Introduction
Dating from 2014, the capabilities and strength of Al-Qaeda are rather difficult to assess owing to the group's reclusiveness ( Jones, 2012 ). However, its influence is still felt in the regions of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri (Sude, 2015). Ayman al-Zawahiri took over the leadership of Al-Qaeda six weeks following the assassination of Osama bin Laden, the former leader of Al-Qaeda, by the US forces (Mendelsohn, 2011). Notably, Al-Qaeda was co-founded by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in 1988. Al-Zawahiri since 2011 after the demise of Bin Laden expanded Al-Qaeda affiliates across the globe (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). Before 2011, Al- Zawahiri served as the second-in-command in orchestrating terror attacks. He was the principal ideologue of Al-Qaeda, the operational brain that spearheaded the terror attack of September 11, 2001. Presently, Zawahiri is the topmost wanted terrorists by the federal US government and an offer of $25 million set apart for whoever discloses information that leads to his capture (Bajoria & Hudson, 2011). This paper aims to offer a detailed discussion that compares and contrasts the leadership and communication techniques between Bin Laden and Al- Zawahiri.
Leadership and Organization
Zawahiri often quotes a radical Islamist, Sayyid Qutb – his admirer, a great influence to the origin of Zawahiri’s militant ideas. Qutb believed that the US as a nation was spiritually impure, thus he championed the concepts of Islamic fundamentalism, holy war, and martyrdom to redeem the world from the influence of the West (Bajoria & Hudson, 2011). Even though Zawahiri received his inspiration from strong personalities like Qutb, he lacked the level of charisma of a terrorist possessed by his predecessor Bin Laden. His lack of effectiveness and charisma made a substantial difference in Al-Qaeda, a group whose members' sworn allegiance to bin Laden (Bajoria & Hudson, 2011).
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Safe Haven
According to Sude (2015), the two Al-Qaeda leaders found a home in Pakistan amidst repeated counterterrorism operations. They found a safe haven within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Structurally, they established links and networks including social ties, tribal leaders, and militant groups operating locally and internationally (Durant, 2013). Al-Qaeda equally retained the Taliban and its allies in Afghanistan particularly during Zawahiri tenure (Sude, 2015). Zawahiri exploited regional chaos to establish a new haven for Al-Qaeda despite his questionable ability to defend the future of Al-Qaeda (Bajoria & Hudson, 2011).
Strategic Focus
Al-Qaeda under Bin Laden's leadership was portrayed as the defender of Islam from the influence of the West. Bin Laden succeeded in this by drawing the United States into visible military conflict resulting in his popularity in the Islamic states (Lefèvre, 2017). Bin Laden before his death shifted his focus from developing strategies aimed at coping with the changes in the Middle East. Thus, Al-Qaeda faced competition for recruits with the Islamic State. The confusion extended further under Al-Zawahiri’s leadership. Failure to develop an operational plan for the Middle East was most evident during the emergence of an independent Islamic State in Iraq (Sude, 2015). Nevertheless, the two leaders were thrilled by the developments of the Middle East and were eager to serve key roles. The central agenda of Bin Laden was to strike down the United States at all cost (Sude, 2015). Both Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri targeted Americans and their allies. They sought to revenge against the US for arresting their own. For instance, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) which was linked to Al-Zawahiri sent the terrorist position on hitting US ( Byman & Williams, 2015 ) . Even a day didn’t pass after the message before Al-Qaeda hit the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenyan terminating the lives of 224 people (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). In addition to lacking bin Laden’s charisma, Al-Zawahiri failed in launching major international attacks. He equally didn't utilize the security vacuum resulting from the Arab Spring. For example, Al-Zawahiri failed to issue a public statement for eleven months between 2014 and 2015 which created numerous uncertainty with regards to the future of Al-Qaeda (Gohel, 2017).
Ideologues and Operatives
Al-Zawahiri relied on operatives whose primacy was to target Near Enemy such as Abu Muhammad al-Masri, an old comrade. Al-Masri disagreed with Bin Laden owing to his preference for attacking Near Enemies (Al-Shishani, 2011). Zawahiri aimed at the international front not fighting in the mountain. Notably, as was revealed by the US State Department in 2009, Zawahiri was the Al-Qaeda’s strategic and operational planner while Bin Laden was a figurehead. Consequently, Al-Qaeda became decentralized overtime under the leadership of Zawahiri; the authority rested mainly in the hands of affiliate leaders of the group. Unlike Bin Laden, Zawahiri arranged for mergers with other Islamists groups including Al-Shabab and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Furthermore, he authorized the creation of various Al-Qaeda affiliates including the Nusra Front, Arabian Peninsula and the Indian Subcontinent (Counter Extremism Project, 2019).
Communication
Media Presence
Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri utilized media platforms for disseminating information through video or audio recordings to the world. These include more than fifty media that was produced by Al-Sahab in 2008 and 2009 (Sude, 2015).
Far and Near Enemy
A cryptic difference of opinion existed between the two leaders even though they had a common strategic focus. Internal correspondence intercepted in 2011 in the course of Abbottabad raid on Bin Laden’s Pakistani compound, presented variability between the two Al-Qaeda top authorities as pertain Al-Qaeda direction in post 9/11 milieu (Gohel, 2017). Al-Zawahiri, though politely, was uncomfortable with versions of a speech delivered by Bin Laden; he rephrased parts of the narrative. In an attempt to justify Al-Zawahiri's changes, his edit of Bin Laden's original speeches included detailed quotes from the Quran to see to it that Al-Qaeda’s doctrine is justified by religion. Near Enemy (internal to the Islamic world) and Far Enemy (external, principally the West) are alluded to by internal and external enemies respectively (Gohel, 2017).
Initially, Al-Zawahiri championed regime change as a matter of priority in the Arab world and attempted to persuade Bin Laden to join in that crusade. On the contrary, Bin Laden convinced Al-Zawahiri in the mid-to-late 1990s that eliminating the US influence from the Arab world by targeting them was instrumental in the creation of the Islamic state (Gohel, 2017). Gohel (2017) established that Bin Laden’s mission and primacy was fighting the Far Enemy through doctrine and actions. Most of his speeches centered on the Far Enemy as opposed to Near Enemy; Al-Shishani (2011) established that 70% of Bin Laden’s speeches majored on far enemy, twenty percent was made up of general instructions to jihadis, and ten percent centered on Near Enemy. Nevertheless, Al-Zawahiri's speech focused on the Near Enemy (Arab regime change) even though he did not entirely exclude the Far Enemy. That is, fifty percent of Al-Zawahiri speech centered on Near Enemy, 15 percent majored on Far Enemy while the rest on general advice (Al-Shishani, 2011). In essence, targeting the US was not a priority for Al-Zawahiri as it was for Bin Laden. Al-Zawahiri fronted the notion of using Al-Qaeda machinery to target the US in Iraq and Afghanistan (Gohel, 2017). Al-Zawahiri privately displayed some flexibility in attacking the West even though he publicly mentioned the attacks. For instance, one of the Al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria alluded to the fact that Al-Zawahiri instructed him not to use Syria in plotting attacks against the West but instead major on Near Enemy (Gohel, 2017)
Conclusion
Al-Qaeda survived following the death of its top leader Osama Bin Laden. The group’s continuity was ensured owing to its strong ideology. Marked changes were evident after Bin Laden’s demise when Al-Zawahiri took over Al-Qaeda leadership. Despite the fact that the two leaders shared a common strategy, their techniques and communication were different. Al-Zawahiri aimed at decentralizing Al-Qaeda across the globe while championing the attack against Near Enemy in his attempt of developing the Arab world. On the contrary, Bin Laden's primacy was targeting the Far Enemy which is the United State with little to do with regime change in the Arab world. Even though Al-Zawahiri did not possess the level Bin Laden's charisma he managed to utilize local and international militant groups and different affiliates in expediting his agenda.
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