Differences in State and Federal Bureaucracies

Table of Contents 

Abstract 3 

Introduction 4 

The Significance of the Study 5 

Researcher’s Problem Statement 5 

Purpose of the study 5 

Literature Review 6 

Dimensions of Bureaucracy 6 

Theoretical Perspective 7 

State Governments and Policy Execution 8 

Delegation and Perceived Discretion 9 

Effective Public Management 12 

Findings 14 

Recommendations 18 

Conclusion 20 

Abstract 

Federal and state bureaucracies should return to their venerable noble and capable institutionalism reputation that showcases effective public governance. Politics and legislation keep on shifting at various times, but bureaucracy and public administrative potential guarantee persistence, sustainability, reliability, and institutional steadiness. State bureaucracies majorly concentrate on their interests when they are also intended to advance the federal mandate. The purpose of this study is to investigate the differences that present themselves in state and federal bureaucracies and as concerns administration and governance . 

Differences in State and Federal Bureaucracies 

Introduction 

Bureaucracy remains in operation since nothing changes its structural framework, and it provides steady, enduring, and reliable institutional structures for governance and administration. Such structures work for both the public and private entities, including the nongovernmental institutions both locally and as the national government. Fundamentally, every government or a recognized company has been bureaucratically positioned in a way, at least regarding critical mandates. Moreover, we should also understand that the dynamism steered by globalization requires speedy structural and process changes to counter new and shifting challenges in the country (Ouziel, 2020; Hatcher, 2020). Bureaucracy also requires adjusting and reacting to the shifting dynamics of the globe. With competent leadership, it can and should do this (Kondratenko et al., 2020). Agencies or state representatives with local and state government influences their power to participate in vertical transfer and implement equitable programs or otherwise that favor or challenge effective administration and governance by the federal government. 

Bureaucracy can and ought to return to its age-old standing of a noble and capable institution of robust public governance. Even though bureaucracy can also be misused as a tool of suppression, micromanaging, and perpetuating evil practices, as it is evident in history, political governance utilizes bureaucracy both for good or bad (Kondratenko et al., 2020). Politics and legislators vary at different times, but bureaucracy and public administrative potential keep on offering persistence, sustainability, reliability, and institutional steadiness. 

The Significance of the Study 

The study is instrumental as it will help us understand the gaps between federal and state-level bureaucracies as concerns governance of resources and administration of programs. Theoretically speaking, public bureaucracy is a fundamental tool of deliberate political action. However, in reality, public bureaucracy, either at the federal or state government level, relies to a bigger extent on the incentives of bureaucratic agents (Hooton, 2019). The blend of bureaucratic structures and specific inspirations spur dedication to interested groups that consider distributive costs (Thomas & Wayner, 2017). The researcher will establish the relationship between the bureaucratic agents in executing delegated programs and how this compares to the incentives and the influence of other interested groups. 

Researcher’s Problem Statement 

Altering a bureaucracy with a spoils framework into a merit-founded one, whereas needful, is influenced by many uncertainties or various impacts. The patronage framework linked the lifestyles of civil service employees to their commitment to the party. Separating these links, as has been witnessed in the US over the past century, has altered how bureaucracies are coordinated. Void of the patronage system and clear frameworks that restrict misuse, bureaucracies concentrate on their interests (Kondratenko et al., 2020). These interests, scholars have established, are intended to suit and advance the bureaucracies themselves. Therefore, there has been a challenge of harmonizing both the state and federal interests so that systems are concentrated to benefit the state and the nation at large. 

Purpose of the study 

The purpose of this study is to investigate the differences that present themselves in state and federal bureaucracies and as concerns administration and governance. 

Literature Review 

The initial step in formulating public policy in the United States (US) is constituting legislation. It is via the execution of policy that legislation becomes significant to the state and the nation at large. Many executions of policies in the US occur in an intergovernmental framework. Since the federal government entrusts the state elected establishments as well as street-level administrations with authority, the execution framework offers a chance for state governments to demonstrate their power over public policy through strategic planning and implementation (Ouziel, 2020). As a matter of fact, the model of intergovernmental agendas and activities gives the states the leeway to change policy (as it suits them) to promote advantages for the state governments. It is key to examine how the framework and model of execution of the state and federal bureaucracies impact their influence. 

Dimensions of Bureaucracy 

Public bureaucracies are characterized by lots of daily procedures that guarantee successful services. The procedures and routines that the public bureaucracies carry out are the outcomes of political arrangements among many political players. Even though it executes critical actions, bureaucracy has inherent scenarios of suspicion and uncertainties from political actors and the public at large. The administration is about the practices people adopt to rationally organize their endeavors and inputs to attain shared goals (Kondratenko et al., 2020) . On the other hand, bureaucracy is about an organization's offices, activities, and ideologies in the most formal and perpetual administration. Bureaucracy in institutions improves efficiency by offering a procedural division of tasks, distributing jobs and resources, and supporting the gaining of competence (Ziganto, 2020). Bureaucracy also embodies relevant human attainment, in which public goals can be attained through the division of labor and linking them to a particular expert so that there is a specialization of skills, routine processes, and offering required incentive frameworks and oversight structures. Bureaucracies are appreciated since Congress has ascertained the place of delegation. It is normal for legislatures to demonstrate their desire towards a specific act and ensure the attainment and supervision of the bureaucracy. 

Theoretical Perspective 

Principal-agent theory indicates that the federal framework or bureaucracy in itself can be recognized as a grading system that has many layers of principal-agent association. On one level, federal voted governments represent the principals, while federal agencies are the agents. The next level involves the federal agencies representing the principals and state institutions elected as the agents (Thomas & Wayner, 2017). Several scholars basing their work on the principal-agent model concentrates on correcting the first level and slightly the second (Sohin, 2017; Thomas & Wayner, 2017). The third level involves state elected governments and street-level institutions as the responsibilities of administration are delegated to the state. 

Hooton (2019) endeavors to ascertain the efficiency of a principal-agent system in understanding outputs from an agency that must comply with the system of bureaucratic independence. He determines that the principal-agent framework has failed to incorporate the link between state elected entities and street-level administrations but adopted the bottom-up model to policy execution that emphasizes the significance of state institutions in the execution process (Thomas & Wayner, 2017). Based on the bottom-up model to execution, public policy is enacted during the execution process as uncertain divergences are figured out in administrative bureaus (Kondratenko et al., 2020). As most public policy is executed at the levels of the state and locally, the execution process of the policy presents a gap for including their welfares into the process. The federal government mandates and empowers the state governments in both the functions of legislation and administration. Governments at the street-level act as agents coherently with the elected institutions at a national level (including the Congress and the president), federal bureaus, and elected entities at the state level (including governors as well as state legislatures). 

Many theoretical foundations indicate that views bureaucratic agents have regarding their policymaking responsibility have a significant role in determining that policy's application. For example, Fiorina (2021) alludes to the fact that the level to which a bureaucratic representative conceives his or her control of the environment influences the input levels and, significantly, the application of the policy. The confidence of having greater autonomy and responsibility to decide on policy matters offer non-monetary motivations for policy-driven bureaucrats. They would rather select the public service instead of what appears as rewarding careers in other institutions that are not part of the government or to involve in "transverse" jobs that allow them to meddle with the government easily (Hatcher, 2020). The actual percentage of discretion is straightly linked to the policy disagreement that is part of the delegation of powers in several theories. Bureaucrats recognize changes in discretion that have been influenced politically. Whereas formal discretion designated by the law is acknowledged, the significant association between the players' perspectives and those forces that influence them has not been investigated much. 

State Governments and Policy Execution 

In a way, states and local administrative levels resemble what happens in the federal government in terms of constitution and running their legislative and executive arm branch bureaus. In most instances, the states have many cabinet-level units and also possess a member of regulatory institutions, including federal organizations and other bureaus (Kondratenko et al., 2020) . As much as the national government assigns the states the legislative and administrative roles within their constituency, the national government also delegates state public bureaus to spearhead national programs (Ouziel, 2020). Consequently, more power is vested or devolved to the state elected representatives, who have the power to determine programs that are not meant for the overall good of the nation. 

Political players that have been elected to serve in various institutions are keen on how national policy is executed in their states. Souza (2017) explains that such a policy will not just influence the people but also business organizations and other groups keen on policy structures. Political representatives can attribute the advantages the government is offering to its people as their efforts, which boosts their electoral reputation (Ouziel, 2020). The citizens will be able to vote and appreciate the bid of such politicians because they are seen to be aggressive about policy execution that benefits the society (Thomas & Wayner, 2017). The priorities of the elected representatives are entrenched in the legitimate code of federalism. Federalism implores that the policymaking course should embody state and local priorities and demands. 

Delegation and Perceived Discretion 

Since bureaucracies and bureaucrats are more agents, it has been challenging to implement the states' national agenda. As the divergence of policy interests between the federal government (represented by the agents) and an administrative bureaucracy lessens in the canonical delegation structure, the agents receive more responsibilities. Hooton (2019) generalizes the idea by recognizing the effect of policy divergence on legislative prudence. According to Hatcher (2020), i f the bureau's interests deviate from those of congresspersons, then the instant advantages of stipulating details in legislation should be greater than if they met these interests. Many political representations have inadequate joint control over bureaucracies than does a sole-principal (Thomas & Wayner, 2017) . Considering a framework that encourages many political principles makes it challenging to consider some situations for Congress to overturn the plans of action instituted by the state agencies based on the executive rejections. 

When the bureaus and presidential interests match, he disputes, we need to be keener on discretion. Kondratenko et al. (2020) further determine that when the bureaus have more autonomy from the federal government, the closeness between the legislative arm of the government and the executive always reduces discretion. This type of debate has been examined with separated instead of unified government as a substitution for conceptual conflict. As the disagreement on policies widens between Congress and the executive, apparent discretion also reduces (Thomas & Wayner, 2017) . Whereas there is a window for the president to choose a conceptual duplicate to a cabinet secretary position, it is contrary to a sovereign agency. Many grounds inform on the significance of a divergent and opinionated agent in a cabinet unit. Also, within the cabinet bureaus, policy disagreements can occur between the executive and Congress. Perfectly, Weinstein-Tell (2018) insists that the president could opt for a cabinet secretary that has common policy disagreements with Congress, whereby he also favors him with a docket that has more budgetary allocation and policymaking independence. 

Bureaucrats possess their objectives and inspirations either at the state or national levels. Souza (2017) suggested that bureaucrats are "budget maximizers" that are stimulated by a blend of wages, prestige, class, and the impression in their agency's objective. Bureaus and such departments are representatives, and the regulation of the bureaucracy is a good model of the principal-agent issue as selected players in the legislative arm of government and the White House endeavor to oversee bureaucratic activities. Bureaucracies are subordinated by the before-the-act control systems, such as the practice of appointment and procedural rules. Bureaucratic systems are also bound by after-the-fact control models such as the availing or not availing incentives for achievement or otherwise poor performance of certain activities (Kondratenko et al., 2020). The agents must adopt such mechanisms to limit the chance of bureaucratic drift. The bureaucratic agents are likely to make policies that favor them and are far from the original goal of the authoritative political players. 

An instance that would be instrumental in understanding the difference between state and federal bureaucracy is the supplementary security income (SSI). SSI is a program that is intended to help the needed persons with disabilities. To participate in the SSI program, prospective clients have to undergo an evaluation that will confirm their inability to engage in various jobs presented, considering their age, education, and competence (Ouziel, 2020). Since SSI is a national program, the federal government lays the medical and income qualification standards. Even though the national government offers funds to ensure every eligible participant receives even the minimum benefit, the state representatives or even at a local level have the liberty to concentrate the resources to their people sparingly (Thomas & Wayner, 2017). Medicaid also has a similar eligibility standard where health insurance is availed to the less fortunate in society. As far as Medicaid is concerned, the national and state governments equitable share the responsibility of providing this aid. 

In spite of the significant role of the national government in ensuring standards and rules and giving funds for programs such as Medicaid and SSI, state governments also have their share of achievement. State governments have been instrumental in the past as concerns institutionalizing a framework for state impact, as the principal-agent model would always recommend. For instance, Kondratenko et al. (2020) investigated how state bureaucracies strategically utilize their administrative authority. It was determined that street-level (but not state) bureaucracies employ policy in a manner that assigns benefits to state governments. 

Effective Public Management 

There is a steady theme that advocates for a contemporary lens of public management that would amount to the effectiveness of an institution. The performance criteria of effectiveness enable recognizing the Holy Grail of effectively linking bureaucracy with democracy in a general sense and as a concern to public relations (Torres, 2021). The aspects of effective public management have to do with many disagreeing ideologies of the news media, the staff, and the code of standards examined in an institution (Kondratenko et al., 2020). Describing effectiveness, the representative of the bureaucracy depicts who observes. The head of the state-elected institution may want a representative that promotes their short-term interests like good publicity and countering negative reportage. 

The elected representative has professional values and principles, resulting from the idea of a responsible public administration that promotes the greater good of the citizens, the public interests, and the democratic appeal. Nonetheless, the professional guidelines and regulations may sometimes challenge the pulls from the political godfathers or individual interests from other electorates (Thomas & Wayner, 2017) . Even though state governments are known for various interests that rely on the specific policy requirement of the state, generally, state-elected institutions focus on reducing taxation and at the same time extending or sustaining services. Through federalism, state institutions can limit the benefit-tax proportions since states may involve in vertical transfer. 

State representatives can reduce their benefit-tax proportions by committing the tax burdens to the federal government and not themselves. Empirical studies reveal that state electorates involve in vertical transferring in their legislation endeavors. It just implies that the state electorates will not behave otherwise with their administrative authority. It only shows how state elected representatives will likely motivate street-level actors to also involve in the vertical transfer of the cost burdens to the national government (Thomas & Wayner, 2017) . All the states can be motivated to transfer costs to the national government by altering the eligibility of the social welfare activities. Nonetheless, manipulation of bureaucratic institutions attracts some costs. States have to commit their scarce resources to make the local bureaucracies react to state needs. The possibility of a state utilizing its resources to involve in vertical transfer relies on the push from state governments to increase benefit-tax percentages. 

As far as Congress is concerned, they have the mandate to manage the public effectively. They need to encourage only accountable bureaucracy through supervision and delegation, offering and suppressing incentives. Congress utilizes the views and reactions of the public to assess their bureaucratic efforts (Hooton, 2019). In some situations, Congress can regulate the bureaucracy by amending legislation and overturning frauds to offer an operative direction to those with the mandate of implementing policies. In this case, it could be the state and local level of government. Congress is more aggressive to involve in "fire-alarm" supervision. The congress members wait for activities or interested parties to indicate their grievances or dissatisfaction with the bureaucratic behaviors of the legislation (Thomas & Wayner, 2017) . Congress would rather embrace the "police patrol" model of supervision where they organize themselves in committees that would methodically assess bureaucracies within their space or various states. 

Even though the national government endeavors to regulate the behavior of many institutions, even locally, by forming binding rules and regulations, it is challenging because those who implement them are from the state. The obvious reason is that if implementors are not on the federal government's side, they will more likely push the interests of the states to which they belong. Therefore, the state control of some institutions is limiting. According to a state officer, for instance, she said, "I will be possibly be sacked if I adhered strictly to the implementation of the guidelines that are supposed to direct the organization (Thomas & Wayner, 2017) ." Such an indication that state officers or employees do not have to comply with the regional or federal agents' mandates but remain loyal to their jurisdictions. 

In conclusion, state bureaucrats have aggressively secured their independence over the administration of programs, even when delegated by the federal government. The only solution to this would be to adopt an earlier recommendation by the US Health and Human Services. They indicated that the federal government should initiate a contract with the state governments that gives them the more supervisory authority of the programs and activities within the states. 

Findings 

In several policy jurisdictions, the national government gives the state institutions the responsibility of executing national programs. Even though this promptly empowers the state bureaus and state elected representatives. Institutions voted by citizens have several tools that permit them to model how street-level agents demonstrate their responsibility. Politicians propose the state bureau's administrative framework, regulate political, bureaucratic selections, impact hiring processes, and allocate capital resources for state bureaus (Torres, 2021). Being that the mechanisms have worked in regulating the bureaucracy at the national level, it is a possibility that they can also be successfully implemented at the state level. Several implementation investigations appreciate the place of the state-level institutions. Studies have shown that states utilize the legislative mandate in the execution process to support their interests. 

Sohoni (2017) determined that state institutions are motivated to defer policy execution and only work at it since the state can look for more promising winning contracts to be implemented at the national level. Ouziel (2020) reiterates that the federal institutions must embrace monitoring tools to prevent the states from utilizing federal grant funds to advance their interests and not the federal ones. Sohoni (2017) also discovered that state representatives utilize their authority to impact federal activities creatively that are advantageous to the states. Even though these surveys appreciate the place of the state government in implementing policies, they are not particularly worried about how states are positively impacted by their administrative powers, unlike the legislative one. It should be likely that states will enjoy the value of the administrative powers since politicians at the state level represent the political principals of the state governments. Empirical studies offer some proof concerning this assertion (Ouziel, 2020). The prejudice of state politicians and administrators impacts how street-level institutions execute a number of federal procedures. The connection between the prejudice of the state politicians and the conduct of agents indicates that federalism offers occasions for the bureaucracy to act as an agent of the local-level jurisdiction. 

The rising occurrences of partisanship and ideological disagreements have been evidenced not just in roll-call voting but also in other avenues. The Congress seats have been hot in the parliament as some express their displeasures aggressively in committee sessions. Allegations of lies, irrational decisions, bad faith, and missing out on the agenda that a party had promised the citizens had been back and forth. The most heated disagreement was witnessed in 1995/ 1996 when a budgetary conflict between the executive (Clinton's administration) and Congress (Kondratenko et al., 2020). The outcome of this opposition by the congressional Republicans was many inequitable government closures. Republican and democratic state electorates have turned out to be highly varied from one another in terms of public policy queries. The political advocates in either Republican or Democrats have somewhat varied policy ideologies than their colleagues in the other party. They enforce such political ideologies through state representatives whom they are related with in terms of political standing. 

In the same breath, the social class foundations of the Democrats and Republicans have turned out to be more idiosyncratic in past years, with poorer citizens supporting a more Democratic course and the affluent in the society rendering their support on the Republican. Whereas the party core regions seem to compete to a certain level, they are more separated in terms of social class than in the past years. It is common to notice a blend of class disparities and varied policy ideologies that causes conflicting perspectives on budgetary interests (Thomas & Wayner, 2017). Moreover, the rising number of interested institutions that are actively involved in federal politics has implied growing challenges on members to fulfill or seem to support group stands that in some way challenge Republicans and Democrats in various directions. Restructurings that have supported the aspect of committee engagements to the press as well as involving the public have created more chances for groups and citizens to push their interests on members and have raised incentives for members to conform to those opposing groups (Torres, 2021). The wearing away of congressional norms and values that formerly motivated specialization, respect, and self-dependence has spurred the pressure levels. Sluggish and inconsistent revenue growth and the heightening cost of entitlement agendas have impeded the accommodation of conflicting interests. 

The same changes have been witnessed at the state level. State elected institutions have become more polarized in several states, and the level of interest group programs has heightened substantially. Legislative practices that formerly motivated courtesy and self-dependence have corroded. Also, the cost of some programs has been so expensive, specifically Medicaid, which made getting extra funds for new activities or extending old programs more challenging (Kondratenko et al., 2020). The state government has also been recognized to fund local government programs, and unfortunately, several local budget disagreements permeate the state capitals in the long run. State budgetary conflicts extend to the budgeting at the local level of the government, which is not supposed to happen. Such changes frequently create an increased level of prejudice and ideological disagreement in the budgetary decisions passed at the state level. The representatives of some political ideologies reinforce their ideas through the current budget reforms witnessed at the state level (Thomas & Wayner, 2017). The budget reforms have intensely emphasized programmatic objectives and achievements since the 1950s, thus pushing decisions and policymakers to concentrate their efforts on values and things that benefit the state. 

There is a gap between the finding on the study of the biasness and bureaucratic outcomes that indicate that state elected entities impact the bureaucracies within those domains. It does not disclose if elected state representatives can utilize their administrative authority to enforce their institutional priorities in the process of implementing policies. Some studies suggest that some kind of democratic power occurs at the execution level (Kondratenko et al., 2020). Nonetheless, the connection between bureaucratic outcomes and biasness could be because of the concurrent influence of interest groups of elected representatives and street-level players. In the same breath, street-level plays can have the same political impression of elected representatives since they are found in a similar political surrounding. 

Other studies indicate that the state-level jurisdiction will not profit from its delegated administrative powers. The authority vested on state elected entities is not far-reaching on those state bureaucracies. The street-level bureaucrats are just representatives that are subject to principals in the state-voted institutions. However, they are sometimes manipulated by principles in the national government. Moreover, bureaucracies take pride in some inherent authorities from agency competency, unreliable information linked to the federal government, robust standard operating procedures (SOPs), clientele alliances, and proper governance (Thomas & Wayner, 2017). It was determined in this research that state-governed outputs at streel-level space showcase the requirements of the state. Consequently, it can be recognized that state elected institutions can utilize their administrative mandate to include their interests in the policy implementation process. 

Recommendations 

The development of the US national government's bureaucracy in the past years is key in understanding the strategies that can work to ensure the gap between the federal and state governments. The scope of the federal executive and the legislature should be well defined so that there is not a conflict of interests at the expense of the bureaucrats, particularly at the state level. Presently, the federal service has approximately 2,800,000 civilians and 1,400,000 military workforces. In spite of the worry of bureaucracy, the national government has sparingly expanded in the past three decades. Generally, the US government is not far from its size four decades ago, depicting a small growth. Also, the cost of government has not risen as the economy of the nation does. Several American citizens still believe that the government has many irrelevant positions that need to be condensed. Some of the ways that can be adopted to limit bureaucracy are the closure of programs, privatization, and devolving government resources and mandates. Eliminating some government programs and institutions that oversee them can come in handy in reducing bureaucracy. Terminating activities and programs is challenging since the public is fond of the services they receive from the government by these agencies. Citizens may feel that there are no irrelevant programs to be minimized. Another thing that can work is the deregulation of programs to do away with regulatory limitations on individual behavior and the operation of agencies. 

Bureaucracy in the state and the federal government can also be appropriated through devolution. Devolution ensures that every level of government at the national, state, or local level has a clear mandate and jurisdiction to operate. The federal government has clear obligations guided by the constitution to concentrate on certain aspects of programs that are unique to them and can only be complemented at the state level and vice versa. Devolution would mean the government is downsizing its federal bureaucracies and assigning policy execution to the states and local communities. Another aspect includes the government encouraging privatization to transfer programs from the public sector to the private sector. Such a model had worked for many countries as sometimes the private institutions had proved to be more effective than when the government was handling the same activities. Privatization will cut down on the number of federal workforces so that the state government can operate with much more autonomy than before. The federal government will still incur costs and employ its power as it were, even if it opts for privatization. 

The president is the “chief executive,” which implies that he can influence and give direction to bureaucratic institutions at the state and local levels. The president should be careful that his presidency is not managerial by extending the influence of the executive so that the states do not have the autonomy to prioritize their interests as well. There are policy challenges that amount from the mixed communications from the elected arms of government at the national level and bureaucracy’s double obligation to be loyal to both the Congress and the president. As an alternative, the president can work with Congress or the legislative arm of the government to harmonize their interests so that the states can adopt for the greater good of the entire country. An executive presidency would make bureaucracy more manipulative and consequently place the state representatives in an awkward position to choose the president's mandate or that of Congress. 

On the other hand, the independent action of the president (representing the executive and the congress results in mixed messages that would have a positive implication on the state representatives. In one way, the mixed messages allow the bureaucrats to have diverse options before making determinations and implementing policy. By narrowing the direction from just one arm of the government, the bureaucrats would not be limited to only passing agendas are sometimes are not favoring their states. Another thing to note is that state elected representatives have a higher chance of responding to the demands of the Congress and Senate authorizing and appropriating committees that supervise them and other institutions. With the appropriate direction from the legislature, the bureaucrats can adhere to policies very aggressively, as seen in the "distributive tendency." 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, state bureaucracies' manipulations are done either by possessing the authority to make legislations that have elements of positive federal implementation or by regulating the implementation of federal programs. Even though many empirical studies investigate how state governments can exercise their legislative authority, not many studies have been done on whether state bureaucracies utilize their administrative authority to influence intergovernmental activities for their advantage. Bureaucracy is the administrative core of any successful government. The lawmakers and other decision-makers are understood, and implementation by executive bureaus and units becomes easier. Bureaucratic structures are utilized to perform critical public responsibilities daily and, particularly during emergencies affecting the whole nation. Despite these scenarios and responsibilities, bureaucracy is normally not appreciated so much in American government and frequently challenges as "big government" run berserk. 

References 

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