Coupled with strategic directions and guidance from the superiors, operational art is vital in developing operations and campaigns. Operational art refers to the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals. This is achieved by designing, organizing, integrating and conducting campaigns, battles, strategies, and key operations ( Joint Force Development, 2017 ). It is also useful in ensuring that commanders use resources efficiency as well as effectively in their pursuit of achieving strategic objectives. Thus, in the absence of operational art, war would be characterized as a set of disconnected engagements. In this case, the only measure of failure or success would be the relative attrition. For operational art to be useful, there is a need for a broad vision, anticipation ability, and multinational and joint cooperation. Operational art can be implemented by Joint Force Commanders (JFC), senior staff officers or subordinate commanders.
The interest of joint operational art does not lie in the use of military forces only. Rather, attention is also given to the arrangement of military efforts in space, time and purpose (Vego, 2017). In particular, joint operational art focuses on the fundamental issues and methods that are related to the synchronization of the space, air, sea, land as well as special operations forces. Operational art requires the commanders to put various factors into consideration. Key among these include the conditions necessary in achieving the strategic goals, the most preferred sequence of actions, the most appropriate and effective use of resources, and the risk of the cost of the joint force. Ultimately, success is dependent on the effective integration of these factors.
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What are the key elements of operational design?
Numerous vital elements characterize operational design. These include anticipation, timing and tempo, synergy, leverage, simultaneity and depth, balance, and forces and functions. Others include operational reach and approach, centers of gravity, decisive points, arranging operations, culmination, indirect versus direct approach and termination ( Dickens , 21 ). Anticipation is essential in planning since it entails remaining alert and ready for the unexpected and opportunities of exploiting the situation. Timing and Tempo help the forces to dominate action, remain unpredictable and operate at a level that lowers the enemy's ability to react. This is with the aim of exploiting friendly capabilities while inhibiting the enemy. Synergy refers to the synchronization and integration of operations. Leverage, on the other hand, is useful in imposing a force's will on an enemy, maintaining the initiative and increasing an enemy's dilemma. Simultaneity and depth are used to attack an opponent's whole structure simultaneously. Balance entails a mix of the joint force’s capabilities and forces. Further, an enemy’s forces and functions are concurrently targeted by the operations of a joint force to create the greatest contact area possible between enemy and friendly forces.
Operational reach and approach are vital in determining the range in which a force operates and maintains effective operations. This is because basing is a critical foundation of a successful operational art (Vego, 2009). Centers of gravity (COG) refer to the capabilities, characteristics or locations that give a force physical strength, freedom of action and the will to fight. Decisive points are usually geographic in nature and help a force to gain an advantage over its enemy. They also determine the outcome of the action taken. Arranging operations entail combining sequential and simultaneous operations in a bid to quickly achieve the desired end state conditions at minimal cost. Culmination can be both defensive and offensive. In the offense, a culmination refers to the point at which an attacker’s combat power is low compared to that of a defender. In defence, culmination refers point when the defending force’s ability to defend successfully or go on the counteroffensive is greatly diminished. Direct or indirect approach highlights the manner in which an enemy’s COG are attacked. Termination denotes a force’s ability to know when to stop military operations as well as conserve the advantages that have been achieved.
What is operational approach?
An operational approach refers to a commander’s description of some of the broad actions that his or her force has to undertake before achieving the desired military end state (U.S Navy, 2011). An operational approach is anchored on an understanding of a force’s operational environment as well as the problem facing the JFC. On approval from the JFC, the operational approach offers the basis for starting, continuing as well as completing planning in detail. In order to develop an operational approach, three aspects are used collectively. These include understanding the strategic direction, understanding the operational direction, and lastly, defining the problem.
To understand the strategic direction, promulgation of the strategic guidance has to be done by the president with the support of other relevant officers. Generally, this guidance offers the long-term and ancillary and intermediate objectives. It also defines what success or victory would look like, and allocates resource and forces to help achieve the strategic objectives (Corn et al., 2012). The commander, on the other hand, connects tactical actions and resources to the strategic ends. The operational environment entails the circumstances, conditions and influences that determine the employment of capabilities and is dependent on the commander's decision. It covers physical areas and factors related to land, air, sea and maritime domains as well as the information environment. Understanding the operational environment helps in identifying the problem, anticipating potential outcomes, and understanding the results of various actions and how these actions contribute to meeting the military end state. Lastly, defining the problem is critical in resolving it. In this regard, there is a need to understand and isolate the causes of the problem in consideration
What are centers of gravity & how can they determined?
At the center of operation art is the ability to mass effects against an enemy’s sources of power so as to neutralize or destroy them. Therefore, the COGs refer to the capabilities, characteristics or locations that give a military force its physical strength, freedom of action, and the will to fight. From a strategic perspective, COGs may include an alliance, set of functions or critical capabilities, public support or national will, or the existing national strategy. The concept of COGs is useful as an analytical tool in different situations. Notably, they are helpful in designing operations and campaigns to help commanders and other personnel to analyze enemy and friendly sources of strength and weaknesses. The analysis of both friendly and enemy COGs is a continuous process that is undertaken throughout the operation ( Hemming , 2013 ).
A force's most direct path to victory involves neutralization or destruction of the enemy's COGs. Nevertheless, COGs are likely to change while an operation is in progress. Likewise, COGs may not be readily discernible or apparent at any given time. Therefore, identifying the enemy COGs is a challenge that requires a detailed understanding and knowledge of how an opponent makes decisions, fights and organizes. It also entails understanding an enemy’s psychological and physical weaknesses and strengths. Commanders and their subordinates are required to be alert to the situations that may fuel changes in COGs. Subsequently, they are required to make the necessary changes to their operations. The enemy's COGs are often highly protected rendering direct attack costly and difficult. In this case, indirect attacks may be preferred until particular conditions are met hence facilitating direct attacks. Identification of positive COGs is vital for their protection. The COGs can be economic, geographic or psychosocial. Their determination entails the detailed assessment of such aspects as the force's composition, force's primary controlling agent, the type of government and the level of civilization among other factors ( Giles & Galvin , 1996 ).
What are critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities, and how do these concepts relate to center of gravity?
Critical capabilities refer to the primary abilities that merit a COG to be identified as such particularly in light of a particular situation scenario or mission. On the other hand, critical requirements are the resources, conditions and means that make a critical capability operative ( Doyle , 2008 ). Critical vulnerabilities refer to components or requirements thereof that are deficient or vulnerable to interdiction, neutralization or attack in a manner that achieves decisive results. In this case, the smaller the resources and effort applied, and the lower the cost and risk, the better. An enemy's COG bears the physical and moral ability to prevent a friendly mission from being successful. Therefore, the critical capabilities or abilities that are ascribed to a particular COG respond to the question of the existing concerns regarding a given entity. The answer to this query is contextual and is based on the context of a given mission or situation.
A force is required to respond to the question of precisely what a given enemy force, whether physical or moral is likely to do to prevent the success of any mission targeted at a specific situation or context. In this case, the attacking force has to focus on the most threatening capabilities. Subsequently, the force should pay more attention to the most prominent capabilities. These capacities, if given a chance to be partially or fully functional may be problematic to the friendly COGs (Strange, 1996). Thus, the critical requirements may include sufficient advance warning, enough ammunition, and observable fields of fire among others.
What are lines of operations and how do they differ from lines of effort?
Operational lines refer to a force’s directional orientation in space and time in relation to its enemy and can be used to conceptualize the operational approach (Diaz, 2003). An operational approach connects a force with its objectives as well as its base of operations. A force is likely to operate on interior lines following the divergence of its operations from a central point. The same happens when the force is closer to separate enemy forces than these enemy forces are to one another. This approach benefits the weaker force since the force is able to rapidly shift the main force laterally compared to its enemy. On the other hand, a force is expected to operate on exterior lines only when its operations converge on the enemy. For this to happen, a stronger or mobile force is needed. This approach also presents a force with the opportunity to annihilate or encircle a less mobile or weak opponent.
The JFCs employ lines of operation in a bid to focus the combat efforts towards achieving the desired objective. Likewise, they use combat power in the three dimensions of space as well as over time. They do this a logical design that is characterized by the integration of the joint force capabilities so as to converge on and subsequently conquer the enemy’s COGs Conversely, lines of effort refer to the use of purpose to focus efforts towards the establishment of strategic and operational conditions via linkage of multiple missions and tasks. While the concept of lines of effort evolved from that of lines of operations, the two are distinct. This is because lines of effort are conceptual while the lines of operations are physical ( Edwan , 2009 ).
References
Corn, G. S., Hansen, V., Jackson, R., Jenks, C., Jensen, E. T., Schoettler, J. A., & Williamson, J. A. (2012). The law of armed conflict: an operational approach. International Review of the Red Cross , 94 (886), 855-858.
Diaz, M. A. (2003). Prosperity or Perdition: Do Lines of Operations Apply in Stability Operations? . Army Command And General Staff Coll Fort Leavenworth School o f Advanced Military Studies.
Dickens, R. R. (2010). Operational Design: The Art of Framing the Solution . Air Command a nd Staff College, Air University Maxwell Air Force Base United States.
Doyle, M. E. (2008). Knowing the Center of Gravity is Not Enough: Critical Factors Analysis in the Operational Environment . Naval War Coll Newport RI Joint Military Operations Dept.
Edwan, D. H. (2009). Symbolic Interpretation of the Lines of Effort through the Theory of Strategic Ambiguity . Army C ommand and G eneral S taff, F ort L eavenworth S chool of A dvanced M ilitary S tudies.
Giles, P. K., & Galvin, T. P. (1996). Center of Gravity: Determination, Analysis, and Application . Army War College Carlisle Barracks PA.
Hemming, L. W. (2013). Center of Gravity Analysis: The Marine Corps Planning Process Needs to Catch Up . Marine Corps Command a nd Staff Coll Quantico VA.
Joint Force Development (2017). Joint Publication 5-0 : Joint Planning. Retrieved from
www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0_20171606.pdf
Strange, J. (1996). Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language . Marine Corps War Coll Quantico VA.
U.S Navy (2011). Joint Publication 5-0 : Joint Operation Planning . Retrieved from https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp5_0%2811%29.pdf
Vego, M. (2017). On Operational Art.
Vego, M. N. (2009). A Case Against Systematic Operational Design . National Defense Univ Washington DC Inst For National Strategic Studies.
