Various measures have been taken since the 9/11 bombing in the United States to eradicate loopholes within the security sector. In essence, dealing with international and local security threats required the creation of legislation and organizations that would help manage security in buildings, government offices, and the transport industry, and even in public areas such as churches, mosques, and recreational facilities. The government has to partner with the private sector to ensure that threats to national security are neutralized in time.
What are four published official resources (strategies, International Codes, etc.) available to the port FSO in assessing domestic and international risks associated with terrorism and other criminal activity threats posed to port maritime operations?
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The Port Facility Security Officer has the responsibility to plan and manage the security in the port. Additionally, the FSO is in charge of other functions such as the maintenance of the seaports and oversees the implementation of security measures to avoid international and local security threats. The focus on the ports is due to their vulnerability as they are the entry points of ships entering the country from foreign waters.
Various resources are utilized by the by the port FSO. For instance, the Security and Accountability for Every Port (SAFE Port Act) of 2006 is a crucial published resource. The act focuses on improving security in facilities such as the port and shipping lanes through the creation and deployment of nuclear and radiological detection schedules by the secretary of Homeland Security ( Finley & Harkiolakis, 2018 ). This program is essential as it ensures the risk-based funding for ports security coordination between critical stakeholders such as the private sector, federal, state, and protection of employees against radiation.
Essentially, one of the strengths of the SAFE act of 2006 is that security assessments that are enabled by this act such as the detection of radiation and nuclear eliminate threats before they reach the country. For instance, the incorporation of organizations such as Homeland Security is crucial as it ensures a specialized approach to detecting threats that could cause national disasters ( Koliousis, 2020 ). The provision of risk-based funds is an important strength as it helps ensure more ability to tackle criminal activities.
One of the weaknesses is that the act does not provide enough solutions to counter the current technological advancement in the maritime infrastructure. There is a need to develop more ability to deal with communication development especially since logistics systems rely on advanced technologies to monitor ship entries.
Maritime Transportation Security Act
MTSA provides the processes that are needed to ensure that waterways and ports are protected. The Act outlines that vulnerability assessment is compulsory in enabling the development of protocols for monitoring luggage and passengers. A vital strength is that through the emphasis on assessments of the ports, the act raises the bar for measures to ensure security and elimination of vulnerability in the ports. It also creates preparedness and enhances prevention strategies.
However, one of the weaknesses of the MTSA is that despite the emphasis on the vulnerability assessment of facilities, it does not take into consideration the safety of the employees ( Weaver et al., 2019 ). It is important to develop strategies for compensation and protection of workers. Workers could be compromised especially when paid salar0ies that do not match their commitment.
The International Ship and Port Facility Security
The ISPS code was implemented after the 9/11 attack to ensure more security in the ports. Essentially, the code is efficient in describing the responsibilities of stakeholders such as the federal, state governments, and companies concerning security which helps the FSO to know how to engage the stakeholders ( Alcaide & Llave, 2020 ). The strength of this code is that it provides a clear step to step guideline on how the FSO can apply various preventive measures to threats facing international ships.
However, it is important to note that the suspension of handling unaccompanied luggage is not effective as a preventive measure. The suspension in most cases has resulted in containers reaching the facility but remains unhandled for some time within the range of the port which is still a threat as explosions could occur. There is a need to coordinate with other international ports to ensure that no luggage moves without accompaniment or the clearance of those ports.
Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism
C-TPAT is a partnership between k stakeholders who include the government agencies and the private sector. In essence, the partnership has more than 11000 certified partners who import goods through the ports ( Koliousis, 2020 ). An important strength of this resource is the involvement of the private sector in ensuring the protection of their businesses. As a result of importers being in contact with traders from foreign countries, they provide information that is essential in enhancing security to counter threats such as terrorism and entry of unauthorized items.
However, the involvement of the private sector partners creates loopholes. For instance, members who are importers are given benefits before they undergo the validation process. This fact means that the importers may be subjected to less serious scrutiny in exchange for security plans as members. There is a need for the creation of more stringent policies to ensure members' luggage are strictly subjected to inspection procedure before being allowed in to avoid entry of items that could be a threat to national security. As a result of the validation process is an agreed up process of the members, it is not as vigorous as should be. Particularly, the partners are allowed to create the measures for validation as a way to create goodwill. However, there is a need to ensure that the measures and procedures of validation are developed by a special committee that includes security agencies and ports management officials.
What is the role of MTSA 2002 required Area Maritime Security Committee or AMSC? Why is this organization critical to the secure operation of a port? Be specific. Are there areas within the security regime that committee members can work more closely with?
Significantly, the Maritime Transportation Security Act was signed in 2002 as a way to control cases of terrorism in the transport sector and particularly in ports. The AMSCs were an establishment of this Act ( Crowell, 2018 ). One of the crucial roles of these committees is to provide a connection between planning, development, review, and updating of area maritime security.
Importantly, the committees have the responsibility to improve communication among stakeholders who include the local, state, and federal bodies, concerning the management of security in the seaports. The committees are therefore crucial due to their ability to involve both the public and private sectors in partnerships. It is a critical role in ensuring security as working together with individuals from sectors such as the police force, industries, and academia is an important way to gather information and develop strategies. For instance, the involvement of researchers is important in understanding various factors that affect the security of the ports hence helping to anticipate events and thus enhance preparedness. Improvement of communication is essential as it has helped to improve working relations among workers of the ports. Additionally, evaluation of information which is a result of improved communication determines how effective the ports are in service delivery and ensuring security of workers and passengers.
Additionally, the AMSCs help in the determination of the impending threats and their potential impact. This role includes ascertaining whether the threats are manmade or natural. Natural threats may include tornadoes or eruption of natural gases close to the ports while the man made ones may include terrorist attacks. This process is crucial as it is helpful in the development of security strategies to mitigate the threats.
AMSCs conduct assessments on various ports to evaluate levels of risks. This assessment is done through projects of the committees such as the Ports Security Grant Program (PSGP). This measure enables the ports to bridge the existing security gaps. For instance, during assessments, the committees may notice that a particular port is using outdated detection systems which is a gap that may allow incidences that may cause harm to passengers and employees such as entry of explosives. Another issue that the assessment by the committee may discover faulty loading systems that may have issues as a result of lack of maintenance or as a result of intentional sabotage with an aim to cause harm. Another project that is undertaken by the AMSCs is the fitting of Blue Force Tracking kits on ships ( Crowell, 2018 ). The kits give the location of ships through video monitors and allow the authorities to help ships move to strategic positions while at sea. Through such kits, it becomes possible to ensure the security of ships even before they get to the port.
There are various areas in which members of the AMSCs can work more closely. For example, the members should work more closely to ensure cybersecurity. With the advancement in technology, cybercrime presents a more complicated issue that ports need to deal with. AMSCs involvement can be significant in understanding the use of various resources to deal with potential cyber-related issues such as the hacking of port management systems ( Koliousis, 2020 ). Working more closely in this area will ensure the creation of cybersecurity strategies. Additionally, the committees and subcommittees may facilitate a training that will give more skills in managing cybersecurity risks such as unauthenticated access to crucial information concerning ports.
The committee may also work more closely in communication. The members need to work on improving the protection of sensitive information. Significantly, using systems for communication such as the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) ( Tam & Jones, 2019 ). The maritime committees can work more closely to determine the criteria for labeling information as sensitive, especially unclassified information. This information includes reports of potential threats to security which may create anxiety to the members of the public if it is leaked. The development and use of such information systems will help mitigate security risks amicably without causing other problems related to the risks. For instance, the leaking of sensitive information such as the presence of explosives in the facility may cause issues such as distress and stampede which are also security threats.
Additionally, the improvement of infrastructure in line with security guidelines is an important area to work in more closely. Essentially, the committee by scaling up assessment of facilities will create an inclination to better infrastructure and up-to-date systems including search booths.
Define and give examples of maritime Cyber terrorism. How does it threaten port security operations now and in the future?
Maritime cyber terrorism involves cyber-attacks whose aim is to negatively affect ports and operations in the port. In essence, cyber terrorism involves the use of advanced technology to cause destruction and harm that threatens life to advance an ideology ( Chung et al., 2020 ). On the other hand maritime cyber is a measure of levels to which assets such as ships could be threatened by compromised systems leading to security failure.
There are various examples of maritime cyber terrorism all of which are likely to affect maritime operations significantly. Malware is one of the commonly used types of cyber-attacks. This application is used to perform malicious functions such as gaining access to networks ( Voyer et al., 2018 ). Currently, ports rely on the use of networks to perform operations such as transactions and sending commands to vessels. Malware can therefore hinder the transmission of information if it gains persistent access to the port networks. Additionally, hackers may use malware to acquire sensitive data such as credentials.
Phishing is also a common example of cyber-attack which involves using fraudulent means to obtain valuable information. For instance, cyber terrorists may send mails to the workers operating port systems asking for information that may indirectly give those leads to valuable details as passwords. In essence, attackers use the users to gain access to systems. In the case of ports, Business Email Compromise (BEC) may be used to target individuals such as managers and the Port FSO. This hacking involves targeting officers with authority to authorize operations and transactions and then using their information to blackmail these officials into sending crucial data.
Another example is the Man In The Middle Attack (MITM). The attacker may communicate between two individuals and uses the information with malicious intent. However, this type of attack is manageable as most online channels of communication are end to end encrypted to ensure privacy. Interception may provide information that is sensitive to the unauthorized person.
Further Distributed Denial Of Service Attack (DDoS) is an attack that involves bombarding the server with traffic. The attacker uses compromised devices within the range of the server to flood the server. This attempt is meant to slow down the server hence slowing down systems and thus affecting operations.
Attackers may also detect vulnerability in applications that the ports use especially new applications. This knowledge may prompt the hackers to target these facilities. This kind of attack is called the Zero-Day Exploit. DNS tunneling on the other hand provides persistent access to victims of hacking.
Ports are susceptible to cyber terrorism due to the reliance of these facilities on technology. Additionally, due to the facilities' attachment to governments, they are likely to be targeted for terrorists who may want to advance political and ideological agenda ( Lagouvardou, 2018 ). Additionally, as a result of the large populations that ports attract, they are likely to provide the environment that cyber terrorists may want to execute mass destruction and killings.
Significantly, cyber terrorism threatens the development of ports. While ports may be looking forward to establishing for terminals for container and human transportat0ion, cyber-attacks are slowing down this development. This reality is caused by the loss of funds through hacking. This occurrence threatens the security operations of ports by an inability by management to put up advanced technology infrastructure in the terminals to evaluate and eliminate threats ( Pyykköa et al., 2020 ). Hence, most terminals have substandard and outdated security systems leading to persistent attacks. Additionally, the cyber-attacks are intending to cause destruction which has cost the management a lot of funds in trying to maintain and replace systems. Since the maintenance of servers and systems takes time that had not been planned for, terrorists in the future may gain the opportunity to launch attacks by sneaking explosives into terminals when the security systems cannot detect them.
In essence, cyber-attacks in the future may be used to deliver harmful substances and gases into terminals and ships without the attackers releasing them manually. For instance, gas and oil systems that are computerized may be compromised leading to explosions or suffocation of people in ships or terminals. Such attacks may be detrimental as it will be difficult to detect the potential threat in time or to track the perpetrators without advanced technology assets. There is a need to ensure that maritime authorities advance technology in the ports to match the fast changing technology used by cyber terrorists.
Conclusion
Significantly, there is a necessity for the government agencies to partner with companies from the private sector to make sure there is the elimination of security risks. One of the important resources used by the Facility Security Officers is ISPS. Cyber terrorism has become widespread with the advancement of technology. Essentially, cyber-attacks may be in form of the use of malware or trickery to obtain unauthorized information. These attacks may affect the security operations of the ports by making terror activities undetectable especially by launching attacks on surveillance cameras and searching devices.
References
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