The Iranian hostage crisis was a key historical watershed in the relations between the United States and Iran. The crisis lasted from 1979 to 1981, making it one of the longest political and diplomatic standoff in modern history 1 . The events that unfolded during this time were not just significant for Iranian history, but had huge impact on American politics; for if these happenings brought an end to the tyrannical rule of the Shah and paved the way for a theocratic system under the Ayatollah, then they also occasioned the resounding defeat of Jimmy Carter in the 1980 elections to President Ronald Reagan. The hostage crisis was also significant in that it marked the first US confrontation with violent and radical Islam. Given the gravity of this hostage crisis, its peculiarity, and enduring impact, a consideration of the events leading to such a standoff deserves some close attention.
American and western power involvement in Iran domestic affairs can be traced to pre-World War II period. In 1925, the allies, concerned that the Reza Shah Pahlavi had become too Pro German, instigated his replacement with his 22-year-old son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The British and the Soviets Union went ahead to occupy the Iranian oil fields and put them at the disposal of allies. It was however in the 1950s that confrontation between western powers and Iranian government worsened owing to the Anglo Iranian oil crisis 2 . Differences between Iran and Britain began to simmer in the 1940s. It is worth pointing out that the British oil companies had a long history in the Iranian oil industry, first under the Anglo-Persian oil company (APOC) and subsequently the Anglo-Iranian oil company (AIOC). In 1948, the Iranian parliament refused to grant oil concession in its northern provinces to the Soviet Union though the agreement would give Iranians the same management and distribution rights. Britain got increasingly alarmed by such proposals from the Soviet Union. Declassified files reveal that the British fuel office raised these concerns with counterparts in the foreign office. It submitted that the concessions granted to Britain all over the world were the source of its oil power and if concerns were awarded to the Soviets, it would significantly undercut its standing in Tehran and risk losing the concessions it already enjoyed in the south. Britain, therefore, thought it necessary to limit any oil development by Iran or by any foreign agent, especially Moscow. The conversation was however fast shifting in Iran’s public discourse. Mohammad Mossadeq, a patrician nationalist politician, strongly opposed not only the Soviet offer but subsequent offers by western nations. He argued that granting of concessions would attract other concession hunters interested in other parts of the country leading to the dismemberment of Iran 3 .
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Britain refused to concede to any of the demands accusing Tehran of outright greed and unreasonableness. London expected that Tehran would give up on its demands or come back with different proposals. It, therefore, came as a surprise to many in London when outright nationalization came as a response to her intransigence. Parliament nationalized the oil industry and elected into office one of the country’s foremost nationalization advocate, Mossadeq, as prime minister. The new premier established a national Iranian oil company that effectively took control of oil production in Iran. The prime minister further invited British technocrats to work in the newly created authority. This decision won Mossadeq unrivaled popularity and acceptance both in Parliament and in the eyes of the public 4 .
Globally, Mossadeq grew in status. In a visit to Washington, declassified state department brief to President Harry Truman described him as a true nationalist who was well informed, affable and witty. In London, Mossadeq was increasingly perceived to be a revolutionary serious about the nationalization agenda. Britain, unwilling to permit the transfer of full control of oil to Iran, came to the hard-nosed conclusion that Mossadeq was a threat to its interests and needed to be purged. London’s assessment of Mossadeq might have been right; that he was more concerned about national sovereignty than royalties. For Mossadeq, Iran would attain true independence if British domination in the oil industry was removed. Mossadeq thought that if great powers were assured that no western rivals got advantages in the award of concessions in Iran, they would respect Iran’s sovereignty 5
The control narrative, it might be argued, is what was used to lure the Americans into the fray. Britain, through deliberate media propaganda, contended that such an attitude could spread to Venezuela and Indonesia, threatening the United States own security. The United States attempted to generate a more agreeable concession between London and Tehran to no avail. Of course, as history has taught us, the British were never interested in such a concession: They were focused on instigating the exit of Mossadeq. The western media, influenced and even controlled by London, was awash with news portraying Mossadeq as an individual unwilling to engage in any compromise. In fact, a good number of historians studying the crisis have fallen victim of the same propaganda: numerous material has been published claiming the crisis could have been averted if Mossadeq had been more compromising 6 . Correspondence from the foreign office to the state department describes the Iranian prime minister as a foremost nationalist whose fundamental objective was to return oil control to Iran. The attempt to persuade Americans that Mossadeq was unwilling to compromise appeared to have worked. Released files show communication in which the state department insisted that the maintenance of control by Britain was of supreme importance. The final solution was to turn to the CIA who collaborated with the Iranian army to overthrow Mossadeq in 1953 7 .
American policy towards Iran from 1953 to 1978 was thereafter characterized by accommodation and support for the Iranian government under the Shah, despite its many cases of abuse, arbitrary arrests and excessive use of force even against students. These years of abuse, under regime considered to be a puppet of the United States, is what formed the bedrock for the Iranian revolution of 1979. The Shah and CIA trained police branch called the SAVAK had been exceedingly brutal. They conducted extensive spying on the Iranian people- including female members spying on their husbands- and engaged in arbitrary arrests, executions, and imprisonment. Further, there was great disgruntlement amongst Iranians with the levels of development, and the prevailing notion was that the Iranian oil industry was under the control of western powers. Nationalist sentiments thus expressed the need for Iran to regain its sovereignty. While the Carter administration had spoken out against human rights abuses in Iran, it had done little to compel the regime to adhere to them 8 .
Starting 1978, monthly protests were held against the Shah, and the United States wondered how it could continue its support for such an unpopular leader. Strikes threatened to paralyze the country. When the Shah was overthrown in 1979 by mass protests and the defeat of troops loyal to the Shah by rebel forces and guerrillas, in what has come to be known as the Iranian revolution, the charismatic Shia Muslim scholar Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran from exile amid great celebration. Amid this pandemonium in Iran, the Shah was diagnosed with cancer and the Carter administration allowed the long-term ally to fly to the United States to receive treatment.
There was a considerable clamor for the Shah to be returned to Iran to face charges for the crimes committed during his tenure. On fourth November 1979, student demonstrators instigated by the office of the supreme leader gathered outside the US embassy in Tehran and soon broke through the embassy’s walls into the compound. The marine assigned to guard the embassy sounded the alarm and put the facility on lock mode. Most of the personnel in the embassy were at this time trying to destroy all sensitive material as protocol demanded. A few hours later, the 66 Americans in the embassy were overwhelmed and captured. The government imposed the condition for their release to be the return of the Shah to face trial 9 .
The hostages had initially thought their capture would be short-lived, but it would last for months. The hostage takers released two African Americans and one woman on the 19 th of November, citing the special place for minorities and women in Islam. The Carter administration, disillusioned with the progress of diplomatic efforts, dispatched a team of ninety-seven delta force soldiers to conduct a rescue operation from the Embassy in April 1980. The attempted rescue turned out to be a botched exercise. Two of the eight dispatched helicopters malfunctioned even before getting to Iran, and others broke down while in the mission on Iranian soil. A decision was made to abort the operation when the helicopters were down to five. This, however, did not mark the end of the misfortune as the helicopters on their return to the base were caught in a sandstorm leading to a collision of two and the death of eight soldiers 10 . President Carter had to make an address to the nation and explain what had transpired during the mission. The American people, it may be argued, lost confidence in President Carter who was at this time seen as incompetent and unable to ensure the safe return of the American hostages 11 .
The botched rescue mission proved both to the Carter administration and the American people that the hostage crisis may take longer than earlier anticipated. This event received considerable media attention, and its gravity was emphasized by the daily broadcast of each day the Americans were held. This further helped undermine Carter’s leadership credentials. The crisis came to an end due to four major factors: First, Ronald Reagan came into office as the president of the United States after the 1980 election with the promise of bringing the Americans home safely by all means necessary. It is this pledge that made the Iranians jittery since they started to anticipate another American military strike. Second, Ayatollah Khomeini had already consolidated power especially after the election of his supporters into Parliament. He did not need to use the hostages to compel America to support his political reforms. Third, the start of the Iraq-Iran war demanded that Iranian authorities direct their resources into the war. Iranian assets, frozen in America, were crucial to such an endeavor, else they would lose their country in the war. Finally, the death of the Shah in 1980 meant that their greatest demand for holding the hostages was no longer viable 12 .
A compromise was reached for the release of the hostages: the unfreezing of Iranian assets in the United States in exchange for hostages on the 20 th of January, 1981, a day before Ronald Reagan took over as president.
Conclusion
The Iranian hostage crisis, it has been demonstrated, was a key watershed in the relations between the United States and Iran. Its impacts were not just in Iran but also in the United States where Jimmy Carter lost his reelection bid. To date, that crisis continues to cast a shadow over the relations between the two nations. In addition, it reinforced the weakness of American power especially since it came after the United States had suffered a major defeat in Vietnam, the economic crisis of the 1970s and the not so successful attempts to deal with revolutionaries in Latin America and Africa.
Bibliography
Farber, David. Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s First Encounter. New Jersey: University of Princeton Press, 2005.
Harris, David. The Crisis: The President, the Profit, and the Shah1979 and the Coming of Militant Islam. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2004.
Philips, James. "What Iran Learned From the Hostage Crisis: Terrorism Works." Heritage Foundation , 2009.
Warren, Christopher, and Mosk Richard. The Iranian Hostage Crisis and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: Implications for International Dispute Resolution and Diplomacy. PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL, 2007.
1 David, Harris. The Crisis: The President, the Profit, and the Shah1979 and the Coming of Militant Islam. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2004.
2 David, Farber. Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s First Encounter. New Jersey: University of Princeton Press, 2005.
3 David, Farber. Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s First Encounter. New Jersey: University of Princeton Press, 2005.
4 Christopher, Warren, and Richard Mosk. The Iranian Hostage Crisis and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: Implications for International Dispute Resolution and Diplomacy. PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL, 2007.
5 David, Harris. The Crisis: The President, the Profit, and the Shah1979 and the Coming of Militant Islam. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2004.
6 David, Farber. Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s First Encounter. New Jersey: University of Princeton Press, 2005.
7 James, Philips. "What Iran Learned From the Hostage Crisis: Terrorism Works." Heritage Foundation , 2009.
8 Christopher, Warren, and Richard Mosk. The Iranian Hostage Crisis and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: Implications for International Dispute Resolution and Diplomacy. PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL, 2007.
9 Christopher, Warren, and Richard Mosk. The Iranian Hostage Crisis and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: Implications for International Dispute Resolution and Diplomacy. PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL, 2007.
10 David, Farber. Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s First Encounter. New Jersey: University of Princeton Press, 2005.
11 David, Harris. The Crisis: The President, the Profit, and the Shah1979 and the Coming of Militant Islam. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2004.
12 David, Harris. The Crisis: The President, the Profit, and the Shah1979 and the Coming of Militant Islam. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2004.
