Many of the studies relating to the Battle of Pork Chop Hill, or the entire Korean War, have majorly focused on the consequences of the war. Many scholars emphasize the number of deaths and amount of resources involved in the war ( Coleman, 2008 ). Additionally, many of these studies concentrate on the political dynamics that hindered the battle from attaining the iconic status of the battles of the Vietnam War or World War II ( Matray, 2012 ). This paper centers on a geographic semiology of the Battle of Pork Chop Hill combat narratives, in order to show how landscape can be considered to be the enemy in this battle.
The paper, to an extent, evaluates how literature pulls on several coded signs to develop the definition of the battle at the level of frontline troops instead of the level of global politics. The paper makes use of studies containing combat narratives from the battle in order to construct a discussion that would support the argument that the physical structures and features of Pork Chop Hill had a significant influence on the outcomes of the battle. A geographic semiology serves to demonstrate how topography is a vital medium through which warring forces’ struggles, both physical and physiological, are depicted.
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Background
In October 1951, the United States 8 th Calvary Regiment seized Pork Chop Hill, which is nearly 300 meters high. As its name suggests, the hill, to some degree, resembles a pork chop. This hill was held again by Item Company of the United States 180 th Infantry Regiment in May 1952 ( Matray, 2015 ). It was then defended by the United States 2 nd Infantry Division’s 1 st Battalion of the 21 st Thai Regiment in November 1952. Pork Chop was one of several other exposed hill garrisons along the Main Line of Resistance that were defended by a sole platoon or company ( Matray, 2012 ). The company that defended Pork Chop was placed in sand-bagged dugouts linked with trenches.
The Battle of Pork Chop Hill occurred in two phases, the first one being in April 1953 while the second was in July the same year. On March 23 rd , the Chinese launched a surprise attack on the Americans and took over a garrison near Pork Chop Hill. Unfortunately, the Americans were in the middle of a rotation, making their defense vulnerable at the time ( Matray, 2015 ). By the time a week had past, the Americans on Pork Chop Hill were surrounded and could be attacked from three different sides of the hill. On April 16 th , the Chinese attacked at midnight, forcing many of the Americans out of the hill, though some American troops continued to defend isolated bunkers. The following two days were marked with attacks and counterattacks from both forces, resulting in heavy casualties.
The terrain of the hill and its surroundings made things particularly difficult for the Americans, who often relied on supporting fire from armored personal carriers (APC) and tanks in the wars before the Korean War ( Matray, 2015 ). The ragged landscape made the area impassible for such weapons. 104 Americans lost their lives in the April battle ( Tobin, 2003 ). Chinese losses are still unknown.
On 6 th July, while the United Nations was expecting a cease fire, the Chinese carried out another surprise attack on Pork Chop. This battle lasted longer than the first, and ended on 10 th that month. Even though the Americans had succeeded in availing APCs at Pork Chop, the terrain made it had for them to anticipate the sudden attacks from the Chinese ( Matray, 2015 ). Regardless, the Americans fought back relentlessly, forcing the Chinese to retreat under fire. 243 Americans as well as 15 of the Republic f Korea soldiers attached to the US army for this battle lost their lives ( Tobin, 2003 ). Chinese casualties were approximately 1500.
The influence of Geography on War Outcomes
Geography, today as well as yesterday, is one of the critical determinants of war strategy. In the period before the 21 st Century, geography was sometimes even more significant than war strategy ( Millett, 2001 ). Military leaders, as can be seen in World War I, mostly developed war strategies based on the geography of the war zone. For example, the control of a higher ground or mountain pass provided one side with distinct advantage over enemy forces. In this way, it can be seen that geography was a key influence in war outcomes before the current technology, which tends to reduce its influence.
Geography as an Enemy at Pork Chop
Studies represent the Korean War, particularly the Battle of Pork Chop Hill, not entirely as a struggle between the Communists and the Americans but as a sophisticated set of geographic dynamics. Such studies hold that the landscape of Pork Chop Hill mediated between human foes and in some instances stood in for the North Koreans and the Chinese ( Millett, 2001 ).
In this cases Geography and the human body are considered to be thoroughly interwoven. The combat zone during the Battle of Pork Hill was littered with corpses of allied and enemy soldiers as well as debris from the multiple explosions involved in the war ( Millett, 2001 ). Additionally, the region’s landscape, which is considered to be “strange” to American troops, is understood by the enemy, who seems to be in natural harmony with such an environment. In this way, the geography of Korea is regarded as the major antagonist since it resists the Americans while harboring and enabling the enemy.
It is the confusion presented by the geography of Pork Chop Hill that somewhat altered the priorities of the warring forces. It is important to note that the battle at Pork Chop was part of a greater war – the Korean War. Given that the battle occurred towards the end of the Korean War, it was irrelevant for the United States to hold on to Pork Chop ( Millett, 2001 ). On the other hand, it was unnecessary for the enemy forces to insist on taking back the territory instead of focusing on other aspects of the war. In the end, both parties were striving to acquire one of the furthest bases on the United Nations exterior line. Such a base did not present any significant strategic benefit in the context of the greater war. It follows that the geography of the battlefield influenced military operations of the warring forces, which in turn disrupted the infantry’s sense of purpose in the war.
While soldiers are trained to operate in almost every situation, there is no doubt that the landscape of the Pork Chop Hill was peculiar to American forces. For instance, some of the soldiers opted to stop using their short-range radios, claiming that they were not meant to be used in the terrain ( Millett, 2001 ). The artillery used by the American forces was also not effective, given that it required sufficient flat tracts of land. The Americans searched for such lands along the main axis of advance without success. Thus, even though Americans possessed large tracts of land and also had relatively more powerful weapons, they were unable to show this strength during the Battle of Pork Chop Hill.
The geography of Pork Chop Hill caused tactical incomprehension among the American troop who engaged enemy forces in that region. Reports from the battle include such statements as: “the heavy fog of the ridges blinded the soldiers to the low grounds and made the hill an illusory scene.” In this way, the soldiers could not have a clear sight of the approaching enemy and in some cases, they could not tell friend from foe ( Millett, 2001 ). One may argue the characteristics of the landscape affected not only the Americans but also all the other parties in the war.
Questions come up about whether it was the geography of the region that is to be blamed or that the patience and skill of the enemy is to be commended. Some studies even describe the American forces as overconfident and ill-informed as they matched to Pork Chop Hill and, therefore, it would be inaccurate to refer to the landscape as a synthetic construct meant to confuse and ensnare American troops ( Matray, 2012 ). The scholars who are reluctant to accept the notion that the landscape of Pork Chop Hill was the real enemy in this battle argue that while the Americans had superior weapons to those of the enemy, the latter was more skilled in operating in such an environment. Thus, the real enemy was the Americans’ lack of skill to navigate and fight in these circumstances. As a result, the Second Platoon’s patrol got lost and the reciprocal patrol sent out from the First Platoon was declared late. In the end both of them were wandering in a maze ( Millett, 2001 ). American troops should have received better training in combat for such a landscape. They should have also been patient enough to study the environment before advancing towards Pork Chop Hill. Also, the challenges presented by the environment were uniform for the warring parties. The fog, for example, blinded every soldier on Pork Chop Hill. However, it is important to note that there is no such feature in the United States and that the Korean army had the opportunity had the opportunity to train on it for years before the war. Considering such facts, then it is valid to claim that the landscape was an enemy during the Battle of Pork Chop Hill.
The predicaments suffered by American troops in this battle, as described by several authors, can be attributed to the spatial nature of the combat zone. In the Battle of Pork Chop Hill, “the soldiers did not actually have a proper view of the battlefield. Rather, they saw the world around them as a rabbit does, stooping on earth and with an eye on one little spot” ( Bleiker and Hoang, 2006 ). As the battle was ongoing, it can be deduced the American soldiers only the dust lifted by the bullets hitting the ground from all sides. Given the contours of Pork Chop Hill, the soldiers could not see clearly yet the enemy knew exactly where they were ( Millett, 2001 ). As a result, the foot-soldiers struggled not only to stick to the tactics they had planned to use during this battle but also comprehend the situation they found themselves in for purpose of imposing order on the chaos of combat. The enemy had clearly taken advantage of the landscape and rendered the American forces powerless.
In his work, Matray (2012) demonstrates the collective uncertainty concerning the actual position the battle took place and for what reason. This uncertainty should not however, does not seek to discredit any historical account of the Battle of Pork Chop Hill. Rather, it is used to show how confusing the landscape was even for the soldiers who fought at Pork Chop Hill ( Millett, 2001 ). Given that the source of information in the Matray’s book is dependent on combat narratives, the incomprehensibility of the discussion regarding the region’s landscape can be attributed to the strange spatial setting of the war zone.
The warring parties, as expected, moved into the trenches after the first several attacks and counterattacks. According to Matray (2012) , while fighting from entrenched positions gives the combatants a sense of safety, it makes it difficult to distinguish between friendly forces and enemy forces. As the barricades became increasingly concretized, the ground-level assessments of territorial control became more unsteady during the battle. For instance, to adapt to the prevailing conditions and the landscape, the Red Army dug trenches going more than 20,000 yards in depth ( Matray, 2012 ). In doing so, there defense had ten times the depth of any of the entrenchment belts recorded in World War I.
Unlike the common modes of fighting during World War I, the unique terrain of Pork Chop Hill seemed to restrict the movement of the combatants, forcing them into “seesaw fighting” ( Millett, 2001 ; Matray, 2012 ). Seesaw fighting takes place when the warring parties trade the same bits of ground and the combatants do not move long distances. The troops move back and forth, repeatedly using the same violence on the same terrain.
Pork Chop Hill, which was part of the Demilitarized Zone, did not allow either of the warring forces to exercise consistent tactics. Going into the Demilitarized Zone with a fixed defense strategy often proved to be ill-informed throughout the Korean War. For this reason, Matray (2012) states that “friendly territory at Pork Chop Hill was essentially also enemy territory.” In other words, the dynamics of the war and the terrain of that area created a situation whereby it was difficult to defend a given patch of land for an extended period since it is likely that enemy forces would occupy it as soon as the chance presents itself.
Conclusion
This paper presents a discussion of the influence of geography on the Battle of Pork Chop Hill as well as a summary of the events of the battle. While many studies emphasize the political and economic aspects of this battle and the Korean War, this one seeks to strengthen the argument that geography was a major determinant of the battle. It is clear that the terrain of Pork Chop hill impeded both movement and the anticipation of attacks for both of the warring parties. In the end, both the United and the Communists had many casualties.
References
Bleiker, R., & Hoang, Y. J. (2006). Remembering and forgetting the Korean War: From trauma to reconciliation. Memory, Trauma and World Politics. Reflections on the Relationship between Past and Present, London: Palgrave Macmillan , 206-210.
Coleman, B. (2008). Colombia and the United States: The making of an Inter-American alliance, 1939–1960.
Matray, J. I. (2012). Conflicts in Korea. A Companion to Harry S. Truman , 498-531.
Matray, J. I. (2015). The Korean War. A Companion to American Military History, 2 Volumes , 222-256.
Millett, A. R. (2001). The Korean War: A 50 ‐ year critical historiography. The Journal of Strategic Studies , 24 (1), 188-224.
Tobin, K. (2003). Contemporary US/Korean Relations: A South Korean Perspective.
