place pressure on government. However, the existence of this plan has been considered the cause of some levels of tensions between the Syrian and Iranian armies and causing most of the nations in the Gulf region to support Sunni extremist groups (Bassiri & Pantucci, 2017). 

Conclusion 

As much as Syria and Iran could be having different systems of politics and governance, they have exhibited one of the rarest alliances in the history of the Middle East. Concerns over the strength of their union in the future are critical questions among analyzers of their relationship. However, judging from their past encounters, the countries’ shared interests in economics and geopolitics would be enough to keep their alliance strong for the next few years. Now, the two nations have built on the foundations of their association that dates back to 1979 during the Islamic Revolution that transformed the politics of Iran through the elimination of the Shah regime. The volume of literature on the factors that motivated the association between Syria and Iran may be large, but at the cornerstone, one finds the fact that their political alignment against the influence of Israel has motivated their collaboration for the three decades of association. Syria’s desire to be the most influential state in the Middle East, for example, has driven its foreign policy to support most of the activities that Iran engaged in to suppress the rise of Israel. The two countries have used different approaches, but they coincide on their foreign policies towards the US. 

Even though Syria worked with the US during the War on Iraq, it did so only because it wanted to strengthen its position in region. Other events in the history of the two nations, such as the Iran-Iraq War, the Muslim Brotherhood, the post 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US, and the case of Hezbollah have been instrumental in strengthening the association between Iran and Syria. Iran’s current existence in Syria is based on the strategic interests of the nation in the Middle East. For instance, as one would expect, the country seeks to prevent the influence of Israel in the region and the possibilities of an anti-Shia regime in Syria that would compromise its strategic plans. Currently, Syria is used as a land bridge to Lebanon to supply arms to provide resistance to Israel. Therefore, Iran has made it its duty to stabilize Syria’s politics and prevent the possibilities of a collapse of its institutions. In the eyes of Tehran, its strategic policies would only succeed through a stable government in Syria. 

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