Iraq was a longstanding party to NPT and IAEA member, and its nuclear program in form of research reactor had been under safeguards. In other words, it was a non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS), but the unearthing of its undeclared activities required international community and IAFA to ensure state compliance. History shows that, Iraq’s nuclear program began in 1956 when Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission was formed. However, serious Nuclear weapons program begun in early 70s, by building Osiraq reactor. In 1981, Iraq looked for outside help to access required technology and expertise. It invaded Kuwait, but ceasefire was declared soon after.
Following the war, IAEA’s inspections began in Iraq. The process was characterized by friction between IAEA and UNSCOM. There were disagreement over inspection methodology, and Iraq denied existence of a nuclear weapons program. Between 1991 and 92, the Initial IAEA Verification and Inspections commenced. The inspections, which were conducted between May 1991-1992 were characterized by success in dismantling Iraq’s nuclear weapons infrastructure. The first inspection was carried out between May 15 to May 21. It ended in September 1991 and proved Iraq had nuclear weapons program. The fall of 1991 saw IAEA begin to coordinate destruction of Iraqi weapons program. This time, Iraq admitted that its procurement network was the final piece of information regarding its nuclear program.
Delegate your assignment to our experts and they will do the rest.
Verification continued between 1993 and 1995. Fuller understanding of scope and nature of Iraq’s program continued. Inspection Agency conducted five missions and Iraq’s cooperation level was dwindling. August 1995 brought another disarmament verification process. IAEA undertook two more inspection campaigns in 1995. The years between 1996 and 98 marked the end of first half of decade; Iraq inspections gave way to OMV phase. In 1997, inspections revealed Iraq had abandoned its nuclear program. Report issued indicated that investigation on Iraq nuclear program have reached point of diminishing returns.
However, inspectors bounced back in full swing. Head of UNSCOM reported Iraqi cooperation had not been forthcoming regarding biological and chemical weapons. During the verification between 1991 and 1998, disarmament process yielded fruits. IAEA involvement in disarmament validated its role. IAEA and member states got a chance to test new techniques and technologies. Initial revelation of Iraq program caused agency to be vilified for failing to detect it. However, the verification process was not without challenges. The manner in which inspections were organized and conducted created problems. Firstly, uncooperative environment delayed operations. Security Council did not indicate how Iraqi’s disarmament would be determined and by whose standards. The growing disunity in council complicated inspection. Disagreements rocked the process and it became clear that, Iraqi’s accusations were self-serving.
In overall, numerous lessons are evident from the Iraq’s first challenge. Unannounced inspections were crucial to IAEA efforts. One-way intelligence flow worked magic, and helped to improve on information security. There is need for reliable and predictable funding and flexibility in planning. It is always significant to clarify roles, and expected outcome.
Divisions in the council had undermined the inspections efforts and sanctions against Iraq in the mid-1990s, had become entrenched, and with questions raised about validity of US and UK intelligence and willingness of especially the US to work through UN.
2. Timeline Iraq
Since the first Iraq inspections under Security Council mandate in early 1991, the road of nuclear verification in Iraq has proved to be long and hard, and valuable lessons learned that have benefitted the international community and strengthened the IAEA inspectorate (Baute, 2004). Limits and loopholes characterized the early years. Traditional approach was inadequate, had enough loopholes that allowed Iraq start a clandestine of nuclear weapons that remained undetected for long. International community believed non-nuclear nations would honor their pledge. The system had loopholes and could not detect whenever a state attempted to deceive it. In order to safeguard the system, and alleviate the loophole, Additional Protocol to NPT was established.
During the weapons trail that took place between 1991 and 1995, the Agency was advised to map out and neutralize Iraq’s nuclear program. Learning phase was a challenge. The IAEA faced challenge of establishing right structure for tackling Iraq’s nuclear file. There was difficulty in knowing the time span Iraq project was going to last. IAEA inspections in 1991 indicated that Iraq bleached transparency terms set by Security Council. Agency completed mandate in 1994 of rendering Iraq harmless. Between 1995 and 1998, the coherent pictures emerged. It became increasingly possible to get accurate estimates regarding nuclear weapons. The inspection team became thorough, and politically independent. Its mandate was being supported by member states.
However, an inspection gap was witnessed between 1998 and 2002 (Baute, 2004). The world went four years without inspections on ground in Iraq. In the absence of inspection, high-resolution commercial satellites became available in 1999 and they provided the reality on the ground. Use of human intelligence proved difficult. Adoption of Security Council resolution 1409 in 2002 provided agency with new mandate leading to a development of a novel type of advanced experience (Baute, 2004). The last round; under the magnifying glass happened between 2002 and 03. Inspections between November 2002 and March 2003 were of different nature with regard to global attention. IAEA took four years to put together equipment and needed personnel. Agency addressed concerns by members within three months. IAE, UN Inspections in Iraq worked. U.N. nuclear agency reported to Security Council that after conducting 247 inspections at 147 sites in March 2003 there lacked evidence of resumed nuclear activities. It showed that, IAEA was right in its assessment of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities. In conclusion, providing IEAE inspectorate with the right authority level is a win-win situation as it benefits the international community, considering it gets assurance whenever it seeks (Baute, 2004).
3. Key Judgments
Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; in the view of most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Iraq intended to obtain first nuclear weapons. It intended to acquire sufficient fissile material (GlobalSecurity.org, 2019). Without them, it would find it hard to come up with sophisticated weapons. Baghdad began renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF and VX. Baghdad has procured types and quantities of equipment and chemicals that will allow CW production. Though not sure, Saddam is said to have stocked CW, at least 100 metric tons.
Iraq has lethal and BW agents capable of manufacturing various agents such as anthrax, missiles, bombs, covert operatives and aerial sprays. On the other hand, Baghdad has large scale, redundant and concealed BW agent production capability. Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development programs capable of delivering biological warfare agent. Saddam has a few dozen Scud-variant SRBMs with ranges of 650 to 900k. Iraq intends to deploy new al-Samud and Ababil-100 SRBMs, and Baghdad’s UAV could threaten Iraq’s neighbors. Saddam is likely to use biological and chemical warfare on US forces. He might use CBW to Iraq territory. He avoided using WMD.
The INR has alternative view of Iraq’s Nuclear Program. State for Intelligence and Research (INR) believes Saddam continues to like nuclear weapons. INR view Iraq’s effort to acquire aluminum tubes is influenced by Baghdad’s attempt to reconstitute nuclear weapons program. Notably, various confidence levels are evident for selected key judgments, and they include high, moderate, and low confidence. High confidence shows that Iraq continues to produce deadly weapons against UN resolutions. Secondly, no detection of the weapons programs and Iraq has complex weapons. Possibly, Iraq can produce a nuclear weapon upon acquisition of fissile materials. In terms of moderate confidence, Iraq lacks capacity to produce nuclear weapon by 2009. Finally, low confidence is surrounded by questions on whether Saddam would use mass destruction weapons, whether he would launch attacks on US Homeland, and whether he would share biological/chemical weapons with al-Qaida. In terms of Uranium acquisition, Iraq has 2.5 tons of uranium oxide as permitted by IAEA, and it continues to seek the same from Niger and Somalia (GlobalSecurity.org, 2019).
References
Baute, J. (2004). Timeline Iraq- Challenges and Lessons Learned From Nuclear Inspections. IAEA Bulletin , Vol 46, no. 1
GlobalSecurity.org (2019). Key Judgments (from October 2002 NIE)-Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons
(nd). Iraq: The First Challenge
