Mind and Body problem has been shrouded in mystery for centuries, and perhaps it shall remain that way forever as there is no actual answer to this issue. From compelling and distinct views, and from simplicity, Descartes tries to prove within “The Meditations” that the mind and body are separate and different. This perception is now called Substance/Cartesian Dualism.
Argument for Descartes’ Substance Dualism
Descartes’s conception of mind included the views that a mind thinks. Descartes’s outset is a directly salient concerning whether the mind/soul is extended. Descartes begins his arguments to demonstrate that he has a body (legs, arms, eyes, etc.) by wondering what more he is aside from his mind (Pereyra, 2008). In the same way, consistent with Descartes, apart from him existing as a mind, and views explicitly that he carries out some physical undertakings via body (Mohammed, 2012). For the most part, the second argument suggests that he has bodily features, an extended substance, which is distinct from his nature as a soul/mind. The line of thought follows that if two things can exist without depending on one another, then they should be two distinct and separate things. Although it is highly likely to imagine that these two entities could live separately, then God is capable of bringing it about. Therefore, if God causes these two things to live independently, they should thereby be distinct from one another (Pereyra, 2008). Whether an individual can apply this to body and mind, it is thus likely that both are well-defined because the two exhibit qualities that distinguish them from the rest. Therefore, if the soul is different from the body, then it is likely to exist as the mind in the absence of the body. However, the question becomes, just because one could explicitly view the mind and body as unrelated, does this imply they really are? In such an instance, Descartes argues a compelling point, provided that it maintained on his terms. Third, Descartes also argues from the viewpoint of simplicity, which stems down to the concept that all things extended could be divided into components. The body is extended and is thereby divisible into different parts. Descartes, however, fails to hold the view that mind could be divided into sections, although regions are categorized separately, and relate to various cognitive functions (Pereyra, 2008). Hence, the mind/soul is indivisible, and if everything extended could be divisible into parts, then it is not possible for the mind to become an extended thing. As such, this results in the conclusion that the mind and body do not share all properties with each other; thus, they should be separable and distinct.
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Objections to Substance Dualism
One of the most typically heard objection associated with Descartes’s dualism in the interaction problem. Dualism suggests that the mind and body are two separate entities yet they somehow causally influence each other (Mohammed, 2012). Therefore, it becomes hard to comprehend how an immaterial thing like the mind could in any way wield enough influence in the physical world. Likewise, it appears equally strange that any material body can exert any type of causal power over an immaterial substance like the mind. Dualism is debatably the default position of the mind/body problem.
A second common argument made by anti-dualists is that dualisms is “brute” to some degree. In theory, dualism is deemed as an infraction on a premise that Gibb (2015) calls Casual Closure Principe. This principle most commonly claims as a familiar or unquestionable view of modern science, adequate by itself to dismiss dualism (Gibb, 2015). Nonetheless, this principle is indefinite and hard to interpret in a manner that is both actual and practically essential. By contrast, it is at times viewed as a procedural belief that bid individuals pursue physical causes for physical activities.
Another objection to Descartes dualism is that both the existence and the quality of the consciousness seems to be based on the brain in grave and significant ways that appear to be in sharp contrast to what people expect to be the case if consciousness was simply non-physical matter. Importantly, this implies that consciousness, by definition, should be entirely reliant on the brain and so strongly incidental on its function (Mohammed, 2012). Different from the body, this activity thought of as inherent to the mind itself dwindles to an infinite point. The soul is, therefore, inherently conscious but cannot spur a conscious experience aside from the body. As such, consciousness hence relies on both the body and mind for its existence. Put another way, the soul without the body is inconceivable. The overall point is that individuals can make mistakes over what they view as conceivable.
None of the raised objections to Descartes’ dualism considered in this study seems to be insurmountable. Importantly, the indifferent view taken towards dualism by many enlightenment thinkers and scholars appears hugely without a warrant, particularly given that the standard conformity in support of materialism seems to be waning. In the same way, the many options to dualism do not appear to lean towards genuine theoretic impulse. Because dualism is the automatic position in the philosophy of mind, the absence of a strong concept denies us the chance to honestly confess that there is the mind on top of the body, existing purely in their own rights.
References
Gibb, S. (2015). The Causal Closure Principle. The Philosophical Quarterly , 65(261), 626–647.
Mohammed, A.A. (2012). A Critique of Descartes’ Mind-Body Dualism . Kritike, 6(1), 95-112. Retrieved from http://www.kritike.org/journal/issue_11/mohammed_june2012.pdf
Pereyra, G.R. (2008). Descartes's Substance Dualism and His Independence Conception of Substance. Journal of the History of Philosophy , 46(1).
