Iran and six world superpower nations signed a nuclear deal in 2015, which was one of the achievements of Barack Obama’s presidency. The six-superpower nations that signed the deal included the United States, the UK, China, France, Germany, and Russia. The structure of the contract canceled the crippling of economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for the restrictions to the nation’s contentious nuclear energy programs. In 1995, Israel’s intelligence services determined that Iran had demonstrated many efforts to establish a military nuclear industry (Ismail, 2015; Kerr, 2016). There is the fear that Iran or other regions may divert nuclear material from serving peaceful reasons and instead of being utilized as nuclear weapons. It is the reason why the National Council of Resistance on Iran (NCRI) was formed so that they can help in detecting hidden nuclear programs and material. Thus, there is the possibility that Iran is covering its practice of building nuclear material and implementing nuclear programs.
It has been a challenge for IAEA to inspect and oversee nuclear facilities, at the same time retrieve information that is helpful in investigations. In addition, the obligation to establish comprehensive safeguards deal is restricted to facilities that the government has marked. Extra procedures and practices to IAEA safeguards treaties heighten the agency’s potential to uncover hidden nuclear facilities and programs. The problem is that the agency’s obligation to scrutinize other facilities and request for extra information is cut off and it is a challenge to discover the intentions and actual activities that Iran is involved in (Rafique & Erum, 2016) . There is a threat that Iran is not being compliant with safeguards terms to the agency and the counterparts to the nuclear deal. IAEA has shown concern that Iran has not been faithful to provide the agency with all the required information concerning their nuclear programs. In fact, Iran has been demonstrating a high level of intelligence so that their negligence and contravention of its terms of the safeguards is irretraceable.
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Background
The IAEA deal was passed in President Barack Obama’s tenure because Iran has been a threat in terms of employing their nuclear weapon. Presently, Donald Trump opposed this deal and he swore not to recertify it ever in his place as the president. Trump determined that the agreement was too soft and Iran compromised the terms of the deal. Many deliberations have been done if the United States should continue to be part of the Iran nuclear deal or opt out (Rafique & Erum, 2016) . They also debate that pulling apart from the deal could even motivate Iran to create a bomb and even unveil a terrible war against innocent nations. Whereas on the other hand, critics maintain that the Iran nuclear agreement will not have an effect on Iran’s intentions and commitment of creating nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, these opponents claim that Iran has even faulted some of the terms of this deal and the United States and the counterparts should come up with stricter sanctions to impede the intentions of Iran to build nuclear programs (Albright, Stricker, & Kelleher-Vergantini, 2015) . They even feel that the United States should insist to threaten Iran using their military force, and engage the input of rebels in Iran to collapse the cruel regimes. The dilemma is whether the United States should remain in the deal or exit, and what the consequences would be. The current disputes concerning Iran’s nuclear program started in August 2002, when the National Council of Resistance on Iran (NCRI), an Iranian colonial unit made serious revelations in a press conference (Ismail, 2015). Some of these fundamental kinds of information have overtime been determined to be true that Iran had created nuclear-associated facilities at Arak and Natanz, without the knowledge of the IAEA. It is this fact that triggered the commotion by the United States who knew about a number of these activities and program that Iran was implementing.
Assumptions
The issues and motives that surround Iran’s nuclear programs are rather complicated and it is challenging, if not impossible, to establish their motives. Iran’s nuclear program could be motivated by their desire to expand energy sources and bring down the level of foreign dependence, as they will have increased revenues through fossil fuel. It may not be wholly accurate to insist that Iran is only motivated to build nuclear weapons so that they can be the dominant power in the region (Gen & Nagel, 2018) . Even with the notion of investing in nuclear power, Iran could be doing that probably because they want to defend their boundaries from any potential attacks by hostile regions within or outside their zone. Two things can be assumed generally:
The situation of Iran’s intention to make nuclear weapons has become irredeemable and there should be immediate efforts to thwart them globally.
Iran’s persistence to produce nuclear weapons has a corresponding negative influence and threats on both the Middle East region and the entire world.
Objectives
To establish the extent in which Iran has been noncompliant with the guidelines signed in the treaty that included six regions.
To lower the suspicions created by the United States and other Middle East countries on Iran.
To determine how to address the tensions brought about by demonizing the Islamic religion in Iran.
Option 1: Strengthening Compliance Mechanisms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of the Iran nuclear deal is working, and the United States should not consider withdrawing from the agreement. Iran has adhered to the deal’s limits laid on it, such as the demand for Iran to destroy or disassemble thousands of centrifuges. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has consistently maintained that Iran has not compromised the terms of the deal ( Rafique & Erum, 2016) . The implementation of this sanction makes it very difficult for Iran to have the capacity of building a bomb, in fact, it moves further away from such a project. Even if Iran chooses to compromise the terms of the deal and attempt to create a bomb, it would have prolonged its escape time and all that efforts would be frustrated accordingly (Kerr, 2016). Previously, Iran had a projected timeline of three months to build nuclear weapons. Today, the sanctions have made it challenging so that the timeline for manifesting nuclear weapons is now more than a year. If this were to be allowed, the global community would find it easy to determine and frustrate their attempts of going that direction.
Pros
The centrifuge dismantlement started immediately the nuclear deal between Iran and the six superpowers was officially implemented on October 18, 2015 (Gen & Nagel, 2018). IAEA had determined that Iran had dissembled 160 second-generation IR-2M centrifuges from Natanz and 258 first-generation equipment at the Fordow enrichment-manufacturing factory (Gen & Nagel, 2018) . Tehran is expected to bring down the aggregate number of installed centrifuges from above 19000 to 6104 first-generation centrifuges (Albright, Stricker, & Kelleher-Vergantini, 2015) . 5060 of these will supplement uranium to reactor-grade stages at Natanz. The 1044 equipment will be left at Fordow, which will be changed to an isotope research zone (Kerr, 2016). Therefore, this deal has been very critical in making the dissembled equipment to be monitored and protected at Natanz with IAEA. It is advantageous for IAEA as it can institute plans and programs that would help them monitor and verify the commitments that the regions that had signed the nuclear deal are showing. They are able to administer consistent monitoring of Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing regions and frustrate uranium extractions and mills.
If the United States continues with the withdrawal plans from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, that is, they could motivate Iran to desire more intensely to build nuclear weapons that are more extensive. The United States should remain in the Iran nuclear deal because if it withdraws and begin to issue public threats about considering preventive military opportunities, the cumulative impact would be to motivate Iran to resuscitate its nuclear weapons programs. This would be so because Iran may be feeling very vulnerable and see the call to shield themselves at whatever costs from any potential attack (Gen & Nagel, 2018) . Therefore, the United States should stay in the deal so that Iran is not pushed toward building a nuclear weapon, which was the first intention for which the deal was made.
Cons
This joint comprehensive plan of action deal is the best alternative to prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons. The deal was proven effective over the years and will be in effect, provided the president recertifies it again. Of course, the disadvantage is what Trump’s shares that it may be difficult for the government and IAEA to determine clearly whether Iran is complying with the expectations of the deal or otherwise (Rezaei, 2017). The deal has not just helped in the prevention of Iran from creating nuclear weapons, but also it enhances the relationship as well as coordination with the United States and the entire globe (Ismail, 2015). The intention of the United States to shake off from the deal could be detrimental and may lead to situations such as stimulating a dreadful regional war that has never been experienced before. Breaking out from the Joint Comprehensive Plan would initiate something for the United States that could have been prevented in the first place. Thus, the threat is that if the US opts out of the deal, the other five regions will be destabilized to deal with the outburst of Iran’s nuclear programs.
Option 2: Resolving the United States-Iran Conflict of Suspicion
The second option is that IAEA can promote cooperation of the United States and other regions with Iran. As indicated earlier, IAEA began investigating Iran’s nuclear program in 2002 (Gen & Nagel, 2018) . Iran and the IAEA had settled on a framework that would explain the unresolved questions concerning Tehran’s nuclear program in August 2007. IAEA’s ability to establish cooperation will Iran will limit the suspicions that they have about them of pursuing a nuclear weapons program. In fact, the suspicions extended to the question of whether there was a potential military scope to Iran’s nuclear programme. Thus, Iran and the IAEA should call for a number of meetings to clear up these discussions on the issues.
Pros
One advantage of showing cooperation and not suspecting Iran is to prevent them from being motivated to build nuclear programs as a way of matching the levels of Middle Eastern countries. The United States should not show in a way that they are supporting or not opposing any of the Middle East countries and ignoring Iran. There would be no need for Iran to seek to develop advanced weapons for defense if they determined that they are not being opposed (Albright, Stricker, & Kelleher-Vergantini, 2015) . Iran should not get the perception that it is in the midst of a progressively hostile world. In fact, there would not be any need for Iran to source for underground assistance from several sources such as the A.Q. Khan network.
Good cooperation and atmosphere between Iran and IAEA could easily support a sequence of talks concerning these threatening issues of noncompliance. In fact, the provisions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) should be detailed and more stringent, since presently, it could take several days (24) for the IAEA to inspect a suspect site. 24 days is enough time to conceal the secrets before they are uncovered (Rezaei, 2017). The JCPOA indicates that if the IAEA is questioning the undeclared activities, it needs to trigger the matter with Iran. If the response of Iran is not satisfactory, it should introduce the matter to Iran. If the response of Iran were still doubted, the IAEA would demand to enter the facility, activating the 24-day timeline (Albright, Stricker, & Kelleher-Vergantini, 2015) . However, one disadvantage is that JCPOA fails to specify the time Tehran would have to respond to the initial IAEA concerns – even though such an action would give a hint to those intending to conceal forbidden activities. There should a 24- hour access to a suspect site under special inspections (Wirl & Yegorov, 2016) . The current process is quite long, and the terms of the deal should be revised to be incorporated anywhere and anytime so that the scrutiny of suspected sites such as Iran could be done appropriately.
Cons
The position of Iran in the Middle East as well as in the global fraternity is a fundamental factor that influences its intentions in the nuclear program. It sees itself as being segregated within the Middle East, majorly because of the centuries’ old Sunni-Shi’a separation in Islam war that substantially led to the uncertainty of the region. As the only chief Shi’a state in the zone, the Iranians sense a great level of anxiety about their security. Moreover, Israel’s formally unclear position concerning its nuclear program frustrates the ambitions of Iran to dominate. Iran also feels that the United States is its greatest threat however much a deal of IAEA was signed (Ismail, 2015). The Iranian have a perception that the US is demonstrating unconditional support to Israel, as well as US position as a terror state, and the insincerity noted in its nuclear policies are the major aspects hindering improved relations. The disadvantage of these factors is such that Iran’s feeling of insecurity has reached the maximum height so that they feel that they must build a nuclear program to attain the regional power and secure its place in the global arena.
Option 3: Addressing the Tension brought About by Demonizing the Islamic Religion in Iran
Religion is another aspect that heightens the tension between Iran and other countries. Religion complicates the complicated connection between suspicion and Iran’s motivation to defend themselves. This is even worse considering the conflicting religious perspective that has filled the Middle East region for several years (Wirl & Yegorov, 2016) . Iran views itself as a non-Arab Shi’a state that is surrounded by Sunni nations. Consequently, it has apparently developed the opinion that their neighbors and other regions could attack them and they are increasingly vulnerable (Gen & Nagel, 2018) . Therefore, the option here is to have a religious balance and make it accommodative even for the Iranians. Discrimination should not be encouraged in the Middle East region simply because other people are not from the Islamic religion.
Iran is also the single non-Arab nation in the Persian Gulf. They may have the perception that an Iran armed with nuclear weapons will be the remaining instrument in Allah’s hand to enforce Islam religion into the whole world. That is, they can mistakenly misconstrue this situation and believe that Ayatollahs have been selected by Allah to take up the mandate of developing nuclear energy program to the UN Security Council to spread the faith (Rafique & Erum, 2016) . Thus, it is significant to recognize the composite social, political and religious aspects, and not at the expense of frustrating the freedom of other regions. Islamic state intentions to claim back some of its lost grandeurs should not be understated (Albright, Stricker, & Kelleher-Vergantini, 2015) . Even with the wrong perception that involvement of in termination of people’s lives is rewardable greatly by Allah could lead to many unexpected tensions.
Pros
The United States and international organizations should reinforce the aspect of respecting the religions of people. In fact, nongovernmental organizations could be used as a medium to promote the habit of appreciating one another. It is not worthwhile to issue threats because of issues of faith. As such, Iran will not feel that they are threatened to shield themselves in this great struggle (Gen & Nagel, 2018) . However, the current state of religious positioning of the surrounding Middle East countries explains the sense of vulnerability they have and it could easily tell their motivation for focusing on a nuclear power program. Iran is pursuing all these programs as secret nuclear weapons programs.
In a wider sense, Islamic Iran has been challenging the West on the matters religion for a long time in history. There has been a great historical struggle between Islam and Christianity that has led to persecutions and wars that were unnecessary in all this time. The struggle for freedom and having dominance can be traced back to the revolts that were stirred among different religions. However, if different religious group become accommodative and instituted positive morals among people, there may be a few instances of nuclear wars among the people (Ismail, 2015). Many Arab states and Iran have always construed the declaration of war against the terrors as a war against the Islam community.
Cons
The focus should be on addressing the labeling effect. Religion has given Iran incentive to pursue a more severe nuclear war agenda because they feel the Muslims are targeted. The labeling of all Muslims to be potential attackers intensifies the mistrust and instability among the Iranians. In spite of the previous efforts that Obama’s administration made to reach out to Iran so that they can engage in positive negotiations, the hostility based on religion is still thriving. The 9/11 attacks were attributed to Islam and the Middle East by many political leaders in the United States and other regions (Rafique & Erum, 2016) . Such labeling could illicit unwanted consequences to retaliate, as it destroys Iran’s national pride and encourages their defiance. Thus, any demonization and verbal intimidations could only be employed with utmost caution and with the understanding that they can illicit commotions from Iran, to be on the safe side.
Discussion
The complexity of the factors influencing Iran’s nuclear program indicates that it is not easy to attain a safe and peaceful environment in the Middle East. The surrounding factors are aspects of hostility, uncertainty as well as suspicions. Diplomatic options and measures to build confidence should be promoted in solving the nuclear program issue in Iran. One of the aspects that have caused Iran to be aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons for their defense is mutual distrust and fearing the possible attacks by other nations in the Middle East and beyond (Wirl & Yegorov, 2016) . Finding a solution to the country's unhealthy relationship with the United States should be the priority and there should be not such confrontations from Israel as they authenticate Iran’s fears and insecurity. It was to create the need for Iran to prepare for a possible confrontation with these unexpected powers. Efforts should be made to bring Iran back to the table, particularly on that IAEA deal and to engage the nation in discourse that is more constructive. Diplomatic solutions would help build confidence and trust to rebuild the lost trust within the region and externally.
The targeted sanctions are significant, but the IAEA should handle this with discretion as it can harm the population of Iran, particularly the poorest. It may accelerate the economic misfortunes of the nation, and illicit more negative feelings of those that are most broken by the sanctions regime. Public discontent may breed great animosity, encouraging extremism and giving way for promotion of nuclear programs in Iran. In fact, such may give way for authorizing irresponsible actions of political leaders to incorporate the building of weapons of mass destruction (Gen & Nagel, 2018) . Therefore, the sanctions that IAEA and the international community, in general, are imposing should be selective and responsive. The sanctions to Iran to thwart their production of nuclear weapons should be targeted on the elite and its military-industrial relationship without interfering with the general public (Wirl & Yegorov, 2016) . Lastly, IAEA should continue to inspect Iran’s nuclear facilities in a consolidated way utilizing every potential means of retrieving information. All these should be done to strengthen the treaty compliance mechanisms of all the regions that signed it.
References
Albright, D., Stricker, A., & Kelleher-Vergantini, S. (2015). Analysis of the IAEA’s Report on the Possible Military Dimensions of Iran’s Nuclear Program. Institute for Science and International Security , 8 .
Gen, B., & Nagel, J. (2018). Monitoring Iranian Weaponization Activities : Another Crucial Flaw of the Nuclear Deal .
Ismail, M. (2015). Iran's Nuclear Program: Regional Implications and Possible Outcomes . Asian Politics & Policy , 7 (2), 245-263.
Kerr, P. K. (2016). Irans Nuclear Program : Tehrans Compliance with International Obligations (No. CRS-R40094). Congressional Research Service Washington United States.
Rafique, M. U., & Erum, R. (2016). Nuclear Agreement Between Iran And P5+ 1 (A Critical Perspective Of Region And International Actors). The Government-Annual Research Journal of Political Science. , 5 (5).
Rezaei, F. (2017). Iran’s Nuclear Program : A Study in Proliferation and Rollback . Springer.
Wirl, F., & Yegorov, Y. (2016). Iran’s Nuclear Program and the West’s Response: A Game Theoretic Approach . In Dynamic Modeling, Empirical Macroeconomics, and Finance (pp. 13-34). Springer, Cham.
