Prisoners’ dilemma game refers to the situation where two criminals of the same group are arrested and confined differently so that they cannot reach each other. They are questioned differently and they restricted from communicating to each other. Due to prosecutor’s lack of evidence, the criminals are given bargain and two choices to make. They can either betray the partner by testifying to the prosecutor that the partner committed or encouraged him to commit the crime or remain silent to show that they cannot betray the partner. If both criminals remain silent, they will both serve the intended period, but when one criminal betrays the other who remained silent then the betrayer is set free while the partner remains in custody for two years longer than the original intended time. If both criminals betray each other then they both serve the same period in custody, however, it is extended longer by one year. The dilemma exists in the way that each prisoner has a choice between the two options, and thus not making a wise decision due to lack of cooperation and not being aware of what the other prisoner will do brings uncertainties.
Prisoners’ dilemma game is a bad game because it encourages self-interest and its judgments lack evidence but rely on the principal of the game. It was originally framed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher working at RAND in 1950. Albert W. Tucker formalized the game with prison sentence rewards and named it, “prisoners’ dilemma”. According to them, prisoners’ dilemma refers to “a standard example of a game analyzed in game theory that shows why two completely “rational” individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so”
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In most cases, prisoners’ dilemma game is not a fair game in a way that one culprit may decide to betray the partner to get favors. They may decide to give wrong information about the crime and the partner while the other may decide to remain silent so that they both get same the judgment. Due to the principal of the game, the betrayer is set free due to the wrong information leaving the partner in custody carrying the burden alone.
Prisoner’s dilemma game is based on assumption that one partner makes a different decision from the other so that he is favored and freed. The game bases on rational decision making where a partner makes a decision best for himself/herself but it is possible for both them making same decision and thus getting small punishment due to lack of enough evidence. In addition, the fact that the prisoners are interrogated differently from each other, it is therefore so hard to rely on the information given because one may just decide to betray the partner by giving false information for him to be freed.
In international relation, a state existing in anarchy and being responsible of their protection cannot trust another state for cooperation as far as security dilemma is concerned. In this case, trade agreement for example can benefit both nations by working as one and signing the treaty. One nation can decide to fool the other into signing the agreement and benefit more than the partner. The other nation has the same option of cheating and gaining more than first nation, but if the two nations decide to cheat or fool one another, they end up doing so poorly and thus the game does represent international relational well.
The game has different shortcomings to both the offenders/prisoners and the other parties in charge of the case. To begin with, the decision separately made by one prisoner has consequences not only to him/her but also to the other partner. The consequences may affect the partner dearly since there is room for betrayal from both or one of the offenders. Due to separate interrogation, one partner may decide to give wrong information to be freed leaving the partner innocently in the custody. Alternatively, the prisoners may end up making same decisions making it hard for the prosecutor/police officer to pass judgment for lack of evidence thus the offenders end up with small punishment. Another shortcoming of dilemma game is that all the problems cannot be solved by the theory of the game.
The assumption that the players have knowledge about a bout their own payoff and the payoff of others is not practical. Additionally, in some countries, which violate the suspect’s human rights before inquiry, it is assumed that due to the fear of torture, the suspects may decide to reveal the truth. However, this may not be the case in the developed world, especially in countries that do not use coercion.
Concerning the international community, they can overcome the defections and facilitate cooperation in many ways. One of the ways include encouraging collective interest among its members because it helps in foregoing self-interest and working towards same agenda. The international community should also promote the principle of dominance to overcome betraying one another and work together towards a common goal. This can be done by establishing hierarchy where nations on top control those below but with respect. The principle of reciprocity can also help international community to overcome defect. This is done by rewarding the nations that cooperate and punishing those who pursue self-interest at the expense of others. It is also important for the international community to identify countries trying to defect and pursuing self-interest and encourage them to become members of the community. This is because members of one community care about other and can sacrifice their own interest to benefit the whole group.
In conclusion, dilemma game being characterized by defection and lack of cooperation, international community should encourage collective interest among its members, observe and enforce the principles of dominance and reciprocity to overcome the vices.
References
Abbott, Kenneth W. "Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers." Yale Journal of International Law 14 (1989):335-411.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . “Prisoner's Dilemma.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . 29 Aug. 2014. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/.
Ostrom, Elinor. “Collective action and the evolution of social norms.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no .3 (2000): 137–158.
Nisen, Max. “They Finally Tested The 'Prisoner's Dilemma' On Actual Prisoners — And The Results Were Not What You Would Expect”. Business Insider. 21 st Jul. 2014. http://www.businessinsider.com/prisoners-dilemma-in-real-life-2013-7.
Elinor Ostrom, “Collective action and the evolution of social norms,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no .3 (2000): 137.
“Prisoner's Dilemma,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , 29 Aug. 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/.
“Prisoner's Dilemma,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , 29 Aug. 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/.
Kenneth Abbott W, "Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers," Yale Journal of International Law, 14 (1989):340.
Kenneth Abbott W, "Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers," Yale Journal of International Law, 14 (1989):335.
Elinor Ostrom, “Collective action and the evolution of social norms,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no .3 (2000): 139.
Max Nisen, “They Finally Tested The 'Prisoner's Dilemma' On Actual Prisoners — And The Results Were Not What You Would Expect,” Business Insider, 21 st Jul. 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/prisoners-dilemma-in-real-life-2013-7
