In the course of his life, Aristotle formulated what is today referred to as Nicomachean Ethics, a philosophical inquiry into the nature of the good life for a person (Coope, 2012). He believed that the necessary traits of the ultimate good are that it is constant, self sufficient, final, and complete. Aristotle also believed that a virtuous individual is not only one who acts well, but also one who desires the good, and is thus a good individual (Coope, 2012). He wrote that no one would term an individual fair if he did not enjoy acting fairly, or generous if he did not enjoy generosity, and the same applies for other virtues. Aristotle meant that the virtues do not solely address a value-laden reading of a person, but also refers to desirable qualities (Coope, 2012). For any action to be considered virtuous, one must do it intentionally, aware of what they are doing, and doing it because they consider it a noble action.
Throughout his work, Aristotle often emphasized on the significance of pleasure to an individual and thus to his research of how people should live. He believed that a happy life must be inclusive of pleasure, and opposed people arguing that pleasure is, by its nature, bad (Coope, 2012). If one considers pleasure in the self-indulgent or physical sense, it becomes obvious that the virtues have little or zero to do with this kind of human understanding. However, if pleasure is thought in equilibrium or harmony, then this brings about virtue, and acting virtuously is indeed pleasurable (Coope, 2012).
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Someone cannot be called virtuous if they do not take pleasure in acting virtuously. This is because the goodness of pleasure is determined by that of the action which it accompanies (Coope, 2012). Therefore, the most superior good, happiness, must incorporate pleasure as this is being virtuous. A good illustration where this would not be the case is with the implementation of laws.
Reference
Coope, U. (2012). ‘Why does Aristotle think that ethical virtue is required for practical wisdom?’ Phronesis , 57(2). Pp. 142 – 163.
