The First World War was historic given its diverse perspectives regarding documentation by popular media as well as historians concerning its impact on the people. It is often depicted as one of the most dreaded wars in history. As such, several myths have been developed and documented by historians regarding this war. However, most historians agree that Germany was able to hold on the war for an extended period of time despite the fact that it was facing superior opponents. Ferguson (2008) provides an explanation on why the war was sustained for a long period of time even though Germany’s opponents had greater military and economic might. Moreover, he explains why the Germany Army collapsed in 1918.
Several accounts have been given to explain the WW1’s persistence even when Germany was waging war against more superior powers. Some historians have created the overall notion that Germany was a highly militarized country before the war. They argue that it is because of this strong military that Germany was able to wage war over an extended period persistently. However, Ferguson (2008) disagrees with this point of view. He seeks to give an alternative explanation to these happenings by providing that he consider being the main reason why the war persisted despite the military might of the Germany opponents (p.156). Ferguson (2008) argues that the Germans waged a preventive war to their opponents. Therefore, the aim of the Germans in the war was not to achieve supremacy as had been largely popularized but rather to prevent the British from undertaking diplomatic agreements that would be detrimental to Germany (p.98).
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Before 1914, the European countries had entered into agreements with each other in different areas of international relations. Such agreements largely excluded Germany because it was considered to be weaker compared to the other Anglo countries. For instance, the British allied together with France and Russia while excluding Germany. This was partly informed by the weakness of Germany that could not be matched with those of the superior countries. From this observation, Ferguson (2008) disputes the argument that Germany sustained the war based on their strength and military or economic might (p.139). He demonstrates that the sustainability of this war over a long period could not be attributed to the military might of Germany during the war. Therefore, Germany allied with the mindset of preventing such diplomatic agreements that largely undermined the Germans.
Moreover, Ferguson also disagreed with the point of view presented by most historians and the media that Germany’s war economy was in a mess before and during the war. On the contrary, Ferguson (2008) holds the view that Germany’s war economy was much stronger and equally contributed to its ability to sustain the war against powerful nations (270). However, he acknowledges that there were imbalances in the resources between Germany and countries like France and Britain. Such disparities in resources enabled Britain and France to spend much more ion the war compared to Germany. Therefore, Germany’s ability to utilize its resources well was a major contributing factor to the sustained war despite the limitation in supplies. In effect, Ferguson implies that this targeted and organized utilization of resources was a major factor that supported Germany during this war.
Ferguson (2008) identifies the defensive position that the Germans held during the war was a contributing factor to the extended war (p.313). He acknowledges that the war would have been won on the western front in the early stages of the war since the French and the British were in a better position to win the war from this perspective. However, the fact the Germans took a defensive approach in the war made it difficult for the other countries to win the war early enough. Ferguson (2008) holds the view that it would have been easy for the competitors to win the war had Germany taken a combative approach (270). He observed that while the original intention of the Germans during the war was to be combative and hence increase their territory, they changed the tack when they realized that the other competing nations could easily overpower them. Therefore, the change of tact to adopt a more defensive approach made it difficult for the British to win the war. As a large economy during the time, Britain had a lot to protect during the war and hence could not equally adopt a fully combative approach. Therefore, waging war from the point of defense was the greatest contributor to the extended period of the war.
Moreover, Ferguson argues that the British and the French undermined the Germans. As a result, they misunderstood their intentions and their capacity during the war. Therefore, Ferguson argues that it was impossible for these countries to put up an adequate defense and retaliation during the war. Ferguson (2008) notes that Britain ignored significant intelligence information it had received concerning the war (p.12-13). In some instances, they misinterpreted such intelligence information because they highly underrated Germany’s capacity to engage them in war. They did not anticipate that Germany could bomb London. Ferguson argues that this continued underestimation of Germany’s capability coupled with its lack of help from any other country made clouded the judgment of the British and the French to the extent that they could make viable war decisions (Ferguson 229). According to Ferguson, this underestimation of German’s capacity was a great contributor to the failure of the British and the French in winning this war during the initial years of the war and hence led to an extended period of war.
The allied strategies taken by other countries in retaliation to the Germany attack were deficient and mistaken on several grounds according to Ferguson. First, both the British and the French adopted a diplomatic approach in creating peace within the region. The countries had flourishing economies that were rising in the wake of industrialization and expanded trade (Ferguson 44). Therefore, they had a great interest in enhancing peace within the region. This explains the diplomatic approach that the countries took in creating peace within this region. However, this approach was lacking on different fronts as it was only geared towards creating diplomatic relationships and ties with countries that had equal economic and military might. This informed the collaboration and relationship between French and Britain. Ferguson notes that this selective diplomacy in the region was a strategy that largely contributed to the war and hence did not achieve the intended purpose of peace (Ferguson 407). Both British and France overlooked the security threat posed by Germany and hence did not engage them in diplomacy that would have otherwise averted the war.
The allied strategies were deficient in anticipating the war moves and strategies that Germany would use during the way. Knowing the economic and military weaknesses of its main enemy, both France and Britain anticipated that Germany would run out of war supplies and hence give up. Moreover, they did not anticipate that it would undertake such radical war steps such as bombing cities like London. Consequently, Ferguson (2008) notes that these countries largely ignored significant intelligence information that would have otherwise informed better strategies. From this perspective, the allied strategies failed due to misinformation. Therefore, the war would have ended much earlier had these countries employed strategies that were informed by facts and reliable intelligence information (Ferguson 13).
The German army together with the Austro Hungary army collapsed in 1918 because of various factors. For example, Ferguson (2008, p.146) notes that the army lacked food supplies. As already noted, Germany had strained resources in this war. Over time, it was obvious that Germany would fail to supply food and other necessities to their army. Without such, it was impossible for the Germany Army to sustain the battle. Secondly, the avenues for supplying food to the western front were greatly hindered (Ferguson 265, 276). Due to the retaliatory attacks from other countries in the region, it was impossible for Germany to access major distribution and transport channels in order to distribute their food. This equally contributed to a limited supply of foodstuffs as well as other support staff to the army and the collapse could not be prevented.
Ferguson also identified the fatigue and weariness as another reason why the Germany army collapsed in 1918. He notes that the war had lasted for four years by August of 1918. Unlike the other countries against whom they fought, the German Army was limited in number. As such, they were overworked during the period of the war. Moreover, some of the army officers died during the war (p.8). This greatly limited the number of army officers in the war and hence they were greatly strained. As such, this led to great fatigued among them that ultimately resulted in the collapse of the army. Lastly, Ferguson (2008) also acknowledges the role that the Peace Treaty that was signed to mark the end of the First World War played in the collapse of the Germany army. This treaty in effect ended the war and cleared all the reasons that had initially contributed to the war (p.397). With nothing more to fight for, the Germany army collapsed in 1918.
In summary, Ferguson enables the audience to consider the Second World War away from the perspectives of prior historians as well as popular media. Through his book, Ferguson demystifies several misconceptions that had largely been popularized by prior historians and media. For instance, he disagrees with the popular opinion that Germany was highly militarized before the war and consequently this led to the persistence of the war. Ferguson notes that this persistent can mainly be attributed to the defensive strategy employed by Germany as well as the misinformed strategies employed by Britain and France. Moreover, he notes that the selective diplomatic approach employed by the countries in the region contributed to the persistence of the war. Lastly, Ferguson identifies lack of supplies as well as fatigued as the major contributors to the collapse of the Germany army in 1918. The dwindling resources of Germany limited its ability to sustain supplies to the army and consequently led to its collapse.
References
Ferguson, N. (2008). The pity of war: Explaining world war I . Hachette UK.
