Cyberbiosecurity Threats to Homeland Security

Introduction 

The convergence of biology and cyber-technology raises unprecedented threats to Homeland Security (Schabacker et al., 2019). Risks emanating from biological sciences have been managed through the implementation of standard biosecurity practices, through which vulnerabilities are identified and mitigated through regularly updated training, policies, and enhancing physical security as the HS is doing. Cyber revolution has facilitated the development of most scientific fields. Notably, the convergence of biological studies and laboratory automation and cyber data has resulted in numerous therapeutic inventions (Schabacker et al., 2019). The fields of biology and cyberology are correlated and offer substantial information on each other (George, 2019). Cyberbiosecurity converges research from lateral thinking, different scientific areas, and intentional combination of two fields (George, 2019). The sophisticated nature of cyber-bio convergence poses tremendous threats to chemical, food and agricultural, energy, healthcare and public health, defense industrial base and emergency services (George, 2019). Policies addressing issues on cyberbiosecurity are minimal due to its multifaceted nature. Deficiency in policy has weakened government response to cyberbiosecurity as a threat to all biological life (Schabacker et al., 2019). Security departments cannot afford to ignore this issue considering its rapid rate of growth. In that sense, the public and private sector must find ways of cooperating to develop viable interventions of identifying, assessing, and eliminating cyberbiosecurity threats.

Issue 

Reports indicate that, increased access to biotechnology in the digital has opened up additional security concerns and as such, has brought up the new aspect of cyberbiosecurity, which entails cybersecurity, cyber-physical security, and biosecuirty considerations. Following the emergence of this new discipline comes the need for a logical and workable approach for evaluating facility and system vulnerabilities to cyberbiosecurity threats. Cyberbiosecurity causes unprecedented vulnerabilities to multiple sectors. According to Murch et al. (2018), cyberbiosecurity refers to understanding the potential risks of convergence in biological and biomedical-based systems and cyber-related areas. The boundaries of cyber biosecurity are unknown due to minimal research devoted to the topic (Murch et al., 2018). Researchers have varying understanding of this field, leading to the current confusion in designing effective approaches. Bajema et al. (2018) simplify cyberbiosecurity as “the digitization of biology”. Biotechnology provides numerous benefits in medical fields but also creates an ethical issue due to the weaponizing of biological data (Bajema et al., 2018). For instance, gene editing could be used to enhance the abilities of disease-causing pathogens. Bajema et al. (2018) provide the example of CRISPR-Cas9 gene-editing technique, which offers cheap and easier ways of altering bacteria and viruses. Duncan et al. (2019) contend that moderate-sized agribusinesses applying computer security technology to create high-yielding and specialty crops are more vulnerable because cyber-attacks often target organizations serving large populations. Besides, most of these sectors are yet to determine the best ways of defending against a cyberbiological attack (Duncan et al., 2019). Researchers have to engage in more conversation on approaching cyberbiosecurity.

Past and Present Status of the Issue 

The field of biosecurity was developed in the 20 th century as a means of reducing the risks of science misuse. According to Murch et al. (2018) biosecurity has addressed numerous risks, which could cause harm to human beings, animals, plants and the general environment through accidental or intentional release of disease agents. In contrast, cybersecurity is a separate field established to address threats to information technology systems (Peccoud et al., 2018). Overlapping of biological and cybernetics fields in cyberbiosecurity has led to widespread attention from researchers and national security agencies. Murch et al. (2018) indicate that the interrelationship between biosecurity and cybersecurity is necessary to provide clear understanding of this issue. Traditionally, security policies have fallen within the category of biosafety and biosecurity (Peccoud et al., 2018). However, past biosecurity policies were oriented towards travel, supply chains, and terrorist activities (Peccoud et al., 2018). This limited scope of approach in biosecurity necessitates strategies capable of understanding computational and experimental workflows in biotechnology (Peccoud et al., 2018). In recent years, the biotechnology sector has shifted to computational techniques of research (Peccoud et al., 2018). For instance, researchers no longer require a physical sample of DNA because they can assemble and manipulate it using computer data.

Policies on Cyberbiosecurity 

Cyberbiosecurity is a relatively new issue that presents challenges for security policymakers (Peccoud et al., 2018). According to research conducted at Colorado State University by Jean Peccoud, security policies have not evolved as fast as the convergence of cybernetics and biotechnology (Peccoud et al., 2018). Peccoud et al. (2018) indicate that the attention directed towards current high-profile hacking incidents has to be replicated in creating awareness for cyberbiosecurity. In the past, passwords were not necessary because one office often relied on one computer (Peccoud et al., 2018). Today, people have to conduct individualized research to understand how to manage their cybersecurity (Peccoud et al., 2018). George (2019) indicates that deterrence and enforcement agencies are too decentralized to handle cyberbiosecurity. It is unclear whether the department of homeland security is capable of serving as deterrents of cyber-bio attacks (Lieberman et al., 2015). For example, the US has two separate agencies to deal with cyber and biological security individually (Lieberman, et al., 2015). Without linking these two entities, the government comes short in implementing cyberbiosecurity (Lieberman, et al., 2015). However, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention provides some laws and regulations to prohibit misuse of science for crime, warfare and terrorism (George, 2019). George (2019) contends that many countries still lack adequate legislation on preventing malevolent cyber-bio activities.

Policy Assessment 

Granted, countries that already have legislation on cyberbiosecurity are still far from perfecting their approaches (Lieberman, et al., 2015). Only one staff member has addressed issues of bio-defense since the establishment of the national Security Council (NSC) in 1947 (George, 2019). Data obtained from the blue ribbon study panel on bio-defense indicates that the bio-defense policy was formally introduced in the White House by an assistant surgeon in 1998 (George, 2019). In 2008, Obama merged the Homeland Security Council (HSC) with the NSC (Lieberman et al., 2015). He disbanded the bio-defense office and distributed its functions within the NSC (Lieberman et al., 2015). This decision was misinformed and contributed to the slow response of the United States towards cyberbiosecurity (Lieberman et al., 2015). Many countries, including the US, lack comprehensive bio-defense strategies (Richardson et al., 2019). Most well intentioned efforts from the public and private sectors have been rendered useless due to a fragmented approach (Lieberman, et al., 2015). The DHS and NSC operations are inhibited by a lack of funding leading to redundancy and deficiency in coordinating cyberbiosecurity (Schabacker et al., 2019). Further, Congress has been ineffective due to lack of an executive branch dedicated to documenting this issue.

Recommendations 

Consequentially, researchers, practitioners, and policymakers from the cybersecurity domain must cooperate in establishing a common plan of action that reflects the complexity of the cyberbiosecurity environment (Lieberman, et al., 2015). George (2019) indicates that most countries conducting biological research are responsible for most cyber incidents facing the DHS and NSC. Countries are sourcing data to feed their cyber-biological weapon programs (George, 2019). Therefore, it is recommended that countries engage in legitimate sharing of scientific data. Researchers must ensure that the digital systems they rely on for sharing information are secure to minimize data breaches (Lieberman, et al., 2015). They should determine how much data is publicly available since in the wrong hands, it could lead to catastrophic events (Lieberman, et al., 2015). Fragmented approaches by the DHS and NSC have lacked coordination and strategy (Lieberman et al., 2015). Therefore, the president should establish an agency devoted solely to cyberbiosecurity. This agency will include cyber-bio approaches in agribusiness and farm-to-table food production, processing, and distribution systems (Duncan et al., 2019). In addition, academia, NGOs, and governmental entities should collaborate to learn of developments in life sciences (Murch et al., 2018). Murch et al. (2018) contend that a unified structure could harmonize priorities and identify steps in addressing cyber-bio attacks. Congress must convene meetings to elevate this issue through the right channels and advocate for better funding on cyberbiosecurity matters.

Conclusion 

The United States government must commit to integrating its cyber and bio communities through lateral thinking. Cyberbiological attacks pose adverse effects on infrastructure sectors. As a result, they must collaborate with government agencies in identifying, assessing, and mitigating new cyber-bio threats. Globally, every country needs clear consequences for those perpetrating misuse of science through use of biological weapons. Collective reliance on the Internet and cloud platforms to store cyberbiological information makes it easier to share information through the world. However, these systems fall short in security. Caution while operating sensitive biological data on computer systems is necessary to minimize breaches and loss of information. To this end, applying the suggested recommendations ensures that governments raise awareness on cyberbiosecurity before adversaries exploit vulnerabilities in cyber-bio systems.

References

Bajema, N., DiEuliis, D., Lutes, C., & Lim, Y.-B. (2018). Digitization of Biology: Understanding the New Risks and Implications for Governance. Emergence and Convergence , 1-29. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=813127 

Duncan, S., Reinhard, R., Williams, R., Ramsey, F., Thomason, W., & Lee, K. (2019). Cyberbiosecurity: A New Perspective on Protecting U.S. Food and Agricultural System. Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology , 7(63), 1-7. https://doi.org/10.3389/fbioe.2019.00063 

George, A. (2019). The National Security Implications of Cyberbiosecurity. Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology , 7(51), 1-4. https://doi.org/10.3389/fbioe.2019.00051 

Richardson, L., Lewis, S., Pauwels, E., & Murch, R. (2019). Cyberbiosecurity: A Call for Cooperation in a New Threat Landscape. Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology , 7(99), 1-5. https://doi.org/10.3389/fbioe.2019.00099 

Lieberman, J., Ridge, T., Shalala, D., Daschle, T., Greenwood, J., & Wainstein, K. (2015). A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Major Reform Needed To Optimize Efforts. Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense , 1-100. https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/20151028ANATIONALBLUEPRINTFORBIODEFENSE.pdf 

Murch, R., So, W., Buchholz, W., Raman, S., & Peccoud, J. (2018). Cyberbiosecurity: An Emerging New Discipline to Help Safeguard the Bioeconomy. Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology , 6(39), 1-6. https://doi.org/10.3389/fbioe.2018.00039 

Peccoud, J., Gallegos, J., Murch, R., Buchholz, W., & Raman, S. (2018). Cyberbiosecurity: From Naive Trust to Risk Awareness. Trends in Biotechnology , 36(1), 4-7. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tibtech.2017.10.012 

Schabacker, D., Levy, L. A., Evans, N., Fowler, J., & Dickey, E. (2019). Assessing Cyberbiosecurity Vulnerabilities and Infrastructure Resilience. Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology , 7(61), 1-7. https://doi.org/10.3389/fbioe.2019.00061