Staff Organization and Training and Efficiency
Operation Chromite staff were well trained and organized for the attack that sought to recapture the Seoul City and the South Korean Republic. The team was drawn from different forces comprising of the Army, Marine, and the Naval Forces. Most of the soldiers in Operation Chromite were US soldiers who had received adequate military training and participated in the just-ended World War II (Knight, 2006). The North Korean Forces takeover of Seoul city in June in 1950 (Gagaridis and Liegeois, 2017) gave the planners of the operation enough time to prepare their staff for the operation. Knight (2006) states, “MacArthur employed the amphibious
planning expertise of Rear Admiral James H. Doyle… and his staff of seasoned World War II veterans.” Enough intelligence operation was gathered before the execution of the attack.
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The collaboration of the different units involved in the attack eliminated contentious moments between the forces and made them focused on the attack. The various groups collaborated in gathering and sharing of intelligence information. This helped the particular units be well prepared for their designated attacks. The chains of command in the different units of the forces were also well-established, helping ensure seamless execution of the operation (Knight, 2006). Proper organization and coordination between the staff made them efficient in carrying out their attack.
Relationship of the commanders and their Staff
The relationship between the commanders and their staff was collaborative and intended to achieve success for the operation. The staff did not fear to state their views to their commanders on areas that they thought would lead to better execution of the operation. A solid example is the staff's preference for making an amphibious landing on Kunsan beach to Inchon (Gagaridis and Liegeois, 2017). Blascak (2019) states the staff “ expressed grave doubts about the wisdom of landing at Inchon, primarily because of the extremely high tides there, the narrow channel to the port, the drain on Eighth Army’s reserves, and the distance from Walker’s lines, which might result in a late link-up.” They reasoned that it would be more strategic to land at this beach due to its closeness to Pusan, which was being attacked by the North Korean forces. It would also be less risky to land on it as its tidal characteristics were more favorable than Inchon. MacArthur allowed this open and constructive discussion among the staff. However, he made them aware of the benefits to be realized if they were to land at Inchon. It would be a surprise attack to the enemies as it was a less likely point to attack, thus would disorient them. It would also help to cut their supplies. The open dialogue and collaboration with the staff helped achieve consensus and comprehension of the suitability of the plan. This open relationship brought huge success for the battle as the mission for the plan were achieved (Blascak, 2019).
Coordination of Plans and Orders in Mission Accomplishment
The plans and orders of Operation Chromite were well thought out. The plan by MacArthur depicted great intellect that went beyond the common military reasoning. His choice of the first location to strike depicts his intelligence and a well thought out plan. Rather than choosing a beach with a more comfortable landing, he decides to go with the Inchon landing, which had harsher tidal conditions. Though risky and with no security in case it failed, the plan presented some advantages to the team. Being a problematic landing ground, the North Korean Forces were less likely to anticipate an attack through this route; thus, if executed, it would catch the enemy by surprise (United States, 1997). Blascak (2019) documents an incident where Joint message MacArthur upon landing at Inchon stating that, “Your transition from defensive to offensive operations was magnificently planned, timed, and executed…” T he enemy having advanced far south to engage the Eighth Army had little forces left manning the Inchon area; thus, it would be easier to go against a smaller number of soldiers. An attack on Inchon would also help cut the enemy's supplies and thus weakening their forces. It also offered an excellent attack ground in case the enemies retreated. The troops would be at an offensive side rather than being on the defense.
The plan and orders were also well coordinated with precise timing of when the attacks would be carried out and by which group of forces. The collaboration between the naval, ground, and the marine troops helped eliminate barriers where one force was limited. The forces complemented each other’s actions to a huge success. The orders for carrying out the attacks were carried out according to the plan, and where changes occurred, quick communications and reorganization were done. An example is an attack scheduled for 0630 on 26 th September but later changed to 0145 and 0200. The changes were well communicated, and coordination carried out quickly (BACM Research, 2019).
Command and Control Communication Systems
Different communication systems were used in Operation Chromite. Messengers often provided the much-needed communication links between the forces. Reconnaissance patrols by the marines helped avail crucial information for use during the main attacks. The Marines carried out aerial observations using helicopters and collected essential information on enemy status, such as their movement out of Seoul (BACM Research, 2019). The information gathered was then shared between the different units to help in better preparation and coordination. Other communication alternatives used were telephone telegram systems. This was, however, inhibited by a large distance between the headquarters and thus loss of signals for the radios. Short battery life was also a challenge. Wire communication through telephone lines was also used. The mode was too faced with problems such as difficult terrain comprising of mountainous areas, and zones of paddy rice made it difficult for signalmen to mount them (Raines, 1996). Destruction of wire lines by enemies and fleeing refugees was also a significant challenge.
For command control and tactical use, especially where long distances were involved, very high frequency (VHF) radios were used. They helped provide communication across the steep terrain, from the sea to land and across rivers. It offered flexibility in communication by providing an all-time clear reception that helped keep up with the occurrences during the battle (Raines, 1996). However, it presented a challenge of the need to mount stations in mountainous areas. The equipment was quite heavy, thus tiresome to carry it uphill and once mounted made the forces susceptible to attacks by enemies as the station could be easily seen. The technology used for communication in operation helped relay the intended information. However, I find the technology less efficient since the operation was quite time-sensitive, and thus faster, and more stable communication systems might have been required.
Organization of the Communication Personnel
The communication personnel was organized in their collection and relay of information crucial for the planning of the attacks. The Marine forces who used aircraft to collect information on the enemy status carried out reconnaissance patrols on time to help the forces to prepare to launch attacks. Their observation of the enemy's withdrawal from Seoul city was notified to the different units to start carrying out attacks to flush them out (BACM Research, 2019). The communication personnel was organized and relayed information to the respective units on time. The CG X Corps informed the 1 st Marine Regiment of the change in their planned attack time, helping them to prepare adequately. The planned reconnaissance patrol across the Han River helped the forces to sufficiently prepare for the attack (BACM Research, 2019).)
Intelligence
Tactical Intelligence Assets Available to Opposing Forces
The opposing forces did not have much intelligence assets at their disposal. It mainly relied on rumors on any impending attacks that were to be carried out. For example, for the Inchon landing attack, the 27 th brigade attached to the North Korean forces only had rumored information that the US forces would attack either Wonsan, Inchon, or Mokpo in the early days of September. BACM Research (2019) asserts that, “Received no information concerning reinforcement in this area. Due to the poor communication system, no information was available concerning the situation on the southern front.” The team had poor communication channels comprising of radios, whistles, bugles, and horns (Raines, 1996) thus did not relay the information early enough to its forces to make arrangements for reinforcement. The opposing forces also relied on sighting the X Corp's communication channels, such as the VHF stations to prepare for guerilla attacks. The team also depended on sighting American soldier’s infantry loaded on trucks, which were often conspicuous to know of impending attacks (BACM Research, 2019).
Major Sources of Tactical Intelligence
The primary source of tactical intelligence for Operation Chromite was through reconnaissance patrols carried using aircraft. Douglas MacArthur relied on the use of aircraft to gather aerial intelligence (Knight, 2006). Knight (2006) asserts, “Direct coordination within the channels of a single service, in this case between Marine ground forces and Marine aviators, still offered the most expedient means of requesting and receiving photographic intelligence.” This enabled carrying out of assessment to determine enemy preparedness and strength. Cameras mounted on helicopters were used to take photographs of areas occupied by the enemy. Assessment of the photographs helped relay crucial information, such as the estimated number of enemy soldiers. The US superiority in aircraft and naval weaponry as compared to the North Korean forces provided the technical advantage needed to gather intelligence against them.
Collection of Tactical Intelligence
The collection of intelligence was often carried out on time to aid in the planning and execution of attacks. Knight (2006) states, “… Marine Aircraft Group 33 provided X Corps with photographs within six to twenty-four hours.” General Douglas MacArthur, who was in charge of Operation Chromite, ensured that his team gathered updated intelligence information. Intelligence was collected on the port conditions, tidal patterns, enemy forces concentration, and the placement of the enemy's weapons (Knight, 2006). Early intelligence gathering on the state at Inchon landing helped depict the low number of enemy forces, weapon placement, and gun positioning in the entrance leading to the harbor. The intelligence was gathered using aircraft using both visual and photographic means. MacArthur required that the intelligence on Inchon landing be collected daily, and the information relayed to the relevant generals and lieutenants (Knight, 2006). The collection of intelligence was carried out by a coordinated team of marine and naval forces to ensure that each was adequately prepared for their particular attacks and also enable the designation of command when their roles overlapped. Reconnaissance patrols by the marines helped collect crucial information on enemy concentration on the Inchon and Seoul region, thus preparing adequately for attacks (BACM Research, 2019).
Use of Tactical Intelligence by the Commanders
The commanders used tactical intelligence wisely, helping them to prepare for the attacks adequately. BACM Research (2019) states that, “Assault troops were forced to climb over the fifteen foot high sea wall adjoining Blue Beach 2, using aluminum scaling ladders designed for the purpose.” Information gathered on the harbor conditions at Inchon, such as the concrete walls, helped the commanders prepare for their attack by being armed with aluminum ladders to climb over (BACM Research, 2019). Intelligence on the low enemy concentration at Inchon landing informed the decision to choose the site as the first attack point. Through aerial observation, the Marines were able to spot the withdrawal of enemy forces from Seoul city and used the intelligence to launch an attack that flushed them out (BACM Research, 2019).
Integration of Tactical Intelligence into Tactical Plans
Intelligence information gathered was integrated into the tactical plans when carrying out the attacks. Worth noting was that the tidal conditions at mid-September presented the best time to launch an amphibious assault at Inchon. The observation was that the high tides would have allowed the naval vessels to make a landing. Failure to attack at this time would have required the forces to wait for a month to carry out the attacks. The operation required no delays since the North Korean Forces were focused on a sustained onslaught against the Pusan Perimeter before the onset of winter (United States, 1997). The intelligence was thus integrated into the technical plan, and the attack at Inchon slated for 15 th September. BACM Research documents that, “Failure to meet that deadline meant almost another month's delay before another landing attempt could be made. For only a short period each month, would tidal conditions at Inchon permit an assault landing across the beaches.” Intelligence on enemy withdrawal from Seoul was incorporated into the plan to launch a combined attack comprising the Eighth Army and the X Corps to flush the enemies out of the city. The use of intelligence information and the organization of the UN forces against the disorganized and uncoordinated North Korean Forces resulted in a big success. The UN forces only had 3498 casualties, unlike the 14000 casualties and 7000 captives for the enemy (BACM Research, 2019).
References
BACM Research. (2019). Korean War: Battle of Inchon - Operation Chromite X Corps After Action Report [Ebook].
Blascak, J. (2019). Risk vs. Reward: The Operational Art at Inchon | Small Wars Journal. Retrieved 24th December 2019, from https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/risk-vs-reward-operational-art-inchon
Gagaridis, A., & Liegeois, M. (2017). Operation Chromite A Strategic Analysis [Ebook].
Knight, P. G. (2006). “MacArthur’s Eyes”: reassessing military intelligence operations in the forgotten war, June 1950-April 1951 (Doctoral dissertation, The Ohio State University).
Raines, R. R. (1996). Getting the message through: a branch history of the US army signal corps (Vol. 30). Government Printing Office.
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff. (1997). Joint Military Operations Historical Collection . Joint Chiefs of Staff.
