Robert M. Clark's Target-Centric Model introduces an alternative methodology that would be utilized as opposed to the traditional intelligence cycle. Clark's model redefines the intelligence process, with the view being towards highlighting that all parts of the intelligence cycle need to come together to create a network. This means that the process needs to consider those involved in intelligence collection, analysts, and ultimately customers, who play an integral part of the intelligence process. The model recognizes the fact that information does not always flow linearly, as some of the information gathered may not be accurate; thus, affecting its usability as to create a network (Clark, 2012). The September 11 attacks in 2001 had a significant impact on the safety of the United States, highlighting failure by the intelligence process to prevent such attacks. The objective of this analysis is to review intelligence gathered by the FBI before the attacks using Clark’s Target-Centric Model to determine whether the security agents would have prevented the attacks beforehand.
Model Formation
If intelligence information was available before the September 11 attacks, a Target-Centric Model could have been developed to aid in the analysis of the intelligence gathered. The model would have played a vital role in the dissemination of intelligence to enhance the identification and prioritization of information. The model would have comprised five phases. Firstly, it would have included the planning and direction phase (Clark, 2012). In this phase, intelligence information is monitored and analyzed, with the aim being towards ensuring that the information collected is accurate and valid. In the case of the September 11 attacks, the FBI would have embarked on a process of determining the real intentions of Zacarias Moussaoui’s decision to enroll for flight training at Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma. The FBI would have engaged in a thorough analysis of Moussaoui’s past to determine whether he posed any notable threats to the American people.
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Secondly, the model would have incorporated the collection phase. Intelligence collection involves obtaining raw information using different approaches, such as human intelligence (HUMINT) and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), among others (Kerr, Wolfe, Donegan, & Pappas, 2018). The FBI would have engaged in the process of interrogation to gather as much HUMINT as possible from Moussaoui. Additionally, the FBI would have equally conducted searches in his home, which would have also help in gathering as much intelligence regarding the planning of the September 11 attacks. The third phase in the model would have been the processing phase. Processing of intelligence involves refining and analyzing the information collected with the view being that this would determine the validity of the data collected (Clark, 2012). The FBI agents would have analyzed all information gathered from Moussaoui’s interrogation and data from the search they conducted on his house.
From the analysis, it would have been much easier to determine the nature of the threat that the United States was facing and whether the threat was credible. The fourth phase of the model would have been production, which involves the translation of processed data into finished intelligence products. Marrin (2016) indicates that information must be translated into a finished product, which is then delivered to the National Security Council responsible for making any decisions regarding the strategic approaches to be incorporated. In the case of the attacks, the FBI would have used information gathered to create finished intelligence products and later pass them on to the council on a priority basis, depending on the nature of data collected. Lastly, the model would have included the dissemination phase, which is a stage where relevant security agencies engage in net assessment of the intelligence to determine the way forward. The model would have suggested that the finished intelligence products be delivered to the National Security Council, which is responsible for making strategic security decisions.
Systems Modeling and Analysis
To aid in the creation of actionable intelligence before the 9/11 attacks, the primary system that would have been most appropriate would have been the intelligence cycle. The intelligence cycle is one of the most effective systems adopted by uniformed services to aid in information collection, processing, and turning it into actionable intelligence (Evans, 2009). The FBI and CIA would have been at the forefront in making use of the intelligence cycle to ensure that they evaluate all the information that they gathered. The fact that Ms. Collen Rowley suggests that the FBI had prior information pointing to a possible attack on United States soil shows that there a significant failure in the intelligence cycle. It was within the mandate of the FBI to undertake a follow-up of information from the Minneapolis field office as a way of turning such data into actionable intelligence.
Regarding the modeling analysis that would have been most appropriate for the FBI prior to the 9/11 attacks, it can be argued that the use of estimative modeling would have been of great value in creating actionable intelligence. Estimative modeling engages in an analysis of intelligence data with the aim being towards determining the estimated date and time of an attack; thus, ensuring that security agencies can prevent attacks (Frank, 2015). The FBI would have made use of estimative modeling as a key tool to determine the estimated period of a possible attack. On the other hand, the FBI would have used the estimative modeling analysis to determine the magnitude of the attack, which is of great importance considering that it ensures that attacks with an impact such as that of the 9/11 attacks are prioritized. The National Security Council would have regarded as such information as actionable intelligence, considering that it goes beyond intelligence collection.
References
Clark, R. M. (2012). Intelligence analysis: A target-centric approach (4ed). Washington, D.C: CQ Press.
Evans, G. (2009). Rethinking military intelligence failure–putting the wheels back on the intelligence cycle. Defense studies , 9 (1), 22-46.
Frank, A. B. (2015). Transforming producer/consumer relations through modeling and computation. In Intelligence Communication in the Digital Era: Transforming Security, Defence, and Business (pp. 88-109). Palgrave Pivot, London.
Kerr, R., Wolfe, T., Donegan, R., & Pappas, A. (2018). Intelligence collection and analysis on Iraq: Issues for the intelligence community. In intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq . Manchester University Press.
Marrin, S. (2016). Improving intelligence studies as an academic discipline. Intelligence and National Security , 31 (2), 266-279.
